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SUMMARY
This dissertation consists of three essays on the intersection of financial intermediation and house-
hold finance. In the first essay, using proprietary account-level data from a major credit bureau,
I examine the impact of stress tests on bank risk-taking in the U.S. consumer credit card market.
I decompose credit supply and demand effects by exploiting credit card–level data on limits and
balances matched to both consumers and banks. For the same consumer, I examine the lending
response of banks experiencing higher stress test–induced capital requirements (i.e., high-exposure
banks) relative to less-exposed banks. I find that the earlier rounds of stress tests induced high-
exposure banks to sharply reduce credit limits, especially for ex-ante risky borrowers. In contrast,
in later rounds of stress tests, high-exposure banks increased limits for risky consumers. Consistent
with higher bank risk-taking in later rounds, cards issued by highly exposed banks have a higher
ex-post likelihood of default. Additionally, I document that more affected non-prime borrowers are
more likely to default subsequently, and that this effect is markedly pronounced for the low-income
and less-educated consumer segments. My findings suggest that stress test–induced increases in
capital requirements can encourage higher bank risk-taking, with distributional consequences for
consumer creditworthiness.
In the second essay, using comprehensive credit bureau data, we study how obtaining market-
place lending (MPL) credit impacts consumers’ future borrowing capacities and outcomes. We find
that MPL borrowers’ credit scores improve temporarily after loan origination relative to observably
similar bank borrowers and borrowers with unmet credit demand, but MPL borrowers default at
higher rates subsequently. We show that the initial improvement in capacities is somewhat mechan-
xiv
ical, while the subsequent deterioration in outcomes indicates MPLs’ screening is weaker relative
to banks. MPL screening relative to banks is especially weaker when banks have relationship-based
information and when MPL platforms provide less information to MPL investors.
In the third essay, using comprehensive credit card–borrower–bank matched data of approxi-
mately 500 million credit cards in the U.S., we analyze how a sharp unexpected decline in banks’
short-term wholesale funding in 2008 affected their consumers. We decompose credit supply and de-
mand effects using the sudden dry-up of short-term wholesale funding (which accounted for 17.8%
of bank funding pre-2008) and account-level data on credit card limits and balances. For the same
consumer, credit card issuers experiencing a 10% greater decline in wholesale funding reduced
credit limits by 0.9% more relative to other issuers. Consumers’ aggregate card balances decreased
by 0.32% for a 1% reduction in aggregate limits induced by the wholesale funding liquidity shock.
We document significant heterogeneity in the pass-through of the bank liquidity shocks with banks
cutting credit limits by more for credit-constrained consumers (e.g., lower credit-score and higher
credit utilization consumers). These consumers respond by cutting their consumption as they are
less able to borrow from alternate sources. Moreover, this consumption decline is long-lasting for
these credit-constrained consumers. Our results highlight that when banks face liquidity shocks,
they are more likely to pass on these shocks to consumers who are least able to hedge against them.
Consequently, our results show who bears the real costs of fragile bank funding structures.
xv
CHAPTER 1
REDUCING RISK OR REACHING FOR YIELD? IMPACT OF STRESS TESTS ON
CREDIT CARD LENDING
1.1 Introduction
In the post-crisis period, stress tests have emerged as the primary tool of macroprudential policy
in the enhanced supervision of systematically important institutions. Stress tests are inherently
forward-looking capital requirements implemented by the Federal Reserve. They gauge the re-
siliency of large bank holding companies (BHCs) to withstand hypothetical adverse economic sce-
narios through adequate capitalization and continue their lending activities. The stated intention
behind stress tests is to promote financial stability, increase transparency in the banking sector, and
improve market discipline ([1, 2, 3]). In this paper, I document that stress test–induced increases in
capital requirements may have had the unintended effect of increasing bank risk-taking in the U.S.
consumer credit card market.
Prior theoretical and empirical literature provides mixed inferences regarding the impact of
higher capital requirements on the incentives of regulated banks to engage in risky lending. By
requiring banks to have more “skin in the game” through higher capital against their risks, stress
tests may reduce banks’ incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking ([4, 5]). Higher capital is
also associated with increased charter values, which lowers the likelihood of future failure, and thus
leads to reductions in risky lending ([6]). On the other hand, higher capital could result in increases
in risky lending due to strengthened monitoring incentives ([7]), incentives to trade off reduced
leverage risk against higher credit risk ([8, 9, 10]), or incentives to search for yield ([11]).
Using proprietary credit card account–level data from a major credit bureau, I find that, over
time, stress test–induced increases in capital requirements have progressively encouraged increased
1
bank risk-taking. Using a within-consumer empirical design, I show that the earlier rounds of stress
tests induced highly exposed banks to sharply reduce limits for ex-ante risky consumers. However,
in later rounds, more exposed banks have increased limits for the risky consumer segment. I find
evidence suggesting that this transition from risk-reduction to risk-seeking behavior is consistent
with banks adapting to stress tests over time. Consistent with higher bank risk-taking in later cy-
cles, I show that cards issued by highly exposed banks have a higher ex-post likelihood of default.
Importantly, I document that non-prime borrowers who have a larger percentage of their total credit
card limits issued by banks with larger implied capital requirements default at higher rates compared
to less-exposed borrowers. As a result, more affected non-prime consumers are also more likely to
experience credit score declines when compared to non-prime consumers with no exposure to stress-
tested banks. Lastly, my findings suggest that such effects are more pronounced for consumers with
lower incomes, lower education levels, and jobs that do not require sophisticated skill sets.
For several reasons, the U.S. consumer credit card market is an ideal experimental setting to
study how changes in capital requirements affect bank risk-taking behavior, and examine any re-
sulting implications for households. Given the unsecured nature of credit card lending, card-issuing
banks bear significant exposure to borrowers’ credit risk, since unsecured claims are generally com-
pletely wiped out in the event of consumer bankruptcy. Reflecting their intrinsically risky nature,
credit cards also have the highest charge-off rates of any products offered by banks ([12]).1 More-
over, credit card lending is almost completely standards-based, with a heavy emphasis on consumer
credit scores ([13]). As a result, I can more cleanly identify bank risk-taking behavior in a setting
with a limited role for soft information. Furthermore, in terms of bank commitments, the market
is also economically significant, with approximately $4.3 trillion in aggregate extended credit card
lines.2
1Moreover, credit card charge-off rates have increased significantly in recent years. Credit card charge-





The credit card market is also important from the perspective of consumers. With nearly 170
million U.S. consumers owning at least one credit card, this market is the largest U.S. consumer
lending market in terms of the number of users. Moreover, credit cards are an important source of
marginal financing for most U.S. households.3 Lastly, there is wide heterogeneity in consumers’
marginal propensity to borrow on credit cards across different consumer segments (see [14, 15]).
As a result, adjustments in bank risk-taking behavior in response to changing capital requirements
can have a significant impact on consumers. Moreover, the consequences of bank risk-taking can be
distributed unequally across different consumer demographics.
The primary identification challenge is to isolate changes in credit supply from changes in credit
demand when studying credit card lending. It is possible that the economic forces that affect a
bank’s exposure to a particular stress test cycle can also affect consumer demand. However, I use
account-level data on credit card limits, which more cleanly reflect a bank’s credit supply function.
As a result, I am able to tease out the marginal propensity to lend (MPL) of banks in response to
stress tests, where I measure this MPL through changes in account-level limits. This approach,
thus, requires me to estimate the extent to which banks are affected by stress tests conducted by the
Federal Reserve.
I approximate banks’ vulnerability to stress tests by constructing the measure of stress test expo-
sure described in [16]. This measure captures cross-sectional variation in the extent to which banks
are impacted by the stress test in any given testing cycle.4 This stress test exposure measure equals
the difference between the BHC’s current capital ratio at the outset of any stress test cycle and the
lowest capital ratio implied under a hypothetical, forward-looking severely adverse economic sce-
card-market-report_2019.pdf
3In a recent report on the economic well-being of consumers, researchers at the Federal Reserve noted
that 40% of U.S. households cannot cover an unexpected emergency expense of $400. Moreover, 43% of
these fragile consumers stated they would use credit cards to cover such unexpected expenses, and pay them
off over time. Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-
economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf.
4Note that I restrict my analysis to banks that undergo stress tests implemented by the Federal Reserve. This approach
helps circumvent potentially problematic comparisons between stress-tested and non-tested banks, which differ on many
dimensions other than size.
3
nario specified by the Fed. It is thus intended to capture the potential decline in bank capital under
stressed economic conditions. Banks facing higher declines are more likely to experience regulatory
interference. The key underlying identification assumption is that stress-tested banks are not able to
perfectly predict their performance in the hypothetical scenarios modeled by the Fed.5
In each testing cycle, I focus on individuals who have credit cards from multiple stress-tested
banks to implement a fixed-effects methodology similar to that of [17]. This fixed-effects method-
ology compares how the credit limits on credit cards issued to the same individual in a given cycle
change as a function of the issuing bank’s exposure to the stress test conducted in that particular
cycle. Effectively, I compare credit limit changes within-consumer and within–stress test cycle.
Thus, I control for any time-varying individual-specific demand factors within a stress test cycle
(e.g., changes in credit score or income) that can affect a bank’s credit extension to an individual.
Moreover, this within-consumer empirical design helps capture the impact of the relative increases
in stress test–induced capital requirements of multiple banks lending to the same consumer.
As part of my analysis, I first group consumers into 20-point credit score bins based on their
credit scores at the outset of each testing cycle. Next, I examine the credit card lending response of
high-exposure banks to consumers in different score bins separately for each cycle.6 This helps iden-
tify whether the lending response of high-exposure banks to consumers of varying creditworthiness
changes over time. My results reveal an interesting pattern. Consistent with the risk-reduction chan-
nel of higher capital requirements, I find that earlier rounds of stress tests induced high-exposure
banks to reduce limits extended to risky consumers. Indeed, for the 2009 and 2012 rounds of stress
tests (where bank performance was publicly disclosed), I find that borrowers with low creditworthi-
ness experienced larger reductions in credit card limits. However, for more recent rounds of stress
5Note that this assumption is likely to be met since stress-tested banks are not privy to the internal models imple-
mented by the Fed to simulate bank performance in stressed economic scenarios. Thus, stress test outcomes always
contain a significant non-predictable component for stress-tested banks. More details about stress tests and the construc-
tion of the stress test exposure measure can be found in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3.2, respectively.
6Throughout the paper, I label high-exposure banks as those that have a higher stress test exposure than low-exposure
banks.
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tests, my results are more consistent with the reaching-for-yield incentives generated by higher cap-
ital requirements. For these later stress tests, I find that high-exposure banks continue to reduce
limits for prime consumers, but they increase limits for the risky, non-prime segment.
I attempt to uncover the mechanism that mediates the transition of stress-tested banks from risk-
reduction to risk-seeking behavior in response to higher implied capital requirements. I do so by first
restricting my analysis to only the credit card issuers that have undergone all the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test exercises conducted from 2012 to 2016. This step
mitigates concerns that my results are driven by the addition of new banks to the stress-testing regime
in more recent cycles. In addition, I apply the bank-level stress test exposure measure as computed
in the 2012 CCAR exercise to all subsequent cycles. This ensures that my findings are not driven by
changes in the relative sorting of distinct banks’ exposures to stress tests across different cycles. I
find that my pattern of findings is largely unaffected by these modifications. Moreover, the transition
appears to be gradual, with increasing magnitudes of risky lending over time. Overall, these findings
suggest that banks adapt to stress test–induced changes in capital requirements with each passing
cycle.
I also test whether my results hold in a pooled setting by concatenating the five CCAR stress tests
conducted from 2012 to 2016. Next, I progressively saturate the specification with the equivalent
of bank×year-month×stress-test-cycle and consumer×year-month×stress-test-cycle fixed effects to
absorb all time-varying, observed and unobserved, bank and consumer heterogeneity in a particular
stress test cycle. This implies that I analyze the supply of credit card limits from banks with varying
stress test exposure to the same consumer in the same stress test cycle. I find that a bank with a one
standard deviation larger stress test exposure reduced its credit supply by approximately $418, based
on the pooled-sample average. However, this reduction in credit supply is borne almost entirely by
the prime (i.e., non-risky) consumer segment. I find that this “within-individual-stress test cycle”
result is robust to a battery of robustness tests. I show that my results are not likely to be driven by
bank-specific individual demand or by any particular bank. Moreover, I show that these results are
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robust to alternative definitions of stress test exposures and alternative measures of consumer con-
straints. Thus, my results suggest that stress tests induce high-exposure banks to tilt the composition
of their credit supply toward risky, non-prime consumers.
Issuing higher limits on credit cards supplied to non-prime consumers will not necessarily indi-
cate greater risk-taking if extended limits remain unused. However, I find that, on average, a $1 stress
test exposure–induced change in card-level limits is associated with a significant 79.3 cent change
in card-level balances for non-prime consumers. In contrast, prime consumers increase balances by
only 16.8 cents for a one-dollar increase in card-level limits induced by stress tests.7 I also examine
the respective balance response on cards issued by high-exposure banks across consumers grouped
in 20-point credit score bins in each stress test cycle. Consistent with my analysis of account-level
limits, I find that non-prime consumers reduced balances on cards issued by high-exposure banks in
the earlier rounds of stress tests. However, in later cycles, non-prime consumers increased balances
on high-exposure credit cards.
Consistent with higher risk-taking, I find that not only do high-exposure banks extend higher
limits to ex-ante risky consumers, but that the cards issued by high-exposure banks also face a
higher likelihood of default in the future. Using the fixed effects within-individual estimator, I find
that non-prime consumers are approximately 6–8% more likely to default on high-exposure cards
relative to cards issued by low-exposure banks to the same individual. This analysis is conducted
at the credit card account level with a within-consumer empirical design; therefore, any changes in
individual-level characteristics (e.g., job loss, income declines, or medical problems) are unlikely to
explain non-prime consumers’ relatively higher probability of defaulting on cards issued by high-
exposure banks.
Given the near-complete hard information–driven nature of credit card lending, banks may op-
7Note that this is consistent with the general finding that non-prime consumers are significantly more likely to




timally respond to the stress test–induced increase in capital requirements by searching for yield in
the non-prime consumer segment. However, if additional credit is extended to consumers whose
sophistication levels are not wholly explained by credit scores, then it is possible that the associated
ex-post credit card delinquencies are unequally distributed across different consumer demograph-
ics. Thus, I proxy for consumer sophistication through income, education, and occupation. I find
that consumers who have lower income, lack a college education, or have jobs that do not require
sophisticated skills are most likely to default on cards issued by high-exposure banks. Importantly,
this finding continues to hold even within the non-prime consumer segment, which indicates that
income, education, and occupation are not perfectly correlated with credit scores.
Next, I document some possible adverse consequences of higher consumer reliance on credit
cards issued by high-exposure banks on borrower creditworthiness. Using the sample of all credit
cards issued to borrowers in my sample, I construct a consumer-level weighted exposure measure
on the basis of card-level limits weighted by the issuing banks’ exposure to stress tests. Consumers
who have a more significant percentage of their total limits issued by banks that are more adversely
impacted by stress tests thus have a larger weighted exposure. I find that such high-exposure con-
sumers are more likely to default ex post on credit cards, and that this effect is significantly larger
in the non-prime segment. Moreover, I also show that non-prime consumers with the median level
of weighted exposure are approximately 5–6% less likely to cross the industry-standard credit score
threshold of 680 and turn prime compared to non-prime consumers with no exposure to stress-tested
banks. These credit score thresholds have been shown to matter for bank lending decisions ([18]).
More generally, changes in credit scores are also known to mediate a large number of dynamic
responses in credit markets (see [19, 14, 20, 21]). Lastly, I show that these adverse effects on cred-
itworthiness are magnified for consumers with lower income, less education, and unsophisticated
jobs.
My paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, this paper connects to research that
analyzes the effects of stress testing on credit supply, which has yielded mixed evidence. While
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[22] find that the annual CCAR stress test exercises do not affect bank loan growth in general,
other papers such as [23] and [16] show that stress tests have resulted in reduced small business
lending, with possibly negative consequences for entrepreneurship and innovation ([24]). In the
syndicated loan market, existing research finds that banks appear to lend more prudently following
the initiation of stress tests by cutting credit supply to non–investment grade firms (see [5, 25,
26]). Using European data, [27] similarly document that banks responded to the 2011 EBA capital
exercise by reducing risky lending. In addition, [28] offer evidence that stress-tested banks cut back
on jumbo mortgage lending. I add to this strand of research on two dimensions. First, I document
the impact of stress tests on consumer credit card lending. More importantly, I document that banks’
response to stress tests varies with time, and identify the effect of stress test–induced increases in
capital requirements on the compositional supply of bank credit.
My paper adds to the relatively scarce empirical literature on capital regulation and bank risk-
taking. [29] document that the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer in Switzerland induced
increased bank risk-taking. Using Spanish data, [30] find that higher provision requirements induced
banks with more substantial exposures to focus their credit supply to firms with higher ex-ante
interest paid and leverage, and with higher likelihoods of ex-post default, which is consistent with
higher risk-taking. Finally, using U.K. data, [31] analyze the impact of capital requirements on
mortgage loan size and risk-shifting behavior. They find that riskier borrowers are not affected by
the reduction in the loan size offered by affected banks. I contribute to this literature by documenting
that banks can respond to increased capital requirements by both reducing or increasing risk-taking,
and that this effect is not consistent over time. Moreover, I examine the impact of such risk-taking
behavior on borrower outcomes.
Broadly, my paper also relates to research investigating the impact of regulation on the incen-
tives of bank managers. An extensive literature in accounting focuses on how regulatory capital
influences managers’ discretion in loan loss provisions and charge-offs (see [32, 33, 34, 35, 36]).
In the context of U.S. stress tests, [37] find evidence suggesting that stress-tested banks manage
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financial performance and invest in political spending in order to improve their chances of passing
stress tests, thus reducing the efficacy of stress tests over time.
1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 General overview of stress tests in the United States
The financial crisis of 2008 led to significant regulatory changes that increased the supervision and
oversight of large financial institutions in the U.S. One such oversight measure was the introduction
of stress tests for large and systematically important financial institutions. Conducted by the Federal
Reserve, stress tests are simulations designed to determine the ability of stressed banks to withstand
a (hypothetical) scenario of prolonged macroeconomic distress.
The very first federally-administered stress testing effort was the Supervisory Capital Assess-
ment Program (SCAP) in 2009 for BHCs with consolidated assets greater than $100 billion. Since
2011, stress tests have become a regular annual exercise under the Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review (CCAR). For the 2011–2013 CCAR cycles, only BHCs that had consolidated assets
greater than $100 billion underwent stress tests conducted by the Fed. Starting in 2014, the Fed be-
gan stress testing BHCs that had assets greater than $50 billion.8 Moreover, starting in 2013, the Fed
began implementing two concurrent versions of stress tests: one based on the CCAR framework, and
the other based on compliance with the Dodd–Frank Act (DFAST). The main difference between
CCAR and DFAST is that under the CCAR framework, BHCs’ planned capital distributions are
incorporated into the stressed-scenario projections; while under the DFAST framework, BHCs’ fu-
ture planned distributions have no effect on stressed-scenario projections. From 2012–2015, reports
summarizing the results of the CCAR and DFAST exercises were released in March. The release
date was moved to June in 2016.
In the U.S., the federal regulator provides banks with three scenarios: baseline, adverse, and
8The decision to reduce the asset size threshold was made in 2012. However, BHCs with assets between $50 billion
and $100 billion were stress-tested by the Fed only after 2013.
9
severely adverse. Each of these scenarios simulates an increasingly hostile economic environment.
These scenarios focus on aggregate risks that affect the entire economy (e.g., rising unemployment
and falling house prices) rather than bank-specific idiosyncratic risks. The goal of these tests is to
ensure that (a) banks remain adequately capitalized during a severe economic crisis and (b) maintain
their capacity to provide credit. To this end, the Fed develops proprietary models that map the effect
of hypothetical economic scenarios on banks’ capital ratios over the duration of the forecast. The
inputs of these models include data on individual bank capitalization, investments, and exposure to
various loan markets. Thus, based on bank data at the outset of the test, the Fed uses its internally
developed models and economic scenarios to determine whether banks pass or fail the stress test in
any given year.9
1.2.2 Importance of stress test outcomes
The results of stress tests are of particular interest to regulators and bank managers, since poor
performance or failure can force poorly performing BHCs to alter their planned capital distributions.
The disclosure of stress test results are also of interest to investors, since the announcement date is
associated with abnormal stock returns for the BHCs being tested ([38, 39, 40]). [41] document
that stress test results convey both positive and negative news to investors, and price volatility and
volume both increase around disclosure dates. Importantly, stress tests also appear to influence bank
practices. According to both bank regulators and senior officers, banks have largely implemented
heightened risk management techniques after the financial crisis as a direct response to increased
regulation.10
9Note that the economic scenarios and underlying assumptions incorporated into the Fed’s models are applied to all
BHCs to a similar extent. Thus, the only difference comes from the asset and investment mix of the BHCs undergoing
stress tests conducted by the Fed.
10Source: MIT Golub Center for Finance and Policy and GrantThornton (2017) survey report.
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1.3 Identification challenges and empirical methodology
In order to examine the impact of stress tests on bank lending in the consumer credit card market, I
must estimate a regression of the following general form:
CreditCardLendingb,t = α + βStressTestExposureb,t−1 + εb,t (1.1)
where the subscripts b and t reference the bank and time, respectively.
However, estimating the above regression at the bank-level is problematic for at least two rea-
sons. First, a given bank’s credit card lending is the observed outcome of both supply and demand
factors. Thus, I must disentangle changes in bank-level credit supply from consumer demand effects.
Second, I must create a measure that quantifies the extent to which BHCs are exposed to the annual
CCAR/DFAST exercise conducted by the Federal Reserve. In this section, I explain my empirical
methodology to overcome such identification concerns.
1.3.1 Isolating changes in credit supply from changes in credit demand
The primary challenge pertains to disentangling demand and supply effects in the credit card market.
My data offers a comparative advantage in this regard; namely, I observe data on both credit card
limits and credit card balances. Credit card limits measure the amount that a lender is willing to lend
to a consumer (i.e., limits measure the supply-side of credit to a consumer). On the other hand, credit
card balances reflect a consumer’s credit demand. Note that credit limits can also reflect consumer
demand if the account holder requests an increase in limits. However, it is less likely that an account
holder would request a reduction in credit limits on an open credit card. In addition, while account
holders can request terminations of open credit cards, it is often unclear whether it is in their best
interest to do so.11
11From the consumer’s perspective, higher credit card limits are generally preferable even if these higher limits
come from unused credit cards, since higher limits provide greater financial slack. Moreover, for a given level of total
11
Although credit limits are a cleaner measure of credit supply, this empirical approach could still
be subject to potential endogeneity concerns if credit card issuers change credit limits in anticipation
of changes in credit demand. My identification strategy allows for mitigating such concerns. I rely
on the unpredictable nature of stress test results as a shock to banks. Ex-ante, banks are aware of
their inclusion in a particular CCAR/DFAST cycle as well as the broad economic scenarios being
modeled by the Federal Reserve. However, stress-tested BHCs are not privy to the proprietary
models the Fed uses to project bank performance under these scenarios. As a result, stress-tested
BHCs cannot perfectly predict their performance in the economic scenarios modeled by the Fed.
I use granular credit card account–level data to estimate the impact of stress test exposure on
the credit limits extended by banks to their credit card borrowers. For identification, I construct my
tests similar to [17] (see also [42, 43, 15]), where I estimate changes in account-level limits in the
presence of Individual fixed effects. For any single stress testing cycle, the empirical specification I
estimate is:
∆CreditLimiti,c,b = α + βStressTestExposureb + f(Xi,c,b) + ηi + εi,c,b, (1.2)
where i, c, and b index individuals, credit cards, and banks, respectively. ∆CreditLimiti,c,b is the
change in credit limits for individual i’s credit card c with bank b in the window around the public
release of results for the stress testing cycle under consideration.
I compute the change in credit limits for each credit card by first collapsing the time-series credit
card–level data by averaging across time to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately
in both the period before data collection (the pre-collection period) and the period after the results
are released (the post-release period). The pre-collection and post-release windows are symmetric;
each consists of two semiannual archives. Each archive is a snapshot of both the credit limit and
individual-level credit card balances, higher credit limits translate to lower utilization ratios. The combination of low
utilization, a greater number of accounts, and more creditors indicates higher consumer creditworthiness, and thus it
generally coincides with higher credit scores.
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the current balance on each credit card at a given time in my sample. The pre-collection window is
chosen such that it ends immediately before bank information is collected for a particular stress test
cycle. Similarly, the post-release window is chosen such that it starts after the public release of stress
test results. For example, for the 19 BHCs included in the 2012 CCAR, the Federal Reserve modeled
forward-looking scenarios using bank data as of 2011Q3. The results of these stress test analyses
were made public in March 2012. Thus, for the 2012 CCAR, the pre-collection (post-release) period
window includes the semiannual archives for January 2011 and July 2011 (July 2012 and January
2013).
The variable StressTestExposureb measures the exposure of a bank to a particular stress test
cycle. β measures the impact of a bank’s stress test exposure on the credit limits it extends to
its borrowers. ηi represents the vector of Individual fixed effects, which control for confounding
individual-specific demand factors (e.g., income changes) that could bias my results. The inclusion
of these fixed effects allows me to compare changes in limits across multiple cards issued to the
same consumer, where the banks issuing these cards differ in their exposure to the stress test under
consideration. Finally, f(Xi,c,b) is a vector of control variables at the bank level, the consumer–bank
level, and the account level, all of which are measured (and averaged) in the pre-collection period.
The bank-level control variables control differences in credit card issuers that could confound my
analysis, such as size, performance, and lending quality. I also account for bank-specific demand
factors by controlling for the age of the credit card, card-level utilization, and the total number of
credit-related accounts between the bank and the borrower.
An alternate approach to conducting the same analysis would be to use the time-series panel data
on credit card accounts, and include a vector of Individual × Archive fixed effects. However, this is
more challenging as it entails a large number of observations and fixed effects. Further, collapsing
the time series and estimating cross-sectional regressions mitigates the econometric issues related
to the underestimation of standard errors in panel data that have short time dimensions ([44, 45]).
Thus, my approach provides conservative standard errors.
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As described above, Equation (1.2) is useful in estimating how banks respond to a single stress
testing cycle. In particular, it allows me to study whether banks respond differently to stress tests
over time by implementing the specification separately for each testing cycle. However, in order
to estimate the average effect across all testing cycles, I estimate the following specification, which
pools together multiple stress testing cycles:
∆CreditLimiti,c,b,t = α + βStressTestExposureb,t + f(Xi,c,b,t) + ηi,t + εi,c,b,t, (1.3)
where i, c, b, and t index individuals, credit cards, banks, and the CCAR/DFAST exercise conducted
in year t, respectively. ηi,t represents a vector of Individual × Stress Test Cycle fixed effects, which
allows me to compare changes in limits across multiple cards issued to the same consumer in a
particular testing cycle. All other variables are defined as in Equation (1.2).
Importantly, this pooled specification allows me to address whether stress tests have an effect on
bank risk-taking in the credit card market. To identify how stress test exposure affects the composi-
tion of bank credit supply, I estimate the following regression specification:
∆CreditLimiti,c,b,t = α + βStressTestExposureb,t ×NonPrimei,t (1.4)
+ f(Xi,c,b,t) + ζb,t + ηi,t + εi,c,b,t
whereNonPrimei,t is a dummy variable that equals 1 for consumers with credit scores under 680 at
the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. ζb,t is a vector of bank-by-time fixed effects,
which helps capture general bank-level credit supply trends across time. As described earlier, ηi,t
captures individual-specific demand factors in a given stress test cycle. Including both ζb,t and ηi,t
in the same specification thus helps suppress concurrent supply and demand factors at the bank and
consumer level, respectively. The remaining variation is therefore pertinent to the bank–consumer
matching process, and it is helpful in identifying compositional changes in the supply of credit at
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the bank–consumer level.
One implicit assumption behind this within-individual implementation is that consumers have
a general demand for credit and are indifferent across issuers. In reality, bank-specific consumer
demand can still confound my analysis, especially if consumers are offered incentives to use certain
credit cards to make specific purchases. For instance, consumers may be rewarded in the form of
cash-back or points for using cards issued by certain issuers towards the purchase of specific goods
(e.g., gasoline). In such cases, changes in the demand for these goods could drive changes in credit
limits. I address this concern in Section 1.5.2 by constructing a “leave-out” mean credit limit for
each bank–consumer pair. This measure captures the average credit limits extended by the bank
across all credit cards after excluding the bank’s credit limit extended to that consumer.
1.3.2 Identifying exposure to stress tests
A secondary challenge is quantifying the extent to which bank holding companies (BHCs) are ex-
posed to the annual CCAR/DFAST exercise conducted by the Federal Reserve. I avoid potentially
problematic comparisons between stress-tested and non-tested banks by restricting my analysis to
the sample of stress-tested banks. For each bank undergoing the CCAR in a given cycle, I com-
pute the measure of stress test exposure described in [16] using annual stress test results publicly
disclosed by the Fed. These results disclose the resiliency of BHC capital to hypothetical, severely
adverse economic scenarios over the following nine quarters. Specifically, these reports contain
information on the minimum implied Tier 1 capital ratio, total risk-based capital ratio, and Tier 1
leverage ratio under stressed conditions.
BHCs with larger declines in modeled forward-looking capital ratios relative to their current
capital ratios are expected to experience larger declines in equity capital, and are thus more likely to
face interference from regulatory authorities. Regulatory interference can take the form of restric-
tions in planned capital distributions as well as increased pressure on poorly performing BHCs to
reduce risks in their portfolio of assets.
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For a given testing cycle, the stress test exposure measure is thus defined as:
∆CapRatioBHC = CapRatioBHC,Outset − CapRatioBHC,Severe, (1.5)
where CapRatioBHC,Outset is the BHC’s starting capital ratio at the beginning of the time horizon
covered by that particular testing cycle, and CapRatioBHC,Severe is the lowest implied capital over
the nine-quarter forward-looking horizon under the severely adverse stress scenario. Consistent
with [16], the exposure measure reflects only quantitative changes in BHC portfolios due to the
stress test scenarios and does not capture qualitative changes associated with the effect of planned
capital distributions. Thus, while the sample contains only CCAR banks, the exposure measure is
computed using disclosures under the Dodd–Frank Act, which do not incorporate a bank’s capital
distribution plan. BHCs with high values of this exposure measure in a given stress test cycle have
portfolios with the greatest downside risk in the severely adverse economic scenario described in
that particular cycle.
My baseline measure of stress test exposure is computed as the change in the Tier 1 capital ratio
of stress-tested banks as identified by the Dodd–Frank annual disclosures. However, in additional
robustness tests, I also define stress test exposure in terms of the total risk-based capital ratio and the
Tier 1 leverage ratio (both measures are constructed using data from DFAST disclosures). Moreover,
I also compute declines in bank capitalization through CCAR disclosures, which account for the
capital distribution plans of stress-tested banks. Lastly, I use the strict BHC size threshold considered
for CCAR inclusion, and I compare credit card lending by BHCs that fall on either side of this
threshold in a difference-in-differences setting. The size threshold was $100 billion for stress tests
conducted before 2014, and the threshold has been $50 billion since the 2014 CCAR/DFAST. Thus,
for stress tests conducted before (since) 2014, I choose the control group of non-tested banks that
have consolidated assets in the $50 billion to $100 billion ($10 billion to $50 billion) range.12 My
12This approach is popular among recent papers that study the lending implications of stress tests, such as [25, 24,
26, 22], among many others. However, a significant concern with this method of comparing stress-tested banks to non-
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results and inferences remain unaffected by these different definitions of stress test exposure.
1.4 Data and summary statistics
1.4.1 Data sources
The majority of my analysis focuses only on banks that are included in the annual CCAR/DFA stress
tests conducted by the Federal Reserve from 2012 through 2016. Given that my analysis focuses
on studying banks’ lending decisions, I am interested only in the quantitative component of stress
tests, which does not capture the effect of banks’ capital distribution plans. Thus, I collect data on
banks’ stress test performance from the annual DFAST disclosure. Banks’ performance is measured
through the evolution of their Tier 1 capital ratio, their total risk-based capital ratio, and their Tier 1
leverage ratio under the baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenarios. Similar to [16], I define
stress test exposure as a bank’s capital ratio at the outset of any particular stress test cycle minus the
lowest implied ratio under the severely adverse economic scenario.
I gather credit card–level data from one of the three major credit bureaus in the U.S. All the data
described below are used purely for academic purposes, and they contain anonymized information.
The credit bureau’s data provide comprehensive records of the various credit accounts opened by
every U.S. resident. These accounts span credit cards, mortgages, auto, and student loans, and
several other trade types.
Of the 35 bank holding companies (BHCs) that have undergone stress tests performed by the
Federal Reserve between 2009 and 2016, I identify 23 banks that both issue credit cards and report
to the credit bureau. These 23 BHCs account for 90% of the market in terms of open credit cards.
Importantly, the dataset covers eight of the top 10 issuers, which comprise 75% of the market, and
it accounts for all six of the largest issuers.
tested banks is the implicit assumption that the only difference between the two groups of banks is asset size. However,
stress-tested and non-tested banks differ in their investment activities, the products and services they offer, and their
systemic importance.
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As described earlier, for the 2011–2015 CCAR/DFAST stress test cycles, the Federal Reserve
modeled forward-looking BHC capital ratios using current BHC data as of Q3 of the previous year,
and it publicly announced the results of the stress tests in March of that year.13 Starting from the
2016 CCAR/DFAST, the Federal Reserve began modeling BHC performance using current data as
of Q4 of the previous year, and they began to release results in June. Thus, for each stress test cycle,
I identify all individuals who have active credit card accounts issued by at least one of the stress-
tested issuers in that particular cycle at the time the issuer submits data to Federal Reserve. I then
obtain information on their credit card limits and balances.
I limit my analysis to credit cards that have at least one non-missing observation before bank
data submission to the Federal Reserve (pre-collection period) and one non-missing observation
after the public announcement of stress test results (post-release period). I winsorize limits at the
1% and 99% levels. Finally, I average the credit limits on credit cards separately in the pre- and
post- periods to capture changes in the average credit supply on individual credit cards after the
announcement of stress test results.
The credit card–level analysis is conducted with individual fixed effects, and thus relies on com-
paring within-individual changes in credit card limits. Therefore, my analysis includes only individ-
uals who have two or more credit cards issued by stress-tested banks in a particular stress test cycle,
where the issuers differ in their exposure to the stress tests. Thus, my sample contains 10.1 million
credit cards issued to 3.27 million individuals across five stress test cycles.
1.4.2 Descriptive statistics
I present bank-level summary statistics in Panel A of Table 1.1. I find that the average implied
decline in the Tier 1 ratios of stress-tested banks is approximately 3.6 percentage points (pp). Sim-
ilarly, the average implied decline in the total risk-based capital ratio (Tier 1 leverage ratio) is ap-
13For example, for the 2012 CCAR, the Federal Reserve modeled BHC performance using data from 2011Q3 and
publicly released stress test results in March 2012.
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proximately 3.8 (2.7) pp. These implied declines are large, and they correspond to a 25–35% change
in capital for banks in my sample. Moreover, there is substantial variation in performance across
banks, with a standard deviation ranging from 1.2–2.0 percentage points. Since my analysis is re-
stricted to stress-tested banks, I cover a set of large banks, with average assets greater than $260
billion. The other bank financial variables are largely in line with the literature.
In Panel B, I present descriptive statistics of credit bureau data. Since my analysis is restricted
to individuals with multiple credit cards issued by different stress-tested institutions, I find that
my sample contains high–credit quality borrowers. The average credit score of borrowers in my
sample is approximately 745. However, there is some variation in borrower creditworthiness, with
a standard deviation of approximately 80 points in credit scores. Their average monthly income is
approximately $4,330. In addition, their utilization ratio (approximately 27%) is consistent with the
national average.
Lastly, I also provide descriptive statistics at the credit card level. The average credit card in my
sample has a limit of approximately $9,850. However, there is substantial variation in issued limits,
with a standard deviation of approximately $8,600. The average utilization of credit cards in my
sample is 23.5%. However, the median is only approximately 4%, which suggests that balances are
not carried over among a large portion of the credit cards in my sample.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics at the credit card–issuing bank level. Panel A uses quarterly BHC Y-9C
regulatory filings data in the pre–stress test period for each stress test cycle. The pre- period for each testing
cycle consists of the four quarters before the outset of that particular stress test cycle. The outset period for
the 2012–2015 stress test cycles is Q3 of the preceding year. The outset period for the 2016 stress test cycle is
2015Q4. Panel B uses credit bureau data in the pre–stress test period, defined analogously to Panel A. These
data are first collapsed to obtain a single bank-level cross-section in the pre–stress test period by averaging
across time. Descriptive statistics are then reported for these time-averaged values. The variables in Panel A
are reported as a fraction of total assets unless specified otherwise. The table reports means, medians, and
standard deviations.
Panel A: Bank characteristics
Standard
Mean Median Deviation
Stress test exposure measures
Stress test exposure #1 (Tier 1 capital ratio) 3.551 3.300 1.844
Stress test exposure #2 (Total risk-based capital ratio) 3.780 3.600 1.974
Stress test exposure #3 (Tier 1 leverage ratio) 2.722 2.700 1.233
Other
Assets (log) 19.392 18.989 1.166
Equity capital ratio 0.121 0.120 0.018
Liquid assets 0.259 0.236 0.085
Business mix
Mortgage loans 0.155 0.165 0.072
C&I loans 0.133 0.129 0.063
Consumer loans 0.139 0.092 0.158
Credit card loans 0.073 0.012 0.143
Performance
ROE 0.053 0.048 0.038
Non-performing loans 0.011 0.007 0.010
Risk-based capital ratio 0.154 0.151 0.022
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Credit score 745 769 79
Monthly income ($) 4,329.81 3,917.00 1,751.25
Debt-to-income ratio 28.292 24.000 25.175
Borrower debt fundamentals
Credit card utilization 27.030 10.710 32.414
Credit card balance ($) 6,118.57 2,383.00 9,893.68
Mortgage balance ($) 210,015.90 155,526.00 220,232.77
Auto balance ($) 18,131.10 14,480.00 18,963.08
Credit card characteristics
Limits ($) 9,842.52 8,000.00 8,572.72
Balances ($) 1,740.79 285.29 3,351.31
Utilization (%) 23.507 3.930 33.060
1.5 Main findings: Trade-level analysis
1.5.1 Impact of stress tests on bank risk-taking in the credit card market
In this section, I use granular credit card–level data to estimate the impact of stress test results on a
bank’s credit supply, and I study any compositional effects. As described in Section 1.3.1, I isolate
changes in credit limits at the account level using consumer fixed effects in each stress test cycle.
I begin my analysis by grouping consumers into 20-point credit score bins separately for each
stress testing cycle. The riskiest (least risky) credit score bin covers the credit score range of 560–
580 (820–840). Next, I study the relative lending response of high-exposure banks by running the
single-cycle regression specification in Equation (1.2) for each of these bins separately within each
stress test cycle. Doing so allows me to examine whether the lending response of high-exposure
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banks changes across time to consumers of varying creditworthiness.
The main independent variable of interest equals the starting value of the (risk-weighted) Tier
1 ratio at the outset of any given cycle minus the lowest Tier 1 ratio implied by the severely ad-
verse stressed scenario implemented for that cycle. This measure of stress test exposure has been
standardized for ease of interpretation. Moreover, all bank-level control variables are constructed
by averaging over the four quarters immediately preceding the outset of any stress test cycle. The
dependent variable is credit card limit growth at the account level. In order to mitigate the effect of
large outliers, I normalize the change in card-level limits by the midpoint between the pre-collection
and post-release periods for each stress test cycle as follows:
∆CC Limiti,c,b =
CC Limiti,c,b,post − CC Limiti,c,b,pre
1
2
× (CC Limiti,c,b,post + CC Limiti,c,b,pre)
,
where i, c, and b reference individuals, credit cards, and banks, respectively. The results of this
analysis are presented in the form of bar graphs in Figure 1.1.
For the 2012 stress test cycle, I find that high-exposure banks respond to stress tests by ag-
gressively cutting credit card limits across all credit score bins. The cuts in limits appear to be
slightly larger for the riskier segment of the consumer base, but only marginally. For the 2013
CCAR/DFAST, I find that high-exposure banks cut credit card lending, but only for the prime seg-
ment of consumers; the non-prime segment experienced no differential decline in credit limits on
cards issued by high-exposure banks. Starting from the 2014 cycle, I observe two opposing patterns.
First, consistent with previous CCAR/DFAST exercises, I find that high-exposure banks cut credit
limits on cards issued to prime consumers. At the same time, however, I find that high-exposure
banks appear to increase credit supply to the non-prime consumer segment. Importantly, for any
given non-prime credit score bin, I find that high-exposure banks supply higher credit limits with
each passing stress test cycle.
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Figure 1.1: Impact of stress tests on bank credit card lending across different cycles and consumer segments
This figure examines how banks have responded to stress tests over time. It documents how the coefficient β associated with the
variable of interest, StressTestExposure, from Equation (1.2) has varied across different stress test cycles for different consumer
segments. For each stress test cycle, consumers who have multiple credit cards issued by stress-tested banks are grouped into 20-
point credit score bins ranging from 560 through 840. Next, the regression specification in Equation (1.2) is run for each of these
credit score bins within each stress test cycle. The associated point estimate on the key independent variable, StressTestExposure,
is presented in the form of bar graphs across different stress test cycles.
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Thus, taken together, the findings in Figure 1.1 suggest that, over time, the stress testing exercises
have become less effective in reducing bank risk-taking. Indeed, the earlier rounds of stress tests
encouraged banks to reduce limits to the non-prime segment, but in subsequent cycles, the rate of
growth in the credit supply extended to the non-prime segment by high-exposure banks has steadily
increased with each passing cycle. In this sense, my findings are more consistent with [46], whose
findings suggest that stress tests have become less informative over time.
Next, I test for evidence consistent with bank risk-taking in the pooled sample of all CCAR/DFAST
exercises conducted from 2012 to 2016. The main advantage of the pooled sample is that it allows
me to include vectors of both Bank × Stress Test Cycle and Individual × Stress Test Cycle fixed
effects, which suppress concurrent bank credit supply and individual demand factors. Thus, the only
remaining variation pertains to the bank–consumer matching process, which allows for cleaner iden-
tification of bank risk-taking behavior. The pooled sample consists of approximately 10.1 million
credit cards issued to approximately 3.3 million individuals across five stress test cycles. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table 1.2.
In Column (1), I report the results of the OLS specification without any fixed effects and control
variables. The results suggest that banks with a one standard deviation higher exposure to stress
tests respond by reducing credit card limits, although the result is only marginally significant at the
10% level. In Column (2), I include a vector of Individual × Stress Test Cycle fixed effects, which
helps capture variation across credit cards issued to the same consumer in a given stress test cycle
in which the banks issuing these cards differ in their exposure to the stress tests. The coefficient of
interest remains negative, but it is now significant at the 5% level and largely unaffected in terms of
economic magnitude. This implies that individual demand factors appear to be largely uncorrelated
with the stress test exposure measure.
In Column (3), I interact the stress test exposure measure with an individual-level dummy vari-
able that equals 1 for non-prime consumers (i.e., consumers with credit scores under 680) and 0 for
prime consumers. I find that the base effect is negative and significant, while the coefficient on the
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Table 1.2: How do banks adjust credit card supply in response to stress tests?
This table shows the relation between stress test exposure and the change in credit card limits using credit bureau data.
Each pre-collection and post-results period for any given stress test cycle consists of two semiannual archives. Credit
card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross section separately in the pre– and post–stress
test periods by averaging across time. Then, the dependent variable is constructed as the growth in limits at the credit
card–level from the pre– to the post–stress test period. Exposure is computed as the difference between the starting
value of banks’ Tier 1 ratio at the outset of the stress test and the lowest capital ratio implied by the severely adverse
stress scenario. Non-Prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit score is below 680 at the outset
of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆ CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure -4.713* -5.382** -5.893** -4.676** -4.925***
(-1.72) (-2.45) (-2.50) (-2.12) (-3.68)
Exposure × Non-prime 3.018*** 3.010*** 3.868*** 3.617***
(2.75) (2.79) (4.43) (4.19)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X
Observations 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.005 0.169 0.169 0.181 0.193 0.213
Trade-level controls X X X
Bank-level controls X
interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the result in Column (3) suggests
that banks with more stress test exposure respond by cutting credit card limits, but these cuts are
concentrated in the prime consumer segment. The results continue to hold when accounting for
trade-level controls (Column (4)) and both trade-level and bank-level controls (Column (5)). The
results presented in Column (5) are economically meaningful, and they suggest that banks with a
one standard deviation larger exposure to stress tests respond by cutting limits by approximately
$418, and this decline is driven largely by reducing the credit supply extended to prime consumers.
Finally, in Column (6), I report results for the full specification that includes both bank-by-time
and individual-by-time fixed effects. Including both sets of fixed effects helps account for both bank
credit supply and individual demand factors. As a result, I can only estimate the coefficient on
the interaction term between the stress test exposure measure and the non-prime dummy indicator.
I find that this coefficient is unaffected in both economic and statistical magnitudes by the fully
25
saturated specification. The takeaway remains that higher stress test exposure induces banks to shift
the composition of its credit supply towards a riskier segment of consumers.
My baseline analysis described above focuses on the five CCAR/DFAST exercises conducted
between 2012 and 2016. I now examine how banks responded to the very first stress test conducted
in the post-crisis period, the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). Given the
significant differences in the implementation details between the 2009 SCAP and the subsequent
CCAR/DFAST exercises, I do not include the SCAP testing cycle in my pooled analysis. Instead, I
separately examine the impact of the SCAP on banks’ risk-taking, and report my findings in Table
1.3.
Table 1.3: Impact of 2009 SCAP on bank risk-taking
This table examines whether stress tests conducted in the pre–CCAR/DFAST era induced banks to reduce risky credit
card lending. The pre–CCAR/DFAST stress test considered is the 2009 Supervisory Capital Assessment Program
(SCAP). In Columns (1) and (2), Failed is a dummy indicator equal to 1 for banks that failed the 2009 SCAP, and
0 for banks that passed the SCAP. In Columns (3) and (4), SCAP Buffer is the amount of capital that SCAP–tested banks
were required to raise scaled by their 2008Q4 risk-weighted assets. Non-Prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an
individual’s credit score is below 680, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank level. T-statistics
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆ CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Failed -9.384***
(-14.44)




SCAP Buffer × Non-prime -2.136*** -2.135***
(-5.01) (-5.00)
Consumer FE X X X X
Bank FE X X
Observations 2,195,458 2,195,458 2,195,458 2,195,458
Adj. R2 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
In Columns (1) and (2), I compare credit card lending by banks that failed the 2009 SCAP
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to that of passing banks. I continue to capture within-consumer changes in lending through the
inclusion of consumer fixed effects. The results indicate that failing banks reduced credit card limits
in reponse to the 2009 SCAP. Importantly, however, these cuts in limits were significantly larger
for the constrained, risky, non-prime segment of the population. In Columns (3) and (4), I replace
the binary passed/failed indicator with the continuous SCAP capital buffer measure. This measure
is defined as the amount of equity capital the SCAP–failing bank was required to raise scaled by
its risk-weighted assets as of 2008Q4. Even using this continuous measure, I find that in response
to the 2009 SCAP, banks with greater exposure cut limits on credit cards by a larger amount for
observably risky borrowers.
Taken together, my findings suggest that more-exposed banks responded to the 2009 SCAP
by reducing risk-taking, but progressively increased risk-taking in the subsequent CCAR/DFAST
exercises. The sharp reduction in risky lending for the 2009 testing cycle can be attributed to the
“surprise” aspect of the SCAP, which was announced by the Federal Reserve in February 2009 and
implemented in the following month. Given the novelty of the stress-testing regime at the time,
more-exposed banks perhaps sharply reduced risky lending to ease capital requirements. Moreover,
banks were included in the SCAP based on ex-ante 2008:Q4 asset size, which mitigated concerns of
self-selection into or out of the test. In contrast, banks are more informed about the timelines of the
CCAR/DFAST process. Probably more importantly, the timing of SCAP was more crucial, since
incentives to take risks were lower in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
1.5.2 Robustness checks
Are these results driven by bank-specific consumer demand?
One concern with the regression specification in Equation (1.3) is that I implicitly assume that in-
dividuals with multiple credit cards have no differential demand across their cards. However, it is
possible that consumers may prefer certain credit cards over others. Thus, such confounding de-
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mand factors at the credit card level could still bias my results, which account only for endogenous
demand factors at the individual level.
To mitigate such card-specific endogeneity concerns, I construct a “leave-out mean” credit limit
change for each credit card. For every individual i’s credit card c issued by bank b, I compute
CreditLimiti,−c,b as the average credit limit using all the credit cards issued by bank b except
credit card c. Next, I compute the change in this “leave-out mean” credit limit for each credit card.
By construction, this measure excludes the credit limit changes made by a bank due to individual
demand factors such as individual requests for increases in credit limits. Moreover, this measure
continues to capture a bank’s average change in credit supply through its credit cards.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table A.1. In Column (1), I present the baseline
result. I continue to find that high-exposure banks cut credit limits on credit cards. In Column (2),
I interact the stress test exposure measure with an indicator variable that equals 1 for non-prime
consumers and 0 otherwise. I continue to find that the high-exposure banks cut credit supply to the
unconstrained, prime consumer segment. These findings are not altered by the inclusion of Bank
× Stress Test Cycle fixed effects (Column (3)). This further suggests that bank-specific individual
demand factors are less likely to influence my results, and individual fixed effects (within each stress
test cycle) adequately control for confounding demand-related factors.
Are these results driven by particular banks?
I show that my results are not driven by any particular bank in my sample. I re-estimate the specifi-
cation in Table 1.2, Column (6), by excluding one bank from the analysis each time and estimating
the regression on the sample consisting of the remaining 22 banks. Consequently, there are 23 such
regressions, and I plot the 23 estimated coefficients on Exposure × NonPrime (along with their
standard errors) in Figure A.1. As can be seen, across all specifications, the estimated interaction
term coefficients are all positive and largely stable, which suggests that no single bank is driving my
finding that banks cut safe, and not risky, lending in response to stress tests.
28
Alternative measures of consumer constraints
In Table A.2, I consider alternate measures of riskiness. In Panel A, I explore the cross-sectional cuts
across credit cards that have different utilization ratios. I group the credit cards in my sample into
three groups based on their utilization at the outset of a particular stress test cycle: low (≤ 50%), high
(50–90%), and very high (> 90%). The results suggest that banks with higher exposure to stress tests
reduce credit limits to low–utilization ratio credit cards (i.e., low-risk credit cards). In contrast, there
appears to be little to no cuts in limits to high- and very high–utilization ratio credit cards. A similar
pattern emerges when I perform cross-sectional cuts based on the consumer’s total utilization ratio,
which is defined as the ratio of the individual’s total credit balance to the individual’s total credit
limit across all her credit cards (Panel B). Lastly, my inferences remain unchanged when I proxy
consumer constraints through the debt-to-income ratio (Panel C).
Alternative measures of stress test exposure
In Table A.3, I document the robustness of my results to alternative measures of bank stress test
exposure. In Panel A (Panel B), I define stress test exposure as the difference between the starting
value of the bank’s total risk-based capital ratio (Tier 1 leverage ratio) at the outset of the test and
the lowest equivalent ratio implied in the severely adverse stress scenario under DFAST guidelines.
Both measures are reported in the annual CCAR/DFAST disclosures. My results are robust to these
alternative definitions. In Panel C, I define stress test exposure in terms of the Tier 1 risk-based
capital ratio under CCAR guidelines, and find that my inferences remain unchanged.
Lastly, in Panel D, I report results that compare stress-tested issuers to non–stress-tested issuers.
While the earlier tests focus on individuals with multiple cards from stress-tested issuers, this ro-
bustness check focuses on individuals that have at least one card from a stressed issuer and one card
from a non-stressed issuer in each cycle. Since the 2012–2013 (2014–2016) CCAR stress test cycles
included banks with consolidated assets over $100 billion ($50 billion), the control group for these
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cycles consists of banks with assets in the $50 billion to $100 billion ($10 billion to $50 billion)
range. Thus, for each stress test cycle, the treated group consists of banks being stress-tested in that
cycle, while the control group consists of banks that fall just under the asset-size threshold used to
demarcate inclusion in stress tests by the Federal Reserve. Even for this test, I find that relative to
non-stressed issuers, stressed issuers cut credit card limits mainly for prime consumers, consistent
with my baseline analysis.
Accounting for bank-level cross-sectional dependencies
In Table A.4, I document the robustness of my baseline results in Table 1.2 to a more stringent
clustering technique. In this table, I cluster standard errors at the bank level. The bank-level cluster is
larger, and it can completely account for any within-bank correlations; however, the size distribution
of this clustering level is heavily skewed owing to the highly concentrated nature of the credit card
industry. Moreover, my sample consists of only 23 banks, and reported standard errors could be
biased with too few clusters ([45, 47]). Regardless, I find that the statistical significance of my
results is unaffected by the level of clustering.
Additional tests
Thus far, my findings capture changes in credit limits along both the intensive and extensive margin,
and I examine whether the results hold separately along both these margins. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table A.5.
In Panel A Table A.5, I focus on credit limit changes that occur along the intensive margin –
i.e., I focus on limit changes in cards that remain open up to one year after stress test results are
disclosed. Importantly, intensive margin changes in limits are arguably more effective in isolating
demand and supply factors, since while consumers can possibly terminate credit cards (i.e., through
a decrease in demand), they are much less likely to request limit decreases on open cards.14 I run the
14Note that it is not always in the best interests of consumers to request credit card limit cuts or even credit card
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specification in Equation (1.3) along the intensive margin, and I find that high-exposure banks tilt
the supply of credit card limits towards non-prime consumers, consistent with my baseline results.
In Panel B, I report results for extensive margin closures. I find that highly exposed banks close
credit cards issued to prime consumers but not for non-prime consumers.
1.5.3 What mediates the transition from risk-reduction to risk-seeking in response to stress tests?
The results presented in the previous section document that banks with larger exposure to stress
tests have increasingly issued higher limits to ex-ante risky consumers. Given my within-consumer
empirical design, my identification comes from changes in credit card lending to the same consumer
by stress-tested banks that differ in their stress test exposure. As a result, the relative sorting of
different banks that lend to the same consumer is of utmost importance. However, in the empirical
analysis conducted thus far, this relative sorting can differ across cycles given the construction of the
stress test exposure measure. Moreover, the number of stress-tested banks has also increased over
time. Thus, it is not possible to categorically attribute the documented findings to any economic
mechanism.
In this section, I attempt to identify the channel that mediates the transition of stress-tested banks
from risk-reduction to risk-seeking behavior in response to stress tests. To do so, I first restrict the
analysis to only the 13 credit card issuers that have been included in each of the five CCAR/DFAST
cycles from 2012 to 2016. Next, I apply the stress test exposure measure constructed for the 2012
CCAR cycle to all subsequent cycles. These two steps help in ensuring that my baseline results are
not driven by the addition of new banks to the CCAR/DFAST process and changes in the relative
sorting of banks across time, respectively.
terminations. From the consumer’s perspective, higher credit card limits are generally favorable, even if they come from
unused credit cards, since higher limits provide greater financial slack. Moreover, having more credit cards, along with
relatively low utilization, indicates high creditworthiness, which is reflected through higher credit scores.
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Figure 1.2: Are banks adapting to stress tests over time?
This figure examines whether banks are adapting to stress tests over time, consistent with a learning mechanism. It documents
how the coefficient β associated with the variable of interest, StressTestExposure, from Equation (1.2) has varied across different
stress test cycles for different consumer segments. For each stress test cycle, consumers who have multiple credit cards issued by
stress-tested banks are grouped into 20-point credit score bins ranging from 560 through 840. Next, the regression specification in
Equation (1.2) is run for each credit score bin within each stress test cycle. The associated point estimates on the key independent
variable, StressTestExposure, are presented in the form of bar graphs across different stress test cycles. The key difference from
Figure (1.1) is that the analysis is restricted to the 13 credit card issuers that have undergone each CCAR/DFAST exercise
conducted by the Federal Reserve between 2012 and 2016. Moreover, banks’ exposure to the 2012 CCAR exercise to all
subsequent cycles. These two steps help ensure that the baseline results are not driven by the addition of new banks to the
CCAR/DFAST exercises or by changes in the relative sorting of banks across time, respectively.
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Next, similar to earlier tests, I first group consumers into 20 point credit score bins for each
stress test cycle. I then study the respective credit card limit changes in response to stress tests for
each of these bins within each stress test cycle. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure
1.2. I find that this pattern of results largely follows the results presented in Figure 1.1 — i.e., over
time, high-exposure banks have transitioned from reducing risky lending to searching-for-yield in
the non-prime credit card market.
For the above test, it is important to note that, by construction, the relative sorting of banks is
held constant across cycles. Thus, I effectively document that the same high-exposure bank that
reduced credit card limits to risky consumers in 2012 issues higher limits to the risky segment in
2016. Moreover, this transition appears to be gradual, with more risky lending over time. Thus,
these findings appear to be consistent with banks adjusting to stress tests over time.
1.5.4 What is the impact on credit card balances?
In this section, I examine how the stress test–induced change in the composition of the supply of
credit card limits affects card-level balances. Prior theoretical work provides mixed suggestions
with regard to the possible relationship between changes in credit card limits and changes in credit
card balances. Under the permanent income hypothesis, an increase in credit limits should not
affect credit balances if permanent income remains unchanged. However, if liquidity constraints are
binding currently, or are expected to be binding in the future, then credit limit changes can lead to
changes in credit balances and consumption.
Elasticity of credit card balances with respect to credit card limits
In Table 1.4, I examine how log-changes in credit card limits affect log-changes in credit card bal-
ances. Panel A reports results for the full sample of credit cards issued to all consumer segments.
Only credit cards with at least one nonmissing pre-collection period observation and one nonmiss-
ing post-release period observation are retained for analysis. In Column (1), I estimate the OLS
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regression to obtain the relation between credit limit changes and credit balance changes at the
credit card level. I find that a 1% change in limits leads to a 0.48% change in balances. It is impor-
tant to note that Column (1) does not include Individual×ST Cycle fixed effects, and I thus capture
cross-sectional variation across individuals and across stress test cycles.
However, endogenous demand factors can bias the estimate in Column (1) because consumer
demand is the primary driver of changes in credit card balances. For example, it is possible that
consumers request increased limits with the intention of increasing utilization in the future. It is also
possible that banks can change limits in response to anticipated (future) changes in demand. Thus,
in Column (2), I re-estimate the specification in Column (1), but in the presence of Individual×ST
Cycle fixed effects. The fixed effects estimator suggests that a 1% change in card-level limits leads
to a 0.60% change in card-level balances. This positive relationship between credit limit changes
and balance changes is consistent with [48].
In Column (3) (Column (4)), I implement the OLS (fixed effects) specification to estimate the
impact of stress test exposure on card-level balances. Both columns suggest that banks with higher
stress test exposure experience declines in credit card balances (relative to cards issued by banks
with lower stress test exposure). Comparing the estimates in Columns (3) and (4) reveals that the
individual demand factors are positively correlated with stress test exposure, resulting in a positively
biased coefficient in Column (3). This suggests that omitting demand factors works against finding
a negative relationship between the exposure of a given bank to stress tests and the relative reduction
in the balances on credit cards issued by said bank.
In Column (5), I estimate a 2SLS specification where I regress the change in card-level balances
on the change in card-level limits, where the latter is instrumented with the stress test exposure
measure. This estimate, which captures the local average treatment effect (LATE), shows that a 1%
change in credit limits due to stress test exposure changes credit card balances by approximately
1.5%.
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Table 1.4: Impact of stress tests on credit card balances
This table shows the relation between stress test exposure and changes in credit card balances at the account level. Each
pre-collection and post-results period for any given stress test cycle consists of two semiannual archives. Credit card–
level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre– and post–stress test
periods by averaging across time. Then, the dependent variable is constructed as the growth at the credit card–level from
the pre– to the post–stress test period. Exposure is computed as the difference between the starting value of banks’
Tier 1 ratio at the outset of the stress test and the lowest capital ratio implied by the severely adverse stress scenario.
Panel A reports results for the full sample. In Column (5), ∆CC Limit is instrumented by the Exposure variable. In
Panel B, elasticities are reported across consumer segments, with Sub-Panels B.1, B.2, and B.3 reporting results for the
full sample, the prime consumer segment, and the non-prime consumer segment, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5)
report percent elasticities, while Columns (2), (4), and (6) report results for dollar regressions. The standard errors are
clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater
than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Full sample
Depvar: ∆ CC Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




∆ CC Limit (Instru.) 1.526**
(2.35)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X
Trade-level controls X X X X X
Bank-level controls X X X X X
Observations 8,518,673 8,518,673 8,518,673 8,518,673 8,518,673
Adj. R2 0.032 0.120 0.028 0.114 0.106
F-stat (Excl. instr.) 45.09
Panel B: Elasticities and dollar sensitivities across consumer segments
B.1: B.2: B.3:
Full sample Prime Non-Prime
% $ % $ % $
∆ CC Bal ∆ CC Bal ∆ CC Bal ∆ CC Bal ∆ CC Bal ∆ CC Bal
Depvar: ∆ CC Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ CC Limit (Instru.) 1.526** 0.248*** 1.406** 0.168*** 3.208*** 0.793***
(2.35) (7.69) (2.39) (5.78) (2.68) (7.95)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X X
Trade-level controls X X X X X X
Bank-level controls X X X X X X
Observations 8,518,673 8,518,673 6,738,697 6,738,697 1,779,976 1,779,976
Adj. R2 0.106 0.074 0.094 0.140 0.152 0.144
F-stat (Excl. instr.) 45.09 22.29 35.07 23.75 78.91 17.78
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Heterogeneity in elasticity across consumer segments
Estimating the sensitivity of credit card balance changes to credit limit changes across all consumer
segments in a pooled setting conceals the wide variation in elasticities across consumers. Thus, in
this section, I examine the respective response sensitivities of prime and non-prime consumers to
changes in limits. In addition, I also estimate dollar regressions to provide a cleaner measure of how
consumers respond to a $1 change in limits. My findings are presented in Panel B of Table 1.4.
In Sub-Panel B.1, I first report elasticities and dollar sensitivities for the full sample of con-
sumers. In Column (1), I re-state the 2SLS estimate presented in Column (5) of Panel A. In Column
(2), I report the dollar regression 2SLS estimate. I find that in the full sample of consumers, a $1
stress test exposure–induced change in card-level limits is associated with a 24.8-cent change in
card-level balances. In Sub-Panel B.2, Column (3), I find that the prime segment experiences a
1.4% change in balances for a 1% change in limits induced by the stress test exposure measure. In
dollar terms, this translates to a 16.8-cent change in balances for every $1 of limit changes induced
by the exposure measure (Column (4)). Finally, in Sub-Panel B.3, I report results for the non-prime
consumer segment. I find that non-prime consumers respond strongly to changes in limits. Non-
prime consumers increase balances by approximately 3.2% for every 1% increase in limits induced
by stress test exposure (Column (5)). This translates to a 79.3-cent balance increase for every $1
stress test exposure–induced increase in credit card limits.
Relationship between credit card balances and stress test exposure across cycles
Thus far, the credit card balance analysis is reported for a concatenation of all stress test cycles. This
masks important variation in the evolution of balances on cards issued by stress-tested banks across
different cycles. Thus, similar to the analysis of card-level limits, I group consumers into credit
score bins of 20 points, and report the effect of stress test exposure on the balances on credit cards
issued to consumers that fall within each bin separately for each stress test cycle.
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Figure 1.3: How has the evolving response of banks to stress tests affected credit card balances?
This figure examines how banks’ changing response to stress tests over time in terms of credit card supply through credit card
limits affects credit card balances. The figure reports the regression results of Equation (1.2), in which the dependent variable
is replaced with card-level changes in balances. For each stress test cycle, consumers who have multiple credit cards issued by
stress-tested banks are grouped into 20-point credit score bins ranging from 560 through 840. Next, the regression specification in
Equation (1.2) is run for each credit score bin within each stress test cycle. The associated point estimates on the key independent
variable, StressTestExposure, are presented in the form of bar graphs across different stress test cycles.
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My findings are presented in Figure 1.3. I find that the balance results largely mirror the limit
results presented in Figure 1.1. For the 2012 stress test cycle, non-prime consumers reduced balances
on cards issued by high-exposure banks, consistent with high-exposure banks cutting limits on cards
issued to such individuals. However, in later cycles, non-prime consumers increase balances on
cards issued by high-exposure banks. At the same time, high-exposure banks experience declines in
balances on cards issued to prime consumers.
1.5.5 Performance of credit cards issued by stress-tested banks
In Table 1.5, I study how higher stress test exposure affects the likelihood of future delinquency on
credit cards issued by high-exposure banks. In earlier sections, I have shown that, compared to banks
with low stress test exposure, high-exposure banks increase the supply of credit card limits offered
to risky, non-prime consumers. This, in turn, induces risky borrowers to increase their balances on
cards issued by high-exposure banks. In this subsection, I analyze whether high-exposure banks
are more likely to grant additional credit to consumers that default more ex-post. This analysis of
ex-post default outcomes serves as a complementary measure of bank risk-taking.
In Panel A, I examine trade-level performance at the 6-month horizon after the disclosure of
stress test results. I estimate the regression specification in Equation (1.4), except without the Bank
× Stress Test Cycle fixed effects. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the
credit card has a past due amount at the 6-month mark after the disclosure of stress test results, and
0 otherwise. The results are reported in Column (1).
The findings suggest that prime consumers are less likely to default on cards issued by high-
exposure banks, although this estimate is only marginally significant at the 10% level. However, non-
prime consumers are approximately 0.36 pp more likely to default on credit cards issued by high-
exposure banks (relative to cards issued by low-exposure banks to the same consumer). Relative to
the mean credit card delinquency rate of 6.07% for non-prime consumers, this estimate suggests that
banks with a one standard deviation higher stress test exposure are approximately 5.93% more likely
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Table 1.5: Consumer performance on credit cards issued by stress-tested banks
This table reports results for the relation between banks’ stress test exposure and credit card–level performance.
Exposure is computed as the difference between the starting value of banks’ Tier 1 ratio at the outset of the stress
test and the lowest capital ratio implied by the severely adverse stress scenario. Non-Prime is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if an individual’s credit score is below 680 at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. Account-
level performance is tracked at various intervals after the public disclosure of stress test results. In Panel A, card-level
performance is measured at the 6-month mark after the public disclosure of stress test results. Credit cards that are
delinquent 6 months after the public disclosure of stress test results are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, in Panels
B and C, card-level performance is measured at the 12-month and 24-month horizons, respectively. The standard errors
are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance
greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C:
1
2 year horizon 1 year horizon 2 year horizon
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposure -0.053* -0.068 -0.092
(-1.78) (-1.54) (-1.54)
Exposure × Non-prime 0.356*** 0.361*** 0.447*** 0.453*** 0.450** 0.460**
(3.13) (3.22) (2.69) (2.78) (2.14) (2.23)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X X X
Trade-level controls X X X X X X
Bank-level controls X X X
Observations 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.581 0.581 0.587 0.587 0.576 0.577
to experience defaults on cards issued to the non-prime segment. Notably, it is on these non-prime
credit cards that high-exposure banks extend higher credit limits, thus inducing borrowers to carry
higher balances. These results remain unaffected after the further inclusion of Bank × Stress Test
Cycle fixed effects (Column (2)).
It is important to note that the specifications reported in Columns (1) and (2) are conducted at
the credit card account level in the presence of individual fixed effects for each stress test cycle.
Thus, for each consumer, the specification captures the probability of delinquency on cards issued
by high stress test exposure banks relative to the probability of delinquency on cards issued by low-
exposure banks to the same consumer. Furthermore, since this analysis is conducted at the trade level
with individual fixed effects, any changes in individual-level characteristics (e.g., job loss, income
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declines, medical problems) are unlikely to explain the non-prime consumer segment’s relatively
higher probability of defaulting on cards issued by high-exposure banks.
In Panels B and C, I examine the respective trade-level performance at the 12-month horizon and
the 24-month horizon after the disclosure of stress test results. At these longer horizons, I find no
evidence suggesting that prime consumers are relatively more or less likely to default on cards issued
by high-exposure banks. However, I continue to find that non-prime consumers are more likely to
default on cards issued by high-exposure banks. In terms of economic magnitude, my estimates
suggest that non-prime consumers are approximately 6–8% more likely to default on credit cards
issued by high-exposure banks 1–2 years after the disclosure of stress test results.
In Figure 1.4, I examine the evolution of card-level defaults across different stress test cycles. I
find that, across stress test cycles, non-prime consumers are increasingly more likely to default on
credit cards issued by high-exposure banks. These findings thus largely track the earlier account-
level limits analysis, where high-exposure banks increasingly issued higher limits to ex-ante risky
consumers with each passing stress test cycle.
In sum, I find statistically robust and economically relevant evidence suggesting that over time,
higher exposure to stress tests has induced banks to increase the supply of credit card limits extended
to risky, non-prime consumers. Doing so induces non-prime consumers to increase the balances
carried on cards issued by high-exposure banks. However, these non-prime consumers are also
significantly more likely to default on cards issued by high-exposure banks in the future.
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of ex post credit card defaults across stress test cycles
This figure examines how banks’ changing response to stress tests over time in terms of credit card supply through credit card
limits relates to ex post card-level defaults. The figure reports the regression results of Equation (1.2), in which the dependent
variable is replaced with an indicator that equals 1 if the credit card is in default at the 12-month mark after stress test results
release, and 0 otherwise. For each stress test cycle, consumers with multiple credit cards issued by stress-tested banks are grouped
into 20-point credit score bins ranging from 560 through 840. Next, the regression specification in Equation (1.2) is run for each
credit score bin within each stress test cycle. The associated point estimates on the key independent variable, StressTestExposure,
are presented in the form of bar graphs across different stress test cycles.
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1.5.6 Are credit card delinquencies related to consumer demographics?
The results discussed thus far show that banks respond to higher stress test exposure by issuing
higher credit card limits to ex-ante risky consumers, and these consumers are more likely to de-
fault on cards issued by high-exposure banks in the future. Given the nature of credit card lending,
which is almost entirely driven by hard information, banks may optimally respond to higher stress
test–induced capital requirements by searching-for-yield in the credit card market. However, if ad-
ditional credit is extended to consumers whose sophistication levels are not perfectly explained by
credit scores, it is possible that the associated ex-post credit card delinquencies are driven by con-
sumer characteristics that are not correlated with credit scores. In this section, I proxy for consumer
sophistication through monthly income, education, and occupation. The results are presented in
Table 1.6.
In Panel A, I proxy for consumer sophistication using monthly income, where higher income
signals higher sophistication. In Column (1), I examine whether income plays a role in explaining
ex-post defaults. I find that low-income consumers are significantly more likely to default on credit
cards issued by high-exposure banks. However, it is possible that credit scores are highly positively
correlated with income. Thus, in Column (2), I examine how card-level performance relates to
consumer income, even in the segment of non-prime consumers. I find that even in the non-prime
segment, low-income consumers are significantly more likely to default on cards issued by high-
exposure banks.
In Panel B, I proxy for consumer sophistication using an indicator variable that equals 1 for
consumers without a college degree and 0 for college degree–holders. I find that less-educated
consumers are more likely to default on cards issued by high-exposure banks (Column (1)). Even in
the segment of non-prime consumers, I find that non–college educated consumers are approximately
24.3% (0.090/0.370) more likely to default on credit cards issued by high-exposure banks (Column
(2)). Lastly, in Panel C, I proxy for sophistication using occupation. I construct an indicator variable
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Table 1.6: Types of consumers most negatively affected: Trade-level analysis
This table reports results examining how the relationship between banks’ stress test exposure and credit card–level
performance is affected by consumer characteristics. Exposure is computed as the difference between the starting
value of banks’ Tier 1 ratio at the outset of the stress test and the lowest capital ratio implied by the severely adverse
stress scenario. Non-prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit score is under 680 at the outset of
a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. Panels A examines whether consumer income impacts card-level performance.
Panel B examines the role of consumer education, where No College is an indicator that equals 0 if the consumer holds
a college degree, and 1 otherwise. Lastly, Panel C examines the role of consumers’ job sophistication, where Non-Soph
Job is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the consumer holds a job that does not require sophisticated skills, and 0
otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Monthly income Panel B: Education
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2) Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2)
Exp × Income (log) -0.143*** -0.020* Exp × No college 0.041*** 0.001
(-4.87) (-1.86) (4.08) (0.25)
Exp × Non-Prime 1.874** Exp × Non-Prime 0.370***
(2.40) (9.61)
Exp × Non-Prime × Income (log) -0.175* Exp × Non-Prime × No college 0.090**
(-1.93) (2.04)
N 8,082,699 8,082,699 8,088,998 8,088,998
Adj. R2 0.578 0.578 0.577 0.577
Panel C: Occupation
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2)
Exp × Non-soph job 0.011 0.004
(0.87) (0.51)
Exp × Non-Prime 0.355***
(11.48)
Exp × Non-Prime × Non-soph job 0.032
(0.47)
N 2,786,075 2,786,075
Adj. R2 0.547 0.547
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that equals 1 for consumers that hold jobs that do not require sophisticated skills, and equals 0 for
consumers with sophisticated jobs.15 My findings suggest that consumers with unsophisticated jobs
are marginally more likely to default on high-exposure credit cards, but this effect is not statistically
significant.16
1.6 Discussion: How are consumers affected by higher exposure to stress-tested banks?
So far, I have provided evidence suggesting that, over time, banks have responded to the stress
test–induced increase in capital requirements by reaching-for-yield in the non-prime segment of the
consumer credit card market. The issuance of higher credit limits to non-prime consumers leads
to higher balances being carried on issued cards. Further consistent with higher risk-taking, I also
show that these non-prime consumers are significantly more likely to default on cards issued by high-
exposure banks. In this section, I examine whether higher consumer-level exposure to banks that are
more adversely impacted by stress tests has implications for consumers’ overall creditworthiness.
1.6.1 Impact on consumer delinquencies
In this section, I consider whether consumers that have greater exposure to banks that are adversely
impacted by stress tests are more likely to experience credit card delinquencies in the future. For
each consumer in my sample, I set an indicator variable equal to 1 if the consumer is delinquent on
credit card payments 12 months after the public disclosure of stress test results, and 0 otherwise.
Next, I construct a weighted average measure at the consumer level called Weighted Expo-
sure, which measures the reliance of consumers on high-exposure banks through their credit limits.
Weighted Exposure is constructed by weighting the bank’s stress test exposure associated with a
15The credit bureau does not have data on the occupations of all consumers. As a result, the results in Panel C are
derived from a smaller sample of consumers in which I can distinguish between consumers with sophisticated versus
non-sophisticated jobs.
16My inferences remain unchanged even if I run a specification where I horse-race the non-prime indicator variable
(that identifies non-prime consumers) with measures of consumer income, education, and occupation. This assuages
concerns that I am simply re-sorting the data on demographic characteristics that are highly correlated with credit
scores. The results of this analysis are presented in Table A.6.
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credit card by its credit limit as a proportion of the consumer’s total credit limit. I restrict my analy-
sis to consumers who have credit cards issued by banks with over $10 billion in assets, which helps
sidestep potentially problematic comparisons between consumers of banks and non-banks.
For the credit card–issuing banks that are not among the 23 banks in my within-consumer sample,
I assume that their stress test exposure is zero. Relying on this assumption results in the misclassifi-
cation of banks as having zero exposure when, in fact they could be affected by stress tests.17 As a
result, some individuals could be misclassified as unexposed or low-exposure individuals when they
are actually high-exposure individuals. However, such a misclassification will only underestimate
my findings.
I present my results in Table 1.7. In Column (1), I examine whether the Weighted Exposure
measure is predictive of consumer default. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant, which
suggests that consumers who are more reliant on high-exposure banks for credit cards are more likely
to default in the 12 months after the public disclosure of stress test results.
It is important to note that in Table 1.7, I do not control for Consumer×ST Cycle fixed ef-
fects because the unit of observation is at the individual level. However, to control for unobserved
confounding factors, in Column (2), I include controls for the individual’s credit quality, such as
the individual’s credit score, debt-to-income ratio, credit card utilization, credit card and mortgage
balance, and the number of credit-related accounts (all measured at the outset of a given stress test
cycle). I find that my estimate drops by approximately 80% in economic magnitude after accounting
for consumer characteristics, but remains significant at the 1% level. Unsurprisingly, this indicates
that consumers’ propensity to default is highly correlated with measures of credit quality.
Next, in Column (3), I include vectors of 5-digit ZIP code and ST Cycle fixed effects, and find
that my results are not significantly affected by their inclusion. In Column (4), I include 5-digit ZIP
code × ST Cycle fixed effects. This vector of fixed effects allows me to compare the future default
17Note that, under the Dodd-Frank Act, BHCs with over $10 billion in assets are required to undergo internal
company-run stress tests under the hypothetical, forward-looking scenarios created by the Fed and publicly report their
performance.
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Table 1.7: Effect of stress test exposure on consumer-level delinquencies
This table shows the relation between stress test exposure and consumer-level delinquencies. The dependent variable is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the consumer is delinquent (i.e., 90 days past due) on credit cards at any point in the
year after the disclosure of stress test results. The key independent variable, Weighted Exposure, is constructed using
account-level data. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately
at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and after the public disclosure of stress test results for that cycle, by averaging
across time. Weighted Exposure is computed at the individual level by aggregating the weighted Exposure measure at
the credit card–level, where the weights assigned to a credit card are proportional to its credit limit. The standard errors
are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weighted Exposure 0.195*** 0.042*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.014**
(3.79) (3.03) (5.08) (4.96) (2.03)
Non-prime 0.945***
(3.21)
Weighted Exposure × Non-prime 0.191***
(3.22)
N 3,158,142 3,158,142 3,158,142 3,158,142 3,158,142
Controls X X X X
Fixed effects ST,Z5 ST×Z5 ST×Z5
Adj R2 0.000 0.077 0.079 0.081 0.081
likelihood of two consumers who live in the same ZIP code at the outset of a particular stress test
cycle, but differ in their exposure to high–stress test exposure banks. Moreover, this set of fixed
effects controls for common shocks at the ZIP code level (e.g., changes in house prices, changes in
unemployment) that can affect the consumer’s propensity to default. My findings remain unaffected
by the inclusion of these fixed effects.
Lastly, in Column (5), I interact the Weighted Exposure measure with an indicator variable for
non-prime consumers in the presence of 5-digit ZIP code×ST Cycle fixed effects. Again, unsurpris-
ingly, the coefficient estimate on Non-Prime suggests that non-prime consumers are significantly
more likely to default on credit cards relative to prime consumers. However, the coefficient estimate
on Weighted Exposure × Non-Prime is also positive and significant, indicating that even within the
non-prime segment, higher reliance on cards issued by stress-tested banks with larger implied capital
requirements (i.e., high-exposure banks) is associated with higher propensities of ex-post defaults.
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My findings suggest that one additional unit of weighted exposure is associated with approximately
a 20% higher default probability for non-prime consumers.
1.6.2 Impact on perceived consumer creditworthiness
In the previous section, I document that consumers with greater reliance on cards issued by high-
exposure banks are more likely to experience credit card delinquencies in the future, and this effect
is significantly larger for the non-prime segment. In this section, I examine whether this higher
propensity for delinquencies affects the relative probability of non-prime consumers becoming prime
consumers by crossing the industry-standard credit score threshold of 680 in the months following
the disclosure of stress test results.18
The analysis is restricted to the sample of non-prime consumers. The dependent variable in the
analysis is an indicator variable that equals 1 for non-prime consumers who turn (and remain) prime
in the 12 months following the conclusion of a stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. I present my
findings in Table 1.8.
Similar to the analysis shown in Table 1.7, I progressively saturate my econometric specification
with ex-ante measures of borrower quality, vectors of 5-digit ZIP code and ST Cycle fixed effects,
and finally, a vector of 5-digit ZIP code × ST Cycle. Despite the addition of all controls, I find
that non-prime consumers who are more reliant on credit cards issued by high-exposure banks are
significantly less likely to become prime in the months following stress test disclosure. The estimate
in Column (4), which contains the full set of controls and fixed effects, suggests that a non-prime
consumer who has the median level of weighted exposure is approximately 5.3% less likely to
become prime when compared to a non-prime consumer with no credit extended from high–stress
test exposure banks.
18These thresholds have been shown to matter in credit markets ([18]).
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Table 1.8: Impact of stress test exposure on consumer creditworthiness
This table examines how the perceived creditworthiness of borrowers is affected by having a high percentage of credit
card limits issued by banks more negatively exposed to stress tests. Broadly, this table examines the relationship between
stress test exposure and the probability of improved borrower creditworthiness in the non-prime consumer segment. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-prime consumer transitions to prime status (i.e., has
a credit score over 680) at any point in the year after stress test results are disclosed. The key independent variable,
Weighted Exposure, is constructed using account-level data. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single
credit card–level cross-section separately at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and after the public disclosure of
stress test results for that cycle, by averaging across time. Weighted Exposure is computed at the individual level by
aggregating the weighted Exposure measure at the credit card–level, in which the weights assigned to a credit card
are proportional to its credit limit. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: 1(Non-prime–Prime) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted Exposure -0.352*** -0.150*** -0.125*** -0.125***
(-4.14) (-3.26) (-3.42) (-3.32)
N 830,929 830,929 830,929 830,929
Controls X X X
Fixed effects ST, Z5 ST×Z5
Adj R2 0.001 0.053 0.058 0.058
1.6.3 Heterogeneity across consumer demographics
In this section, I examine whether the above documented adverse consequences of higher consumer
reliance on high-exposure banks are driven by measures of consumer sophistication not perfectly
correlated with credit scores. I present my findings in Table 1.9.
In Panel A, I study consumer delinquencies. I find that the adverse outcomes of future defaults
associated with higher reliance on high-exposure banks is driven by low-income consumers (Sub-
Panel A.1). In Sub-Panel A.2, I examine whether education plays a moderating role. I find that
higher reliance on high-exposure banks is not associated with higher future default likelihood in the
sample of college-educated consumers. However, high-exposure consumers with no college degree
are significantly more likely to be delinquent in the future. Lastly, in Sub-Panel A.3, I proxy for
consumer sophistication based on occupation. As earlier, I set an indicator variable that equals 1
for consumers who hold jobs that do not require a sophisticated skillset, and 0 otherwise. I find
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that, on average, for a given level of weighted exposure, consumers with non-sophisticated jobs are
approximately three times more likely to be delinquent in the future.
In Panel B, I study the impact of greater reliance on high-exposure banks on consumer credit-
worthiness. I find that high-exposure non-prime consumers with lower incomes are less likely to
transition to prime status within one year of the conclusion of a given stress test cycle (Sub-Panel
B.1). In Sub-Panel B.2, I find that non–college educated non-prime consumers with a 1-unit higher
weighted exposure are approximately 17% less likely to transition to prime status in the future when
compared to non–college educated non-prime consumers with no exposure to stress-tested banks.
Lastly, in Sub-Panel B.3, I find that non-prime consumers with non-sophisticated jobs are also less
likely to transition to prime status, but this effect is not statistically significant.
Thus, the results discussed in this section provides suggestive evidence that higher consumer
reliance on credit cards issued by banks that are more exposed to stress tests has possible adverse
consequences on consumers’ financial well-being. Not only are high-exposure non-prime consumers
significantly more likely to experience ex-post credit card defaults, they are also less likely to tran-
sition to prime status in the future when compared to low-exposure non-prime consumers. Given
that credit scores mediate a large number of dynamic responses in credit markets (see [19, 14, 20,
21]) and that lenders use certain credit score thresholds in lending decisions ([18]), my findings sug-
gest that high-exposure individuals are less likely to enjoy the benefits associated with higher credit
scores. This is especially stark given that average consumer credit scores have increased in the years
following the financial crisis.19 Moreover, I also find that these potentially adverse effects are driven
largely by consumers with lower income, lower education, and non-sophisticated jobs.
19Using credit bureau data, I plot average consumer credit score trends in Figure 1.5. I find that consumer credit
scores have increased by approximately 10 points, on average, in the 10 years since the financial crisis of 2008.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneity across consumer demographics
This table examines the role of consumer demographics in explaining ex-post consumer creditworthiness. Panel A examines ex-post delinquencies, while
Panel B studies the probability of non-prime consumers transitioning to prime status following the disclosure of stress test results. The dependent variable
in Panel A is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the consumer is 90 days past due on credit cards one year after the disclosure of stress test results,
and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Panel B is an indicator variable that equals 1 for non-prime consumers who transition to prime status after
the disclosure of stress test results, and 0 for non-prime consumers who do not transition. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the non-prime consumer transitions to prime status (i.e., has a credit score over 680) at any point in the year after stress test results disclosure. The
key independent variable, Weighted Exposure, is constructed using account-level data. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit
card–level cross-section separately at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and after the public disclosure of stress test results for that cycle, by averaging
across time. Weighted Exposure is computed at the individual level by aggregating the weighted Exposure measure at the credit card–level, in which the
weights assigned to a credit card are proportional to its credit limit. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Impact of consumer demographics on delinquencies
B.1: Monthly income B.2: Education B.3: Occupation
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (2) Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (3)
Weighted Exp × Income (log) -0.073** Weighted Exp × No college 0.074*** Weighted Exp × Non-soph job 0.097***
(-2.16) (4.66) (4.09)
Weighted Exp 0.645** Weighted Exp 0.007 Weighted Exp 0.034***
(2.25) (0.64) (2.87)
Income (log) -0.852*** No college -0.096* Non-soph job -0.173**
(-8.81) (-1.72) (-2.02)
N 3,158,142 3,158,142 1,000,435
Fixed effects ST×Z5 ST×Z5 ST×Z5
Adj R2 0.101 0.101 0.088
Panel B: Impact of consumer demographics on perceived consumer creditworthiness
B.1: Monthly income B.2: Education B.3: Occupation
Depvar: 1(Non-prime–Prime) (1) Depvar: 1(Non-prime–Prime) (2) Depvar: 1(Non-prime–Prime) (3)
Weighted Exp × Income (log) 0.359*** Weighted Exp × No college -0.213** Weighted Exp × Non-soph job -0.103
(3.46) (-2.12) (-0.57)
Weighted Exp -3.232*** Weighted Exp -0.120 Weighted Exp -0.399***
(-3.90) (-1.14) (-2.97)
Income (log) 5.566*** No college -1.271*** Non-soph job 0.041
(13.90) (-3.27) (0.06)
N 830,929 830,929 222,340
Fixed effects ST×Z5 ST×Z5 ST×Z5
Adj R2 0.143 0.194 0.140
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Figure 1.5: Average credit scores over time
This figure shows the evolution of consumer credit scores over time in the U.S. The sample covers the period
2010 through 2018. Consumer credit scores are measured using the Vantage 3.0 credit scoring model, which
ranges from a low of 300 to a high of 850. The average credit scores for all consumers in the United States
across time are represented in the form of red diamond-shaped symbols. These symbols are connected by a
solid black line.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I examine how banks respond to stress test–induced increases in capital requirements
in the form of risk-taking in the consumer credit card market. Using detailed account-level data
on credit card limits and balances, I implement a within-consumer empirical specification, which
allows me to study the effects of stress tests on the credit card limits offered to the same consumer
by two or more banks that have differential exposure to stress tests. I find that the earlier rounds
of stress tests induced banks with larger implied capital requirements to sharply reduce limits for
risky consumers, consistent with the risk-reduction effect of higher capital requirements. However,
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in later rounds of stress tests, I find that the same highly exposed banks have increasingly issued
higher limits to ex-ante risky consumers. Thus, in later rounds, my findings are more consistent
with the reach-for-yield incentives generated by higher capital requirements. This transition from
risk-reduction to risk-seeking behavior appears to be mediated through banks adapting to stress tests
over time. Furthermore, I find that issuing higher limits to risky consumers does indeed increase
the riskiness of bank lending. I document that non-prime consumers, who have a high marginal
propensity to borrow, respond to increased credit limits by increasing carried-over balances on cards
issued by high-exposure banks.
Consistent with higher bank risk-taking in later rounds, I document that cards issued by high-
exposure banks have higher ex-post likelihoods of default relative to cards issued by low-exposure
banks to the same individual. Moreover, this higher relative propensity to default on cards issued
by high-exposure banks is driven entirely by the non-prime consumer segment. Credit card lending
is, by nature, driven almost entirely by hard information. Thus, banks may optimally respond to
higher stress test–induced capital requirements by searching for yield in the non-prime consumer
segment in the credit card market. However, if additional credit is extended to consumers whose so-
phistication levels are not perfectly explained by their credit scores, it is possible that the associated
ex-post credit card delinquencies are distributed unequally across different consumer demographics.
Consistently, I find that consumers with lower income, low education levels, and unsophisticated
jobs are significantly more likely to default subsequently.
Lastly, I find suggestive evidence that greater reliance on credit cards issued by high-exposure
banks can have potentially unfavorable implications for consumer credit outcomes. I document that
consumers who have a larger percentage of their total credit card limits issued by high-exposure
banks are significantly more likely to default when compared to consumers with no exposure to
stress-tested banks. Moreover, this effect is driven almost entirely by the non-prime consumer seg-
ment. Consistently, I find that more affected non-prime consumers are thus significantly less likely
to cross the credit score threshold of 680 ex-post (thus turning prime) compared to low-exposure
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non-prime consumers. Moreover, these effects are more pronounced for the low-income and less-
educated consumer segments. Thus, taken together, I find that stress test–induced increases in capital
requirements can induce higher risk-taking by banks. However, such potentially profit-maximizing
“reaching-for-yield” behavior on the part of some banks can have adverse consequences on con-
sumer creditworthiness, which are distributed unequally across different consumer demographics.
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CHAPTER 2
IMPACT OF MARKETPLACE LENDING ON CONSUMERS’ FUTURE BORROWING
CAPACITIES AND BORROWING OUTCOMES
2.1 Introduction
Consumer lending, at $3.6 trillion in 2017, constitutes a significant share of the U.S. economy.
Banks are the primary providers of credit to most consumers. However, over the last decade, sev-
eral FinTech disruptors, including marketplace lending (MPL) platforms such as Lending Club and
Prosper, have entered the consumer credit market and have grown rapidly. MPL platforms allow in-
dividual investors and institutions to compete with traditional financial intermediaries such as banks.
Moreover, MPL platforms rely heavily on data-driven technology for origination and, in contrast to
traditional banking models, they rely on direct due diligence by MPL investors ([49, 50]). Thus,
greater credit market competition and the collective information production by MPLs and their in-
vestors could challenge the traditional banking model and affect how borrowers access credit.
In this paper, we examine how obtaining MPL credit affects a borrower’s future borrowing capac-
ities (i.e., credit scores, credit card utilization, and credit card limits) and their borrowing outcomes
(i.e., debt accumulation and defaults). We interpret these effects within the context of the screening
technology of the MPL platform and its investors. For instance, screening by MPL lenders implies
that MPL borrowers should have fewer defaults relative to observably similar borrowers who are
denied the credit. Moreover, if screening by MPL lenders signals better expected outcomes, then
other lenders should be more willing to extend credit to MPL borrowers, thereby improving MPL
borrowers’ future borrowing capacities ([51]).
Using the same framework, we also examine how the screening technology of MPL lenders
compares to that of traditional banks, in order to shed light on MPLs’ ability to challenge the tradi-
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tional banking model. However, it is challenging to identify screening, as lenders typically screen
on private information that is not always observable to the econometrician. Our comprehensive
account-level data for all U.S. consumers mitigates this challenge. First, we can account for detailed
borrower characteristics before loan origination, which are also observable to lenders while they
make their credit decisions. Next, we also observe the borrower’s credit usage and credit outcomes
ex post, which are correlated with the lender’s private information. Thus, given observably similar
MPL and bank borrowers, if MPL lenders have better private information and screen better than
banks, then MPL borrowers’ ex post credit outcomes and their ability to access credit should be
better than bank borrowers.
We identify approximately one million borrowers on one of the largest U.S. MPL platforms using
anonymized data from Equifax. These detailed data allow us to compare MPL borrowers to non-
MPL borrowers and track their credit characteristics and credit outcomes at a monthly frequency. At
loan origination, the average MPL borrower’s credit score is 19 points lower than the average U.S.
borrower. The average MPL borrower also has six more debt-related accounts than the average U.S.
borrower. The most salient difference is that MPL borrowers have about twice as many credit cards,
twice the amount of credit card balances, and twice the credit card utilization ratio as the average
U.S. borrower. Overall, MPL borrowers appear to have lower observable credit quality and a higher
reliance on credit card debt.
In order to construct observably similar benchmark borrowers to MPL borrowers, we focus on
borrowers that reside in the same 5-digit ZIP code as an MPL borrower and who also applied for an
unsecured installment loan from a bank in the same year–month as the MPL borrower. As a result,
we obtain two cohorts of bank applicants: (a) those that successfully obtained credit from banks
(i.e, bank borrowers) and (b) those that were denied credit from banks (i.e, unmet borrowers).1 We
further match these MPL and non-MPL borrowers on the various credit characteristics on which
1Our dataset does not contain information on borrowers who were denied credit by the MPL platform. Thus, we
cannot identify and track these borrowers in our analysis.
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MPL and non-MPL borrowers tend to differ.2 Together, these observably similar benchmark bor-
rowers allow us to compare the effect of obtaining MPL credit with that of obtaining or being denied
comparable bank credit.
We begin our analysis by examining the effect of MPL loan take-up on a borrower’s future bor-
rowing capacities: the borrower’s credit scores, credit limits, and credit utilization. We find that the
borrowing capacities of MPL borrowers improve shortly after the MPL loan take-up. Within the
first two months after obtaining the MPL loan, MPL borrowers experience a sharp 38-point increase
in credit scores relative to unmet borrowers and a 13-point increase relative to bank borrowers. As a
result, we find that 39.7% of the MPL borrowers in the unmet cohort jump from subprime to near-
prime or near-prime to prime shortly after obtaining the MPL loan. We also find that lenders are
more willing to supply credit to MPL borrowers after their loan take-up. However, in contrast to
the credit score trends, the increase in credit limits is not immediate but rather grows steadily over
time. Two years after the MPL loan take-up, MPL borrowers have 15% ($2,740) and 6% ($1,247)
higher credit limits relative to the average pre-loan credit limits of $18,266 for unmet borrowers and
$20,784 for bank borrowers, respectively. Finally, MPL borrowers also enjoy immediate higher bor-
rowing capacities on their credit cards because MPL borrowers tend to consolidate their credit card
debt with the MPL loan, which sharply reduces their existing credit card utilization. This response
is consistent with the MPL borrowers’ most frequently stated loan purpose of debt consolidation
during their MPL loan application.3
Next, we analyze the effect of obtaining an MPL loan on a borrower’s future borrowing out-
comes as measured by debt accumulation and defaults. First, it is important to note that higher
borrowing capacities after obtaining an MPL loan need not result in more immediate or future bor-
2We focus on unsecured personal installment loans from banks, as it is a comparable credit product to the MPL
loan. We match the MPL and these non-MPL borrowers on the levels and trends of credit utilization ratios and credit
scores. We also match them on the number of open accounts, revolving accounts, mortgage balance, total non-mortgage
balance, credit card limits, monthly income, and debt-to-income ratio. Our matching exercise yields 347,172 unmet
cohorts and 118,148 bank cohorts.
3Using publicly available data from Lending Club and Prosper, we find that approximately 81.82% of MPL loan
applications state “debt consolidation” as the primary reason for accessing MPL credit.
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rowing if, for instance, the permanent income hypothesis holds. However, if borrowers are credit
constrained either currently or in the future, then greater borrowing capacities can lead to more bor-
rowing. Similarly, if borrowing allows an individual to manage temporary liquidity shocks in the
short term without having to default, then additional borrowing can lower defaults in the short run.
In contrast, additional borrowing can also be associated with adverse selection if borrowers with a
higher likelihood of default borrow more and default.
We document that MPL borrowers increase their credit card borrowing at a higher rate than the
benchmark cohorts of bank and unmet borrowers. MPL borrowers were able to pay down their
credit card debt by about 64% relative to the unmet borrowers immediately after obtaining the MPL
loan; however, two years later, MPL borrowers have 14% ($1,448) more credit card debt than unmet
borrowers. Similarly, MPL borrowers have 9% ($1,010) more credit card debt than bank borrowers.
Further, two years after obtaining an MPL loan, MPL borrowers have higher aggregate debt and
have higher required monthly debt repayments relative to their monthly income. Thus, our results
suggest that MPL borrowers, despite the immediate debt consolidation, have a greater debt burden
and appear relatively more liquidity constrained than their benchmark cohorts two years after the
MPL loan take-up.
Next, we examine whether the additional borrowing by MPL borrowers affects their defaults.
We find that two years after obtaining an MPL loan, MPL borrowers default across all types of debt
more than the ex ante observably similar benchmark unmet and bank borrowers. Two years post loan
origination, MPL borrowers default 1.13 percentage points (pp) (24% relative to the mean default
rate) more than their benchmark unmet borrowers and 0.72 pp (20%) more than bank borrowers.4
Consistent with the deterioration in long-term borrowing outcomes, MPL borrowers’ credit scores
are 2 points and 7 points lower than their benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively, two
years after the MPL loan take-up. In contrast, while the credit scores of the bank borrowers also
jump after their loan take-up, their credit scores are relatively more persistent over time compared
4The 2-year mean default rate for the unmet cohort is 4.75%, and the bank cohort is 3.53%.
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to MPL borrowers.
Thus, in stark contrast to the results on borrowing capacities, the worse borrowing outcomes of
MPL borrowers suggest that MPL lenders screen less effectively than banks (i.e., adverse selection).
We argue that our results are unlikely to be driven by MPL and bank borrowers facing different loan
terms (i.e., the moral hazard effect). First, our results are robust to controlling for loan terms.5 Next,
MPL borrowers default at higher rates across all types of debt, which is arguably a mix of various
loan terms. MPL borrowers also default more than bank borrowers on credit card debt, which
generally has standardized terms across borrowers ([54]). Thus, the worse borrowing outcomes of
MPL borrowers seem to be more indicative of their poorer credit quality rather than the loan terms
available to them. Finally, we also show that our results are not sensitive to our matching procedure.
Next, we try to shed light on why borrowing from MPLs temporarily improves the borrowing
capacities of borrowers, but MPL borrowers subsequently default at a higher rate than similar cohorts
of bank borrowers and borrowers with unmet credit demand. Our evidence suggests that the initial
credit score jump is somewhat “mechanical” in nature and is unlikely to be driven by an information
spillover from the MPL loan. First, we observe that the credit scores of MPL borrowers jump even
before MPL loan origination data are reflected in the credit bureau data.6 Second, we find that
this credit score jump is almost entirely explained by the sharp decline in the credit utilization of
borrowers who use the MPL loan to immediately pay down their credit card debt. These results
indicate that credit scores after obtaining an MPL loan jump because credit scoring models, which
factor in credit utilization, mechanically assign a higher credit score after debt consolidation.7
Similarly, our analysis suggests that the MPL borrowers’ higher credit limits relative to their
benchmark borrowers are markedly explained by their mechanical credit score jump within the first
5Lenders can also use non-price loan terms (e.g., maturity, loan amount) to screen borrowers (see [52, 53]). Thus,
controlling for loan terms could control for both the moral hazard effect and the screening effect associated with them.
6For instance, most MPL loans are reported to credit bureaus about three months after they are originated. However,
credit scores increase within the first two months after loan origination.
7However, in practice, one fundamental reason why credit utilization factors heavily in credit scoring models (which
are inverse relative default probabilities) is because consumers choose to default on their unsecured credit card debt
before other secured debt (e.g., auto loans, mortgages).
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two months after obtaining an MPL loan. Moreover, we find that the increase in credit limits is
driven primarily by the opening of new credit card accounts as opposed to increased limits on ex-
isting accounts. As new lenders arguably rely more on credit scores for their lending decisions than
existing relationship lenders, this evidence further highlights the role of the credit score jump in
explaining the higher future credit limits of MPL borrowers.
Next, we attempt to understand why MPL borrowers subsequently default at a higher rate com-
pared to similar cohorts of bank borrowers and borrowers with unmet credit demand. We provide
suggestive evidence for the adverse selection of MPL borrowers on two dimensions. First, we find
that MPL borrowers default more than bank borrowers because MPL borrowers are more likely to
be liquidity constrained. That is, we find that contemporaneous changes in the required monthly
debt repayments as a fraction of monthly income, a proxy for changes in liquidity constraints, can
explain the differential default rates between MPL borrowers and the benchmark bank and unmet
borrowers.
Second, we find that among MPL borrowers, those who use a greater fraction of their loan
proceeds to consolidate debt have lower future default rates and higher future credit scores. Debt
consolidation can be a positive signal because it suggests the borrower’s intention to refinance ex-
pensive debt, pay off debt faster with fixed regular payments, or simplify and consolidate payments
spread across multiple debt accounts. However, while debt consolidation is the primary stated loan
purpose of the MPL borrowers, MPL lenders cannot ensure that their borrowers will use their loan
proceeds for their stated loan purpose, thereby increasing the likelihood of adverse selection issues.8
Further, in contrast to the MPL borrowers, we find this adverse selection on debt consolidation to be
significantly smaller among bank borrowers.
Our results on adverse selection suggest that even though both MPL and bank borrowers ob-
tain loans, the lower ability of MPL lenders to screen borrowers can pool more high–default risk
8For instance, despite stating debt consolidation as the loan purpose, borrowers with a higher default probability
might be more likely to use their loan proceeds for consumption, thus ending up with more debt.
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MPL borrowers with low–default risk MPL borrowers. However, over time, these borrowers’ types
are revealed through their private actions (e.g., debt accumulation, defaults). Consistent with these
arguments, we find that the average borrowing capacities and outcomes of MPL borrowers deteri-
orate more steeply over time than bank borrowers. Overall, our results indicate that the screening
technology of MPL platforms is weaker than banks.
Finally, we analyze why banks are able to screen better than MPL platforms. In our sample
of first-time bank installment loan borrowers and MPL loan borrowers, we find that the better per-
formance of bank borrowers is mainly driven by those who have a previous relationship with their
originating bank as opposed to non-relationship bank borrowers. These results are consistent with
banks having more information to screen their relationship borrowers, such as other account-level
and transaction-level data, which are not easily available to the MPL platforms. We also find that
after November 2014, when the MPL platform in our study reduced the information provided on
loan applicants to their investors (see [50]), the default rates of MPL borrowers relative to bank
borrowers worsened. These results suggest that investors are an important contributor to the MPL
screening technology.
We contribute to the burgeoning literature on investor screening on MPL platforms. For exam-
ple, [49] find that peer lenders display greater accuracy in predicting loan defaults than borrowers’
credit scores. [55] suggest that lender screening improves over time owing to repeated participation
on MPL platforms. Exploiting a natural experiment on the Lending Club platform, [53] show that
loan terms (e.g., maturity) can be used to screen borrowers. [50] show superior screening by sophis-
ticated investors on MPL platforms.9 Broadly, this area of research has examined screening within
MPL platforms. We contribute to this literature by benchmarking the screening technology of MPL
platforms relative to traditional banks.10
9Other studies on MPL platforms have focused on how various borrower characteristics affect loan approval and loan
pricing. See, for instance, the effect of race ([56]), the appearance of trustworthiness ([57]), attractiveness ([58]), social
networks ([59]), and the unverifiable reasons stated on MPL loan applications ([60]).
10Another strand of literature studies whether MPL credit serves as a complement or substitute to bank credit (see
[61, 62, 63]). However, this is not our study’s focus.
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Our results also highlight the superior information available to traditional financial interme-
diaries to screen borrowers ( [64, 65]). Data-driven information processing can either substitute
or complement traditional hard information such as credit scores ([66]), but our results show the
limitation of using hard data to infer relationship-based information that is available to traditional
financial intermediaries.
In a related paper, [51] finds that obtaining MPL credit has positive information spillover effects
for borrowers. However, [51] focuses on repeat applicants. Like most peer-to-peer markets, the MPL
platform typically relies on feedback and reputation systems to facilitate transactions by publishing
information on past borrowing outcomes. Thus, it is likely that repeat borrowers are of higher quality
because the platform screens out the low-quality borrowers over time. Alternatively, borrowers may
exert more effort toward loan repayment in order to maintain continued access to the MPL platform.
To our knowledge, we are the first to show that MPL borrower outcomes improve temporar-
ily after their loan take-up, but they subsequently default at a higher rate. [67] also document that
FinTech borrowers are more likely to default and exhibit higher indebtedness than borrowers from
traditional financial institutions. While they analyze the behavioral biases of FinTech borrowers,
our study focuses on explaining these trends more generally by comparing the screening technolo-
gies of MPL platforms to traditional lenders and by exploring the economic factors that drive their
distinctive screening technologies.
Our results contribute to the literature on the association between borrower quality and the mech-
anisms through which borrowers are funded on MPL platforms. The MPL loans in our study are
funded using the price assignment mechanism, wherein a menu of take-it-or-leave-it loan contracts
are offered to borrowers based on the platform’s credit scoring algorithm.11 Our results are consistent
with [68] and [69], who show that while the price assignment mechanism improves the probability
of funding loans, it comes at the cost of increasing adverse selection among borrowers.
11For instance, borrowers can leave the MPL platform without applying for a loan after they view the menu of loan
contracts available to them.
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Finally, our results also document the dependence of the credit market on credit scores, in which
even non-fundamental changes in credit scores can have real effects on credit supply ([70, 20]).
Overall, these results highlight a trade-off associated with automated underwriting using credit
scores: While credit scoring can improve the overall screening ability of credit markets ([71]), it
can also crowd out the production of soft information ([72, 73]).
2.2 Empirical methodology and identification
The main objective of this paper is to examine the effects of obtaining MPL credit on borrowers’
future borrowing capacities and future borrowing outcomes. To this end, we evaluate the effects
of obtaining MPL credit against two benchmarks. The first benchmark is an observably similar
non-MPL borrower whose credit demand was unmet. In other words, such a non-MPL borrower
was denied a loan after applying for it or the borrower refused to take up an approved loan. The
second benchmark is an observably similar non-MPL borrower who obtains credit from a traditional
financial intermediary such as a bank. For both benchmark non-MPL borrowers, we consider credit
products that are comparable to the MPL loan, namely, unsecured bank personal installment loans.
By comparing the future borrowing capacities and outcomes of MPL borrowers to these bench-
mark non-MPL borrowers, we seek to compare the screening technology of MPL lenders with
the screening technology of traditional bank lenders. However, a primary challenge in identify-
ing screening is that screening typically occurs on information that is privately observed by the
lender, but not the econometrician. We mitigate this challenge by using detailed micro credit bureau
data on borrowers. First, these detailed data allow us to control for the borrower characteristics that
lenders utilize for their credit decisions. Second, we also observe a borrower’s behavior and out-
comes ex post, which should be correlated with their lender’s private information that was used to
screen borrowers and make the credit decision. Thus, if MPL lenders screen better than banks, then
MPL borrowers’ expected credit market outcomes should be better than observably similar bank
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borrowers.
To compare the effect of obtaining an MPL loan on a borrower’s future borrowing capacities
and outcomes, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model for every event-month
t ∈ [−12,+24] around the MPL loan take-up:
Y tic − Y −1ic = ∆Y
{t,−1}
ic = α + β
tMPLi + f(X
{−1}
i ) + λc + εic, (2.1)
where subscript i indexes individuals and subscript c indexes cohorts. A cohort is a pair of ob-
servably similar MPL and non-MPL borrowers who live in the same 5-digit ZIP code and apply for
credit in the same year–month. We construct cohorts by implementing a k–nearest neigbhors (KNN)
algorithm to match MPL and non-MPL borrowers on both the levels and the trends of several credit-
related variables (e.g., credit score, credit balance, income, debt-to-income ratio) as described in
detail in Section 2.3.3.
∆Y
{t,−1}
ic represents the change in borrowing capacity or borrowing outcome of borrower i (who
belongs to cohort c) from event-month −1 to event-month t. Event-month 0 represents the MPL
(or equivalently bank) loan origination month. MPLi equals 1 if individual i obtains an MPL loan,
and equals 0 otherwise (i.e., the individual obtains a bank loan or the individual’s credit demand
is unmet). Thus, βt captures the effect of obtaining an MPL loan on future credit outcomes and
borrowing capacities t months after the MPL loan take-up relative to the non-MPL benchmark.
f(X
{−1}
i ) is a vector of control variables that includes a large set of credit-related variables and loan
terms and is measured in the month prior to the MPL loan origination. λc represents cohort fixed
effects, and εic is the error term. We double-cluster standard errors at the ZIP code and origination
year–month level.
The model in Equation (2.1) is akin to the following fully saturated model in levels:






i )×Montht + λct + εict,
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with Cohort×Year-month (λct), Individual (αi) fixed effects, an indicator for each month (Montht),
and allowing for the effect of the differences in ex ante characteristics to vary flexibly over time
(f(X{−1}i ) × Montht).12 However, the differenced model in Equation (2.1) is parsimonious and
thus easier to implement compared to the fully saturated model in levels. We verify that both Equa-
tion (2.1) and the levels specification above provide the same results.
The differenced outcome variable ∆Y {t,−1}ic differences out the time-invariant borrower-specific
heterogeneity αi. Cohort fixed effects (λc) ensure that βt, which is the coefficient associated with
MPLi, is identified within-cohort by comparing the MPL borrower to the matched non-MPL bor-
rower.13 The vector of control variables, f(X{−1}i ) also includes the matching variables used for
constructing our cohorts prior to loan take-up to account for any imperfect matches between MPL
and non-MPL borrowers.
Controlling for the observable information that is common to both the MPL and the bank’s
lending decision is important for our analysis. For instance, if both banks and MPL lenders use a
borrower characteristic that is unobservable by the econometrician, then βt can be biased if bank
and MPL lenders intentionally obtain a different (priced) risk exposure on this omitted borrower
characteristic. Typically, one cannot completely eliminate this possibility because the full set of
borrower characteristics that lenders use for their credit decisions is generally unknown. However,
this concern is mitigated in our setting because MPL lenders are required by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to publicly disclose the information they use to evaluate the risk of loans.
This information is primarily provided by credit bureaus, which is similar to our data, and consists
of information such as the number of debt accounts and the usage and payment history on those
accounts. Arguably, this information is also available to banks.
A further potential concern is that even if the common information set used by the lenders is
12We do not control for contemporaneous variables f(Xi,t) to avoid the “bad” controls problem because some of the
credit-related variables in f(Xi,t) can themselves be affected due to the MPL loan take-up (see [74]).
13A cohort c is calendar-time and borrower-pair specific. This is because the MPL borrower and the counterfactual
borrower are matched on the calendar year–month of the loan take-up (i.e., the calendar year–month and event year–
month are perfectly collinear). Thus, cohort fixed effects perfectly absorb calendar-time and event-time fixed effects.
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known, their proprietary credit model is unknown, which can again bias βt if we assume a linear
regression model. This concern is mitigated by our KNN matching analysis because matching MPL
and non-MPL borrowers can account for any non-linear dependence of the outcome variable on
the matching variables, thereby avoiding functional form restrictions imposed by a linear regression
model. Most of our baseline analysis relies on the matched cohorts, but we also show that our
results are similar if we conduct this analysis using the unmatched sample by controlling for all the
matching variables used to construct our cohorts.
In additional robustness tests involving comparisons of MPL borrowers and bank borrowers,
we also include loan terms as controls to account for the possibility that the differences in future
credit outcomes and borrowing capacities are driven by the differences in loan terms between the
MPL loans and the bank installment loans. For instance, taking up a larger loan, or a higher interest
rate-loan today might reduce the borrower’s future borrowing capacity.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
2.3.1 Data
We obtain our data from Equifax. All the data are used purely for academic purposes, and they
contain completely anonymized information. The credit bureau’s trade line-level data provide com-
prehensive, anonymized records of the various lines of credit opened by every U.S. consumer. Our
dataset spans the time period between 2011 and 2016. We use this dataset to identify all individuals
who originated unsecured installment loans from one of the largest MPLs in the consumer credit
space in the U.S. We identify 1,283,429 MPL borrowers in our primary dataset.14 Among these bor-
rowers, we include only loans with nonmissing loan origination dates and strictly positive balances
(91.84% of sample). Next, we exclude repeat borrowers and focus only on one-time MPL borrowers
14We use publicly available data from the MPL platform in our study, and we find that the credit bureau’s sample
covers approximately 98.65% of all loans self-reported by the MPL platform on its website.
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on this platform (81.39% of sample).15 After applying these filters, our data consist of 1,043,370
one-time MPL borrowers who originated an MPL loan between 2011 and 2016.
Next, we merge our MPL origination data with the borrower’s credit data (e.g., credit score,
credit balance, utilization ratio, defaults) and demographic data (e.g., monthly income, occupation,
education).16 These credit data consist of monthly snapshots at the individual level. We gather
the credit data for a borrower from 12 months before the origination of the MPL loan (the pre-
period) to 24 months after origination (the post-period). As the demographic data are available only
since June 2013, we further restrict our sample to MPL loan originations between June 2013 and
December 2016. Thus, our final sample consists of 763,986 borrowers who obtained an MPL loan
between June 2013 and December 2016.
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics: MPL borrowers versus the average U.S. borrower
In Table 2.1, Panel A, we compare the characteristics of the MPL borrowers in the month before
the MPL loan origination to a 5% random sample of the total U.S. population. The results show
that the average MPL borrower’s credit score is 19 points lower than the average U.S. borrower’s
credit score. The average MPL borrower also has about six more debt accounts than the average
U.S. borrower. The average MPL borrower most saliently differs from the average U.S. borrower
on credit card–related debt accounts. For instance, the average MPL borrower has about twice the
number of credit cards, twice the amount of credit card balances, and twice the credit utilization
ratio as the average U.S. borrower.
15This filter reduces concerns about strategic borrower behavior, which can contaminate the analysis of the effect of
MPL loan take-up on future borrowing capacities and outcomes.
16We have access to Vantage 3.0 credit scores as opposed to FICO scores. The MPL we study
uses FICO scores for its lending decisions. For our empirical analysis, it is important to note that
the correlation between the Vantage 3.0 score and the FICO score is greater than 0.9. Source:
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201209 Analysis Differences Consumer Credit.pdf.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the credit and income characteristics of MPL borrowers. Panel A compares
the characteristics of MPL borrowers in the month before MPL loan origination to a 5% random sample of the total
U.S. population. Panel B compares MPL borrowers to all non-MPL borrowers who unsuccessfully apply for a bank
installment loan (i.e., unmet borrowers) and to non-MPL borrowers who apply for and receive a bank installment loan
(i.e., bank borrowers). Both sets of non-MPL borrowers are chosen such that they reside in the same 5-digit zip-code as
the MPL borrower and apply for the installment loan in the same month as the MPL borrower. Panel C compares MPL
borrowers to matched counterfactuals of observably similar bank borrowers and unmet borrowers using data from Panel
B.





Credit Score 656.44 675.47
Credit card utilization 69.42% 30.89%
Credit card balance $9,821 $4,197
Credit card accounts (#) 3.84 1.97
Other credit variables
Debt accounts (#) 10.49 4.68
Total Debt $232,463 $208,195
Monthly Income $3,602 $3,437
Debt-to-Income 41.03% 27.82%
Other debt
Auto accounts (#) 1.02 0.66
Mortgage accounts (#) 0.86 0.79
Student loan accounts (#) 2.23 1.66
Auto debt $20,659 $17,038
Mortgage debt $189,597 $186,237
Student debt $24,425 $19,122
Other characteristics
% College Graduates 26.85% 32.30%
% Sophisticated Job 19.64% 19.52%
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Panel B: Pre-matching summary statistics
MPL Unmet Bank
Observations 734,742 17,369,467 2,916,178
Credit card variables
Credit score 656 634 700
Credit card utilization 70 48.9 43.8
Credit card balance 9,943 6,470 8,368
Credit card accounts (#) 3.84 2.28 3.01
Other credit variables
Debt accounts (#) 10.7 6.02 8.31
Total Debt 229,539 259,163 212,614
Monthly income 3,584 3,419 3,902
DTI ratio 39.7 37.1 36.9
Originated loan terms
Loan amount 13,744 — 12,893
Loan maturity (months) 42 — 42.7
Loan interest rate (%) 16.2 — 10.2
Monthly loan payment 423 — 318
Panel C: Post-matching summary statistics
Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL Unmet MPL Bank
Observations 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148
Credit card variables
Credit score 654 655 669 672
Credit card utilization 72.3 71.7 67.7 67.5
Credit card balance 10,935 11,220 11,559 12,160
Credit card accounts (#) 4.07 3.48 4.18 3.56
Other credit variables
Debt accounts (#) 11.1 9.67 11.21 9.95
Total debt 243,119 235,453 238,749 226,424
Monthly income 3,654 3,719 3,797 3,849
DTI ratio 41.6 40.5 41.9 41.3
Originated loan terms
Loan amount 14,207 — 15,078 13,588
Loan maturity (months) 42.2 — 42.8 49.3
Loan interest rate (%) 16.1 — 14.3 11.8
Monthly loan payment 434 — 451 345
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While the monthly income of the average MPL borrower is similar to that of the average U.S.
borrower, the average MPL borrower is more indebted. The total debt-to-income (DTI) ratio for
the average MPL borrower is 41.03%, compared to 27.82% for the average U.S. borrower. Relative
to the average U.S. borrower, the average MPL borrower is equally likely to have a sophisticated
job, although MPL borrowers are less likely to have a college degree.17 Overall, one of the main
takeaways from Table 2.1, Panel A, is that the average MPL borrower differs significantly from the
average U.S. consumer in their credit card use.
2.3.3 Cohort construction and summary statistics
This section describes the construction of cohorts for our empirical analysis. Each cohort consists
of a pair of observably similar MPL and a non-MPL borrower who live in the same 5-digit ZIP
code and apply for credit in the same year–month. We construct two types of cohorts—namely, the
bank cohort and the unmet cohort . These two types of cohorts correspond to the two benchmarks
against which we compare an MPL borrower’s future credit capacities and outcomes. The bank
cohort consists of observably similar non-MPL borrowers who obtain unsecured installment loans
from banks . The unmet cohort consists of observably similar non-MPL borrowers whose demand
for unsecured bank installment loans is unmet.
We start with 763,986 MPL borrowers who obtained an MPL loan between June 2013 and De-
cember 2016 (see Section 2.3.1). For every MPL borrower, we identify non-MPL borrowers who
reside in the same 5-digit ZIP code as the MPL borrower and who also applied for a bank installment
loan in the same month as the MPL borrower. This procedure yields about 19 million unmet borrow-
ers and 3 million bank borrowers. Next, we omit borrowers who have multiple credit applications
in the same month. This filter retains 734,742 MPL borrowers (96% of the total MPL borrowers),
17.37 million unmet borrowers (92%), and 2.92 million bank borrowers (96%). Table 2.1, Panel B,
17We classify jobs in the physician/dentist, lawyers/judges, professional/technical, management, business owner in-
dustries as sophisticated jobs.
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compares these MPL, unmet, and bank borrowers.
Table 2.1, Panel B, shows that MPL and non-MPL borrowers differ significantly even after con-
trolling for location and loan application period. On average, MPL borrowers’ credit scores are 22
points higher than that of unmet borrowers, but they are 44 points lower than bank borrowers. The
MPL borrowers have significantly higher credit card utilization ratios, higher credit balances, and
more debt-related accounts than both unmet and bank borrowers. Despite their lower credit scores
and higher debt-to-income ratios, MPL borrowers receive a 6.6% higher loan amount than bank
borrowers. However, MPL borrowers pay a 6 pp higher interest rate than the bank borrowers for a
loan with similar maturity. Overall, MPL borrowers pay $105 (or 33%) higher monthly payments
towards loan repayment than the bank borrowers.
To control for the observable differences between MPL and non-MPL borrowers we employ a
tight matching algorithm. We match MPL and non-MPL borrowers to have similar monthly trends
and levels in their credit scores, credit card balances, and credit card utilization ratios over the one
year before their respective loan applications. This is because Panels A and B of Table 2.1 show that
the average MPL and non-MPL borrowers differ most significantly on credit card–related variables.
Next, we use a k-nearest neighbor (KNN) matching algorithm to match the MPL and the non-MPL
borrowers on their number of debt accounts, number of revolving debt accounts, mortgage debt,
non-mortgage debt, monthly income, and their monthly debt-to-income ratios in the month before
their loan applications.
Out of 734,742 MPL borrowers, 590,201 of them (80%) have complete credit history information
for conducting the above matching procedure. Using the above matching criteria and borrowers
with non-missing credit data, we can match 347,172 MPL borrowers (or 59%) to unmet borrowers
to create our unmet cohort, and we can match 118,148 MPL borrowers (or 20%) to bank borrowers
to create our bank cohort. These match rates suggest that MPL borrowers tend to be observably
more similar to the unmet borrowers than the bank borrowers. Overall, our unmet cohort and bank
cohorts consist of MPL borrowers and their counterfactual non-MPL borrowers who (a) reside in the
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same 5-digit ZIP code, (b) applied for their installment loans in the same month, (c) exhibit identical
credit card–related trends, and (d) are similar on other credit-related variables.
Table 2.1, Panel C shows the summary statistics for the unmet cohort and the bank cohort in
the month before MPL loan origination. The MPL and non-MPL borrowers within both cohorts
seem balanced on credit scores, credit card utilization, and credit card balances. The balancing
based on other credit characteristics (e.g., monthly income, total debt) for the MPL and non-MPL
borrowers within both cohorts has also improved compared to the pre-matched sample in Table 2.1,
Panel B. Despite having similar credit characteristics, the average MPL borrower in the bank cohort
can obtain a loan amount that is 11% higher than the bank borrower. The maturity of the MPL
borrower’s loan is 7 months shorter, and the interest rate is 2.5 pp higher than the bank borrower’s
loan. Finally, the average MPL borrower within the bank cohort pays $106 (or 31%) higher monthly
payments than the bank borrower towards loan repayment.
2.4 How does MPL Borrowing Impact Consumers’ Future Borrowing Capacities and Bor-
rowing Outcomes?
2.4.1 Graphical analysis
We begin by plotting the monthly trends for borrowing capacities and outcomes in Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2, respectively, to visually illustrate the effect of MPL loan take-up. The dashed vertical
lines in all the plots indicate the loan origination month. These figures also illustrate the pre-trends
in borrowing capacities and outcomes before the loan take-up.
Figure 2.1 shows an immediate increase in borrowing capacities for both MPL and bank bor-
rowers through a sharp reduction in credit utilization ratios and a jump in credit scores within the
first two months after their loan take-up. The credit card balance trends in Figure 2.2, Panel A, show
that the sharp reduction in credit utilization ratios is driven by the paying down of credit card debt
immediately after obtaining the loan. This pattern is consistent with debt consolidation, which is the
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main stated purpose of MPL loans.18
Panels A and B of Figure 2.1 also show a striking pattern: The credit score trends closely mirror
the credit utilization trends. For instance, the credit scores of both MPL and bank borrowers rise
sharply in the first two months after their loan originations. These are also the months during which
the MPL and bank borrowers consolidate their credit card debt. The credit scores of both MPL and
bank borrowers fall after the second month following loan origination. However, relative to the bank
borrowers, the credit scores of the MPL borrowers fall more steeply and then revert to their pre-loan
take-up levels within two years. Over the same period, the credit utilization ratios of the MPL and
bank borrowers increase steadily, but with a much steeper increase for the MPL borrowers. This
suggests that the MPL borrowers borrowed against their borrowing capacities at a faster rate.
The credit card balance trends in Figure 2.2, Panel A, indicate that credit consolidation is short
lived. Within two years of obtaining loans and consolidating their debt, the credit balances of both
the MPL and bank borrowers steadily increase and eventually surpass their pre-loan take-up levels.
In contrast, the unmet borrowers, whose bank loan applications were unsuccessful, could not con-
solidate their debt. Consequently, their credit balances remain steady over time. Figure 2.2, Panel
A, also suggests that the MPL, unmet, and bank borrowers experienced an increase in their credit
limits over time. This is because their credit utilization ratios two years after their loan originations
are lower than their pre-loan take-up values despite having similar, or higher, credit balances.
Panels B and C of Figure 2.2 plot the default trends for the unmet and bank cohorts. A borrower
is considered to be in default in month t if the borrower is 90+ days past due on a required payment
in month t. Thus, this default rate definition allows for self-cures and considers self-cures in month
t as non-delinquent borrowers in month t. For each type of debt (e.g., credit card debt), we compute
the average default rate as the number of delinquent borrowers as a fraction of the total number of
borrowers.
18The publicly available data for the MPL lender in our study show that 81.8% of all approved MPL borrowers during
our sample period state debt consolidation as the loan purpose on their loan applications.
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Figure 2.1: Impact of MPL loans on borrowing capacities
This figure presents average trends in the borrowing capacities of MPL borrowers in the months around MPL loan
origination for the unmet and bank cohorts. Panel A documents trends in credit card utilization ratios, Panel B documents
trends in credit scores. In both panels, the x-axis displays event time relative to the month of loan origination and the
y-axis represents borrowing capacities.
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Figure 2.2: Impact of MPL loans on borrowing outcomes
This figure presents average trends in the borrowing outcomes of MPL borrowers in the months around MPL loan
origination for the unmet and bank cohorts. Panel A documents credit card balance trends, Panel B documents credit
card default trends, and Panel C documents non-credit card default trends. In all panels, the x-axis displays event time
relative to the month of loan origination and the y-axis represents borrowing outcomes.
The default rates of the unmet borrowers for both credit card debt and non–credit card debt
increase sharply within the three months after their unsuccessful loan applications. This pattern
contrasts with the default rates of the MPL and bank borrowers, which remain relatively low in the
first three months after their loan take-up but then trend upwards thereafter. Two years after the loan
take-up, MPL borrowers default at a higher rate across all types of debt relative to the benchmark
unmet and bank borrowers.
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2.4.2 Univariate Analysis
We supplement our graphical analysis with summary statistics for the effect of MPL loan take-up in
Table 2.2 for the unmet cohort, the bank cohort, and the full unmatched sample of MPL borrowers.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the immediate short-run response of MPL loan take-up on future
borrowing capacities and outcomes. We find that the total debt of both MPL and bank borrowers
increases in the immediate term, which suggests that both sets of borrowers use only a portion
of their loan proceeds to consolidate debt. This is because, if the entire loan proceeds are used
to consolidate debt, then the borrower’s total debt should remain unchanged.19 The average MPL
borrower in the full unmatched sample consolidates less debt than the MPL borrower in the bank
and unmet cohorts. The change in the DTI ratio for the MPL borrowers is also greater than both the
unmet and bank borrowers immediately after loan take-up. This suggests that the MPL borrowers
must set aside a larger fraction of their monthly income for debt repayment.
The credit score of the unmet borrower drops by about 4 points, while the credit scores of the
MPL and the bank borrowers increase by 33 and 22 points, respectively, shortly after their loan take-
up. The unmet borrowers default more than the MPL and bank borrowers shortly after not obtaining
the credit. Overall, Table 2.2, Panel A, shows an improvement in borrowing capacities and borrow-
ing outcomes for the MPL and the bank borrowers relative to the unmet borrowers immediately after
loan take-up.
Table 2.2, Panel B, presents the long-run response of MPL loan take-up on future borrowing
capacities and outcomes. Panel B shows that two years after the loan take-up, the total debt of
the MPL borrowers is still relatively higher than the unmet and the bank borrowers. Comparing the
long-term debt response to the short-term debt response suggests that all the three types of borrowers
do not accumulate much debt beyond the first month after loan origination. However, over the same
period, the monthly DTI ratio of the MPL borrower increases significantly relative to both the bank
19The increase in total debt immediately after loan origination (∆TotalDebt) equals the loan amount (L) minus the
consolidation amount (C) (i.e., ∆TotalDebt = L− C).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics that document changes in the credit profile characteristics of MPL borrowers
after the MPL loan origination. Panel A reports the immediate response of MPL borrowers’ credit characteristics one
month after MPL loan take-up. Panel B reports the long-run response of MPL borrowers’ credit characteristics 2 years
after MPL loan origination. Both panels report changes in the credit profile characteristics of the full sample of MPL
borrowers after MPL loan origination. Both panels also compare changes in the credit profile characteristics of MPL
borrowers to observably-similar matched bank borrowers and borrowers with unmet credit demand.
Panel A: Short-run (−1,+1) response to MPL take-up
Full Sample Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL MPL Unmet MPL Bank
∆Log(Total Debt) (log-pts) 21.719 19.462 1.386 18.271 14.462
∆DTI Ratio (pp) 8.190 7.987 1.547 7.788 5.198
Borrowing capacities
∆Credit Utilization (pp) -25.905 -27.791 -1.352 -27.886 -22.926
∆Credit Score (pts) 30.295 32.88 -4.004 32.802 22.303
∆Log(Credit Limit) (log-pts) 4.340 3.312 2.869 2.493 1.696
Borrowing outcomes
∆Log(Credit Balance) (log-pts) -98.439 -103.157 -5.43 -113.726 -112.959
∆Credit Card Defaults (pp) -0.008 -0.002 0.201 0.007 0.029
∆Non-Credit Card Defaults (pp) 0.125 0.122 0.422 0.149 0.107
Panel B: Long-run (−1,+24) response to MPL take-up
Full Sample Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL MPL Unmet MPL Bank
∆Log(Total Debt) (log-pts) 25.429 20.686 -3.155 19.693 11.469
∆DTI Ratio (pp) 18.222 17.567 4.043 15.467 7.854
Borrowing capacities
∆Credit Utilization (pp) -8.545 -11.276 -11.284 -11.716 -14.094
∆Credit Score (pts) -5.602 -1.735 4.951 -2.295 11.243
∆Log(Credit Limit) (log-pts) 40.320 36.476 20.476 30.602 21.781
Borrowing outcomes
∆Log(Credit Balance) (log-pts) 0.708 -9.747 -31.823 -22.714 -45.523
∆Credit Card Defaults (pp) 4.279 4.101 2.523 3.353 2.147
∆Non-Credit Card Defaults (pp) 4.023 3.867 2.256 3.14 2.019
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borrower and the unmet borrower. This can occur if MPL borrowers substitute their existing debt
with more expensive debt (i.e., debt with higher interest rates) or more short-term debt (i.e., debt with
shorter maturity), both of which will result higher monthly payments. Alternatively, this can also
occur if the MPL borrowers’ incomes reduce more than the bank borrowers’ and unmet borrowers’
incomes.
The credit limits of the MPL borrowers are higher than both counterfactual benchmarks two
years after loan take-up. Finally, Table 2.2 , Panel B, shows that, relative to the benchmark borrow-
ers, the MPL borrowers default at a higher rate in the long run across all types of debt, and they have
lower credit scores.
Overall, the univariate analysis shows that the borrowing capacities (e.g., credit scores) and
outcomes (e.g., credit card defaults) of the MPL borrowers improve shortly after the MPL loan take-
up relative to their benchmark borrowers. Thus, the short-run response to the MPL loan take-up,
which indicates an improvement in the borrowing capacities of MPL borrowers, suggests that MPL
lenders screen their borrowers more effectively than banks. However, this improvement in the MPL
borrower’s borrowing capacities and outcome is temporary, since they both deteriorate faster than
the benchmark borrowers. Two years after the MPL loan take-up, MPL borrowers have, on average,
lower borrowing capacities and more adverse credit outcomes than their benchmark bank and unmet
borrowers. Thus, in stark contrast to the short-run response, the long-run response suggests that
MPL lenders’ screening technology is weaker than banks.
2.4.3 Regression analysis of the effect of MPL loan take-up
In this section, we examine the effect of obtaining an MPL loan on a borrower’s future borrowing
capacities and borrowing outcomes by estimating our baseline specification in Equation (2.1) over
different time horizons relative to the month of MPL loan take-up. Our regression results are largely
similar to the univariate analysis shown in Table 2.2. However, by including cohort fixed effects and
the matching variables in our regression model, we are better able to compare the MPL borrower
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with the non-MPL borrower within a cohort while also controlling for confounding effects due to
any inexact matching.
We do not include loan terms as controls in our baseline analysis in order to facilitate a com-
parison between the unmet cohort and bank cohort. This is because loan terms are not available for
unmet borrowers as they were unsuccessful in obtaining a loan. However, in robustness checks for
the bank cohort, we also control for loan terms and show that our results are qualitatively similar.
How does MPL Borrowing Impact Consumers’ Borrowing Capacities?
Credit Utilization
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.3 report the regression results for the change in credit utilization for
MPL borrowers relative to the unmet and bank borrowers, respectively. We estimate the baseline
specification in Equation (2.1) with the change in credit utilization ratio as our dependent variable.
All columns display β, which is the coefficient associated with MPL in Equation (2.1). As we in-
clude cohort fixed effects, β is identified using within-cohort variation by comparing MPL borrowers
to their benchmark borrowers.
We find that the credit utilization ratios of MPL borrowers decline in the first few months after
the loan take-up relative to the benchmark unmet and bank borrowers but then steadily increases
thereafter. This is consistent with credit card debt consolidation occurring shortly after loan take-up,
as seen in Figure 2.1. Columns (1) and (2) also show that the economic significance of the pre-trends
is small, which demonstrates the efficacy of our matching procedure to construct cohorts. Column
(1) shows that two years after the loan take-up, MPL borrowers’ credit utilization has steadily in-
creased and is 1.21 pp lower than that of the unmet borrowers, who could not obtain a loan and
consolidate their debt. Column (2) shows that, relative to bank borrowers, MPL borrowers have a
slightly greater utilization ratio (0.38 pp) two years after their loan take-up.
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Table 2.3: Impact of MPL loans on borrowing capacities
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ borrowing capacities in the months surrounding MPL loan origi-
nation. Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present the evolution of credit card utilization ratios,
credit scores, and credit card limits, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4), and (6)) report the re-
gression results for the change in borrowing capacities for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample of unmet
credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL
loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures the differ-
ential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CC Utilization Credit Scores Log(CC Limits)
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 0.049 -1.157∗∗∗ -1.597∗∗∗ -3.434∗∗∗ -4.110∗∗∗ -3.646∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.099) (0.286) (0.261) (0.157) (0.155)
−6 0.043 -0.638∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -2.632∗∗∗ -1.887∗∗∗ -1.534∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.053) (0.126) (0.169) (0.070) (0.088)
−3 -0.286∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.172 -1.720∗∗∗ -0.948∗∗∗ -0.498∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.045) (0.124) (0.127) (0.153) (0.070)
−2 -0.143∗∗∗ -0.059∗ 0.215∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗ -0.443∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.031) (0.075) (0.110) (0.085) (0.041)
Post-period
+0 -8.251∗∗∗ -1.632∗∗∗ 12.493∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗ 0.247 0.122∗
(0.518) (0.359) (0.656) (0.499) (0.164) (0.068)
+1 -26.940∗∗∗ -6.103∗∗∗ 38.090∗∗∗ 13.029∗∗∗ 0.255 0.448∗∗∗
(0.565) (0.425) (0.878) (1.062) (0.672) (0.111)
+2 -25.375∗∗∗ -5.037∗∗∗ 37.365∗∗∗ 12.354∗∗∗ 2.649∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗
(0.468) (0.441) (0.994) (0.977) (0.848) (0.147)
+3 -21.586∗∗∗ -4.001∗∗∗ 27.472∗∗∗ 3.770∗∗∗ 5.560∗∗∗ 2.582∗∗∗
(0.466) (0.428) (0.716) (0.745) (0.778) (0.187)
+6 -13.118∗∗∗ -1.686∗∗∗ 18.284∗∗∗ 0.131 11.211∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗
(0.462) (0.408) (0.724) (0.727) (0.799) (0.267)
+12 -5.435∗∗∗ 0.450∗ 7.143∗∗∗ -4.050∗∗∗ 15.790∗∗∗ 6.094∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.255) (0.820) (0.745) (0.816) (0.351)
+18 -2.330∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 1.798∗∗ -5.527∗∗∗ 16.110∗∗∗ 6.028∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.230) (0.870) (0.713) (0.791) (0.453)
+24 -1.208∗∗∗ 0.382∗ -2.153∗∗∗ -6.538∗∗∗ 15.337∗∗∗ 5.848∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.217) (0.725) (0.629) (0.878) (0.573)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.25 0.243 0.171 0.175 0.231 0.201
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Credit Scores
Next, in Table 2.3, Columns (3) and (4), we analyze the effect of obtaining an MPL loan on the
borrower’s credit scores. We estimate the baseline specification in Equation (2.1) with the change in
credit score as the dependent variable, and report the coefficient associated withMPL. We find that,
relative to the unmet borrowers who did not obtain a loan, the credit scores of the MPL borrowers
sharply increased by 38 points after obtaining an MPL loan. To put the magnitude of this credit score
increase in context, we find that 39.7% of the MPL borrowers jump from a lower credit category
(e.g., subprime, near-prime) to a higher credit category (e.g., prime) shortly after obtaining their
MPL loan.20 Similarly, the 13-point credit score increase of the MPL borrowers relative to the bank
borrowers allowed 8.9% (36.2 − 27.3) more MPL borrowers to jump from a lower credit category
to a higher credit category.
However, the credit scores of MPL borrowers steadily decrease over time relative to their bench-
mark borrowers. Two years after loan origination, the MPL borrowers’ credit scores are about 2
points and 7 points lower than the benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively.
Credit limits
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.3 show that the credit limits of the MPL borrowers increase after
MPL loan take-up relative to the benchmark unmet and bank borrowers. We estimate the baseline
specification in Equation (2.1) with the log change in total credit card limits as the dependent vari-
able, and report the coefficients associated with MPL. For each month, the total credit limit for an
individual is computed by aggregating the credit limits across all the credit cards of an individual.
Thus, this definition captures credit limit changes on both the intensive and the extensive margin.
Column (5) of Table 2.3 shows that the credit limits of MPL borrowers increase monotonically
20Subprime, near-prime, and prime consumers have credit scores in the range 300–619, 620–679, and 680–850,
respectively. Among the MPL borrowers in the unmet cohort, 25.8% jump from the near-prime to the prime category,
9.3% jump from the subprime to the near-prime category, and 4.6% jump from the subprime to the prime category.
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over time relative to the unmet borrower within the first 18 months after obtaining the MPL loan.
Two years after the MPL loan take-up, MPL borrowers have 15.3% (or $2,740) higher total credit
limits than their benchmark unmet borrowers. Column (6) presents similar evidence for the bank
cohort. Credit limits for the MPL borrowers increase monotonically relative to the bank borrowers
over the first year after obtaining the MPL loan, and decrease thereafter. Two years after MPL loan
take-up, the MPL borrowers have 5.8% (or $1,247) higher total credit limits than their benchmark
bank borrowers.
Overall, the results in Table 2.3 show that after obtaining an MPL loan, the borrowing capacities
of the MPL borrowers increase.
How does MPL Borrowing Impact Consumers’ Borrowing Outcomes?
In this subsection, we examine the effect of MPL loan take-up on the borrower’s future borrowing
outcomes using our baseline regression framework. It is important to note that greater borrowing
capacities need not necessarily result in greater borrowing. For instance, if the increase in borrowing
capacity (e.g., credit limits) is supply driven (e.g., automatic credit limit increases by banks), then
under the permanent income hypothesis, it should not lead to more borrowing. Similarly, borrowers
with credit score improvements may apply for higher credit limits without intending to borrow on
them immediately, but instead to build greater buffers to deal with future liquidity shocks (e.g., the
buffer stock hypothesis of [75]).
On the other hand, if borrowers are credit constrained, then greater borrowing capacities can lead
to more immediate borrowing ([48]). Further, if borrowing allows consumers to manage temporary
liquidity shocks without having to default, then having greater borrowing capacities should reduce
defaults. However, if consumers with a higher default likelihood are more likely to build borrowing
capacities and then borrow more, then greater borrowing capacities should lead to more defaults.
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Credit card debt
Table 2.4, Columns (1) and (2), show how credit card balances change over time for the MPL
borrowers relative to the unmet and bank borrowers, respectively. We estimate the baseline specifi-
cation in Equation (2.1) with the log change in total credit card balances as the dependent variable,
and report the coefficients associated with MPL.
After consolidating their credit card debt in the first two months after the MPL loan take-up, the
MPL borrowers subsequently accumulate 13.8% and 8.6% higher credit card balances over the next
two years relative to their benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively.21 More importantly,
as the credit card balance trends in Panel A of Figure 2.2 show, the MPL borrowers accumulate these
credit balances at a faster rate than the bank borrowers. This trend suggests that the MPL borrowers
have a greater propensity to consume out of credit card liquidity than bank borrowers.
Total debt
Table 2.4, Columns (3) and (4), present the baseline regression results for the total debt balances of
the unmet cohort and bank cohort, respectively. Total debt balances are computed by aggregating a
consumer’s debt across all her debt accounts. In the post period (i.e., the period after loan origina-
tion), this aggregation also includes the new installment loan issued to the MPL borrower and the
bank borrower.22
First, Columns (3) and (4) show a sharp increase in total debt immediately after loan origina-
tion. This suggests that both the MPL borrowers and bank borrowers use only a part of their loan
proceeds to consolidate their debt. This trend can also be seen in the Figure B.1, which plots the
monthly trends for the total debt balance. On average, MPL borrowers and bank borrowers use
21Strictly speaking, the coefficient estimates should be interpreted in log point changes. Thus, a −100 log point
change will translate to a −63.2% (e−1 − 1 = 0.632) change. However, for ease of stating the results, we interpret log
point changes as percentage changes.
22In general, we find that both the bank and MPL installment loans are reported to the credit bureau with a delay of
1–3 months. We correct for this delay before computing the total debt balances to ensure that any given month reflects
the true total debt balances in that month.
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Table 2.4: Impact of MPL loans on future borrowing
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ overall debt levels in the months surrounding MPL loan origination.
Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present the evolution of credit card balances, total balances,
and debt-to-income ratios, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4), and (6)) report the regression results
for the change in the borrowing outcomes for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample of unmet credit demand
borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination
by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures the differential response of
MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are
double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(CC Balance) Log(Total Debt) DTI Ratio
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 1.333∗∗∗ 4.092∗∗∗ -2.647∗∗∗ -2.135∗∗∗ 0.049 -0.328∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.504) (0.222) (0.241) (0.076) (0.080)
−6 0.293∗ 1.765∗∗∗ -1.250∗∗∗ -1.300∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.307∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.344) (0.184) (0.190) (0.059) (0.067)
−3 -0.472∗ 0.176 -0.518∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ -0.046 -0.138∗∗∗
(0.251) (0.140) (0.228) (0.232) (0.042) (0.042)
−2 0.017 0.296∗∗ -0.223 -0.369∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.130) (0.162) (0.137) (0.033) (0.035)
Post-period
+0 -25.652∗∗∗ -3.392∗∗ 22.949∗∗∗ 3.532∗∗∗ 10.483∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗
(1.702) (1.486) (0.213) (0.205) (0.107) (0.164)
+1 -102.500∗∗∗ -14.100∗∗∗ 17.763∗∗∗ 3.954∗∗∗ 6.371∗∗∗ 2.531∗∗∗
(1.986) (2.387) (0.428) (0.215) (0.107) (0.099)
+2 -89.371∗∗∗ -7.326∗∗∗ 18.596∗∗∗ 4.938∗∗∗ 5.925∗∗∗ 3.300∗∗∗
(2.313) (2.182) (0.663) (0.223) (0.122) (0.117)
+3 -65.679∗∗∗ -1.883 19.665∗∗∗ 5.650∗∗∗ 5.740∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(2.203) (2.044) (0.660) (0.272) (0.148) (0.129)
+6 -25.104∗∗∗ 7.243∗∗∗ 20.960∗∗∗ 5.511∗∗∗ 6.336∗∗∗ 3.617∗∗∗
(1.647) (1.533) (0.657) (0.264) (0.219) (0.117)
+12 3.126∗∗∗ 11.670∗∗∗ 22.173∗∗∗ 6.231∗∗∗ 9.546∗∗∗ 4.947∗∗∗
(1.128) (0.994) (0.612) (0.370) (0.282) (0.199)
+18 11.800∗∗∗ 10.433∗∗∗ 21.419∗∗∗ 5.943∗∗∗ 11.454∗∗∗ 5.931∗∗∗
(1.102) (0.924) (0.663) (0.411) (0.299) (0.233)
+24 13.842∗∗∗ 8.649∗∗∗ 20.279∗∗∗ 5.868∗∗∗ 11.944∗∗∗ 5.808∗∗∗
(1.030) (1.058) (0.791) (0.516) (0.217) (0.203)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.171 0.149 0.246 0.277 0.185 0.196
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43.6% and 48.3% of their loan proceeds to consolidate their debt, respectively. This implies that
MPL borrowers use most of their loan proceeds for consumption purposes rather than for debt con-
solidation, even though the MPL borrowers’ primary loan purpose stated in their loan application is
debt consolidation. The results in Columns (3) and (4) show that two years after the loan origination,
MPL borrowers have 20.3% and 5.9% greater debt than their benchmark unmet and bank borrowers,
respectively.
Further, Columns (3) and (4) show that the total debt of the MPL borrowers relative to their
benchmark borrowers remains relatively flat in the post–loan origination period. This contrasts with
the total credit card debt trends shown in Columns (1) and (2), which drop to their lowest point in
month +1 and increase steeply thereafter until month +24. For instance, the dollar change in total
debt for the MPL borrower relative to the unmet borrower is $5,667 between month +1 and month
+24. In comparison, the dollar change in total credit card debt for the MPL borrower relative to the
unmet borrower over the same period is $5,314, which is greater. These numbers suggest that the
MPL borrowers substituted, on average, about $353 (5667 − 5314) of their other outstanding debt
with credit card debt over time by borrowing out of credit card liquidity.
Debt-to-income ratio
Next, we present regression results for the changes in monthly DTI ratio over time in Table 2.4,
Columns (5) and (6). The DTI ratio is the ratio of the total monthly required debt payment relative
to the borrower’s monthly income. The total required monthly debt payments are the aggregate
monthly payments that a borrower is required to make across all her debt accounts to remain non-
delinquent. Borrowers with larger DTI ratios are arguably more liquidity constrained because they
have to set aside a larger fraction of their monthly income for debt repayment.23 Thus, changes in
DTI ratio can indicate how the liquidity constraints of borrowers change over time.




The results in Columns (5) and (6) show that the DTI ratio of the MPL borrower relative to the
matched unmet and bank borrowers steadily increases over time. Two years after loan origination,
the MPL borrower has a 11.9% and 5.8% higher DTI ratio relative to the benchmark unmet and
bank borrower, respectively. We find similar results if we regress the change in total monthly debt
payment (i.e., the numerator in the DTI ratio) instead of the change in DTI ratio (see Table B.1).
This mitigates the concern that income growth might be driving our results. We find that two years
after the MPL loan origination, the MPL borrower has a 30.1% and a 12.7% higher monthly debt
payment relative to the benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively.
Overall, the future borrowing trends of MPL borrowers suggests that they are more likely to
borrow out of credit card liquidity, more likely substitute other debt with credit card debt, and
more likely to be more liquidity constrained. This use of credit card debt by the MPL borrowers
is consistent with prior studies, which suggest that liquidity-constrained consumers are more willing
to take on high interest rate debt (e.g., credit card debt), if the debt has a long maturity ([76]).
Defaults
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 show the regression results of defaults across all kinds of debt
using our baseline specification in Equation (2.1) for the unmet and bank cohorts. We find that,
two years after the MPL loan origination, MPL borrowers default 1.13 pp and 0.72 pp more than
their benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively. These point estimates suggest that MPL
borrowers default 24% and 20% more than their benchmark unmet and bank borrowers, respectively,
when compared to the average 2-year default rate of 4.75% for the unmet cohort and 3.53% for the
bank cohort. We find similar results for credit card defaults (Columns (3) and (4)) and non–credit
card defaults (Columns (5) and (6)). Overall, the evidence on defaults in Table 2.5 suggests that
MPL borrowers default at a higher rate than their benchmark counterfactual borrowers across all
kinds of debt.
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Table 2.5: Impact of MPL loans on default rates
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ default rates in the months surrounding MPL loan origination.
Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present the evolution of defaults on any kind of debt, defaults
on credit cards, and defaults on non–credit card products, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4), and
(6)) report the regression results for the change in the default rates for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample
of unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month
of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures
the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors,
reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: All Defaults CC Defaults Non-CC Defaults
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 0.188∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.013 0.030 0.182∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.042) (0.021) (0.022) (0.033) (0.041)
−6 0.092∗∗∗ 0.084 0.042∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.086∗
(0.027) (0.052) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.051)
−3 -0.026 0.049∗∗ -0.033∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.035
(0.026) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022)
−2 -0.038∗∗ 0.008 -0.024∗∗ 0.004 0.011 0.016
(0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
Post-period
+0 -0.249∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.104∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.141∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.030) (0.020) (0.012) (0.009) (0.027) (0.020)
+1 -0.502∗∗∗ -0.010 -0.253∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.276∗∗∗ -0.016
(0.051) (0.034) (0.016) (0.016) (0.042) (0.030)
+2 -1.128∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.669∗∗∗ -0.041∗ -0.605∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.069) (0.033) (0.038) (0.022) (0.048) (0.030)
+3 -1.785∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗ -1.157∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.989∗∗∗ -0.046∗
(0.095) (0.030) (0.064) (0.030) (0.060) (0.025)
+6 -2.395∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -1.918∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -1.317∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.090) (0.107) (0.052) (0.073) (0.072)
+12 -0.806∗∗∗ 0.229 -0.646∗∗∗ 0.230∗ -0.351∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.177) (0.144) (0.123) (0.124) (0.117) (0.086)
+18 0.832∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.135) (0.138) (0.114) (0.118) (0.088)
+24 1.127∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.131) (0.097) (0.090) (0.093) (0.100)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.105 0.097 0.085 0.082 0.029 0.042
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Robustness checks
In this section, we test the robustness of our baseline findings. In Table B.2 and Table B.3, we show
that our baseline results are not dependent on our matching procedure. In these tables, we consider a
5% random sample of all U.S. borrowers and we re-run our baseline analysis without matching MPL
and non-MPL borrowers. We use this random sample to estimate our baseline Equation (2.1) with
the same controls. However, we replace cohort fixed effects with fixed effects at the 5-digit ZIP code
level, the 5-point credit score bin level, and the loan origination year-month level.24 Our modified
baseline specification effectively compares MPL borrowers with non-MPL borrowers within the
same 5-digit ZIP code, with similar credit scores, and who apply for their loans in the same year-
month.
Our baseline point estimates for both borrowing capacities and outcomes are largely unchanged
(in both sign and economic magnitude) in the unmatched sample analysis. For example, our baseline
matched cohort analysis estimates suggest that MPL borrowers’ credit scores are 2–7 points lower
than their benchmark non-MPL borrowers two years after MPL loan take-up. In comparison, the
corresponding estimates from our unmatched sample analysis are 3–9 points. Despite the similarity
in estimates provided by the matched cohort analysis and the unmatched sample analysis, we prefer
the former in principle because it accounts for any nonlinear dependence of the outcome variable
on the matching variables. This is important given that we do not observe the functional form of a
lender’s credit model.
Our baseline results are also robust to controlling for loan terms and are presented in Table B.4–
Table B.6. Recall that we can control for loan terms only in our bank cohort analysis because
the unmet borrowers do not obtain loans. We distinguish between non-price loan terms (e.g., loan
amount, maturity) and price loan terms (e.g., interest rates) in our analysis for the reasons stated
below and include them as controls sequentially. The odd-numbered columns in Table B.4–Table B.6
24The 5% random sample contains 33,482 MPL borrowers, 106,974 bank borrowers, and 401,923 unmet borrowers
with non-missing credit data for regression analysis.
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control for non-price loan terms, while the even-numbered columns control for both non-price and
price loan terms. The sample size for these tests is lower by 29% due to missing loan terms.
We first add non-price loan terms such as loan amount and maturity to our baseline regression
specification. These controls broadly serve two purposes. First, they control for the effect of non-
price loan terms on future borrowing capacities and outcomes. For instance, a higher loan amount
today can reduce a borrower’s future borrowing capacities and also increase future defaults. Second,
lenders can also use non-price loan terms to screen borrowers. For unsecured debt, such as the MPL
and bank installment loans in our sample, lenders can screen borrowers on only two non-price loan
terms – loan amount ([77, 52]) and loan maturity ([78, 53]). We find that our results are stronger
compared to the baseline results after controlling for non-price loan terms.
The loan interest rate can also affect future borrowing capacities and outcomes. Additionally,
the interest rate is also related to adverse selection ([79]), which is precisely the effect our analysis
attempts to capture. That is, conditional on observable borrower characteristics and non-price loan
terms, higher interest rates will attract higher default risk borrowers in the absence of adequate
screening by lenders. Consistent with this notion, the results after controlling for interest rates are
weaker compared to our baseline results.
2.5 Economic channel and interpretation of the results
The previous sections document two main results. First, the borrowing capacities and outcomes of
MPL borrowers improve shortly after obtaining the MPL loan relative to their counterfactual bench-
mark borrowers. Second, after this initial improvement, the borrowing capacities and outcomes of
MPL borrowers deteriorate over time and become worse in the long run when compared to their
benchmark borrowers.
The short-run and long-run responses to obtaining an MPL loan appear to be in discord. For
instance, the immediate increase in credit scores and the willingness of lenders to provide more
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credit to MPL borrowers indicate that obtaining an MPL loan signals that the borrower is of a higher
credit quality than what is suggested by the borrower’s observable characteristics before the MPL
loan. This evidence is consistent with MPL lenders screening their borrowers before loan approval.
Further, as their borrowing capacities improve relative to the benchmark bank borrowers, it suggests
that MPL lenders screen their borrowers better than banks.
On the other hand, the ex post worse repayment outcomes compared to bank borrowers indicate
that MPL lenders screen their borrowers poorly compared to banks. In this section we investigate
the underlying economic mechanisms that can help rationalize these discordant effects of obtaining
MPL credit.
2.5.1 Information frictions and default patterns
We begin by analyzing the results that document the ex post higher default rates of the MPL borrow-
ers relative to their benchmarks. Specifically, we ask whether greater information frictions between
lenders and borrowers, such as adverse selection or moral hazard, can explain the higher default
rates of MPL borrowers relative to bank borrowers.
In general, the potential for both adverse selection and moral hazard in the MPL markets can
be high. Borrowers in the MPL markets are dispersed, anonymous, and distant from their lenders.
These factors make it challenging to screen and monitor borrowers ([80]). However, MPL platforms
and investors can use sophisticated credit models and rely on a feedback or reputation system to
mitigate the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard ([81, 50, 82]).
It is also important to distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard effects. Adverse
selection suggests that borrowers with a higher default risk are also more likely to obtain MPL loans
than bank loans because MPL lenders screen their borrowers poorly compared to banks. In contrast,
moral hazard suggests that even MPL borrowers who are ex ante identical to bank borrowers will
default at a higher rate. This higher default rate can occur either because MPL lenders monitor their
borrowers less intensively than banks, or because MPL borrowers face different contract terms than
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bank borrowers. For instance, Table 2.1, Panel C, shows that MPL loans are, on average, larger than
bank loans even for observably similar MPL and bank borrowers. This difference can lead to more
defaults on MPL loans due to the moral hazard associated with the repayment of more debt.
Typically, it is difficult to separate adverse selection from moral hazard because the adverse
selection of borrowers occurs based on information that is privately observable to the borrowers.
However, we believe that our default results are more consistent with the adverse selection effect,
which suggests that MPL lenders screen poorly compared to banks. First, the default rates of MPL
borrowers are greater than bank borrowers even after controlling for the loan contract terms in our
analysis. Next, the default rates of MPL borrowers are higher across all debt accounts, which is
arguably a mix of various loan terms (e.g., loan size, interest rate, maturity, collateralization, lender
monitoring intensity). Thus, the relatively higher default rates of MPL borrowers across all their
debts seem to be more indicative of their generally poorer credit quality (i.e., adverse selection)
rather than the kind of loan terms available to them (i.e., moral hazard).
Further, we also find that MPL borrowers’ default rate on credit card debt is significantly higher
than that of bank borrowers. Credit cards typically have standardized terms across lenders – they are
unsecured, have sticky and similar interest rates, and require similar minimum monthly payments
([83, 54]). Thus, given the similarity of credit card terms, the higher credit card default rates of
MPL borrowers more likely indicate their poorer credit quality. We also find that lower credit score
borrowers are more likely to default than higher credit score borrowers two years after the MPL
loan take-up (see Table B.10). This evidence is again consistent with adverse selection as adverse
selection problems, and hence the benefits of screening, are likely greater for lower credit score
borrowers than for higher credit score borrowers.
In the subsequent subsections we investigate the economic nature of the private information
based on which the adverse selection of MPL borrowers occurs. The evidence in Section 2.4.3
suggests that MPL borrowers and their counterfactual benchmarks differ on at least two dimensions.
First, the MPL borrowers have a greater propensity to borrow out of liquidity. Second, the MPL
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borrowers consolidate less of their credit card debt using their loan proceeds. In the subsequent
subsections, we investigate whether potential adverse selection related to these factors can account
for the default patterns observed between the MPL borrowers and their counterfactual benchmarks.
Adverse selection on liquidity constraints
We begin by analyzing the potential adverse selection of MPL borrowers associated with their
greater propensity to borrow out of liquidity and then default at higher rates than their benchmarks.
This adverse selection effect can occur if some MPL borrowers strategically increase their borrow-
ing because they anticipate defaulting in the future. Alternatively, it could also occur because some
MPL borrowers always tend to be more credit or liquidity constrained, and they default because they
cannot maintain their debt repayments. We can ascertain which of the above two factors drives MPL
borrowers’ defaults by observing these borrowers’ future behavior and outcomes.
To examine whether higher total debt levels or liquidity constraints explain our default patterns,
Table 2.6 re-estimates the default regressions for the unmet and bank cohorts after controlling for
contemporaneous changes in liquidity constraints and total debt obligations over time. We proxy for
borrower liquidity constraints using the borrower’s monthly DTI ratio, which captures the borrower’s
monthly debt payment relative to her monthly income. We compute a borrower’s total debt by
aggregating across all the borrower’s debt accounts.
Table 2.6, Column (1) controls for contemporaneous changes in total debt obligations, and Ta-
ble 2.6, Column (2) controls for contemporaneous changes in liquidity constraints for the default
regressions. A comparison of the regression estimates in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.6 with the
estimates shown in Table 2.5, Column (1) (i.e., without the debt controls) suggests that changes in
liquidity constraints, as opposed to changes in total debt, are better able to explain the diverging de-
fault trends between the MPL and the benchmark unmet borrowers. Similarly, Table 2.6, Columns
(3) and (4) show that liquidity constraints are also better able to explain the default trends between
the MPL borrowers and the benchmark bank borrowers. We find similar results when we analyze
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Table 2.6: Adverse selection on liquidity constraints
This table presents results that examine the role of different measures of borrower indebtedness in explaining trends in
credit card defaults. Columns (1)–(2) and Columns (3)–(4) present the results for the unmet cohort and the bank cohort,
respectively. Columns (1) and (3) (Columns (2) and (4)) report the regression results that control for contemporaneous
change in total debt (contemporaneous change in debt-to-income ratio). Each row represents a unique event month
relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent
variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The
standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month
levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: All Defaults
Monthly DID Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-period
−12 0.172∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042)
−6 0.085∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.081 0.084
(0.027) (0.027) (0.051) (0.052)
−3 -0.026 -0.022 0.049∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023)
−2 -0.039∗∗ -0.035∗∗ 0.008 0.008
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Post-period
+0 -0.263∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.001 0.0004
(0.033) (0.058) (0.020) (0.020)
+1 -0.452∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.055
(0.052) (0.077) (0.034) (0.035)
+2 -1.031∗∗∗ -2.210∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.191∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.114) (0.034) (0.039)
+3 -1.648∗∗∗ -3.255∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.385∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.141) (0.032) (0.034)
+6 -2.081∗∗∗ -4.565∗∗∗ -0.323∗∗∗ -1.130∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.158) (0.090) (0.085)
+12 -0.526∗∗∗ -4.021∗∗∗ 0.286∗ -1.203∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.084) (0.146) (0.083)
+18 1.123∗∗∗ -2.901∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.080) (0.136) (0.091)
+24 1.344∗∗∗ -2.568∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.092) (0.131) (0.122)
Matching Controls X X X X
Other Controls X X X X
∆Total Debt (−1, t) X X
∆DTI Ratio (−1, t) X X
# Cohorts 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.106 0.196 0.097 0.184
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defaults on credit cards and non–credit card products separately, and report our findings in Table B.7.
Overall, the results in Table 2.6 are consistent with the adverse selection of MPL borrowers on the
dimension of liquidity constraints relative to their benchmark borrowers.
Further, Figure 2.3 plots the hazard rates of defaults to shed more light on the timing and rate of
defaults.25 The default hazard rate for unmet borrowers peaks shortly after they are unable to obtain
credit. Interestingly, the MPL borrower’s hazard rate also peaks around the same level as that of the
unmet borrower, but about 12 months later – i.e., between month 15 and 18 after obtaining the MPL
loan. In comparison, the hazard rates for the bank borrowers always remain lower than both unmet
and MPL borrowers. Overall, these patterns indicate that providing an MPL loan only temporarily
relaxes the MPL borrower’s liquidity constraints and only delays her eventual default.
25The hazard rate at month t is defined as the number of loans that enter delinquency in month t as a fraction of the
number of non-delinquent loans in month t− 1.
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Figure 2.3: Default hazard rates
This figure presents the default hazard rates for unmet and bank cohorts. The default hazard rate at month t is defined
as the number of loans that enter delinquency in month t as a fraction of the number of non-delinquent loans in month
t − 1. Panel A and Panel B show default hazard rates for credit card debt, and non-credit card debt, respectively. In all
panels, the x-axis displays event time relative to the month of loan origination and the y-axis represents default hazard
rate.
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Adverse selection on debt consolidation
While debt consolidation is one of the primary stated loan purposes of MPL borrowers, the MPL
lenders cannot ensure that borrowers will use their MPL loans for their stated purpose. For instance,
borrowers who use their loan proceeds for consumption of goods rather than for debt consolidation
can end up with higher debt levels, which can lead to higher defaults. Such information asymmetries
between the MPL lenders and borrowers can potentially lead to adverse selection problems. There-
fore, we analyze the potential adverse selection of the MPL borrowers on this second dimension
since our results show that MPL borrowers consolidate less debt than bank borrowers.
A commitment to consolidate debt can signal positively about a borrower’s credit quality dur-
ing the loan application phase. Debt consolidation can simplify multiple payments that are spread
across several debt accounts into a single payment for the consolidated debt account. Thus, debt
consolidation can signal a borrower’s commitment to keep track of their debt obligations and avoid
mistakes such as missed payments. In the specific case of credit card debt consolidation, borrowers
can also signal a commitment to pay off their debt more quickly because personal installment loans
typically have a fixed and shorter maturity (e.g., three or five years) compared to credit cards.26
Consequently, we examine whether a borrower’s degree of debt consolidation shortly after their
loan take-up is predictive of their future creditworthiness. Further, if banks screen their borrowers
better than MPL lenders, then debt consolidation should be less predictive of future creditworthiness
for the bank borrowers than the MPL borrowers.
We measure a borrower’s degree of debt consolidation by her consolidation ratio, which is the
amount of loan proceeds the borrower uses for debt consolidation as a fraction of her loan amount.
We measure the debt consolidation amount by subtracting the total change in debt in the monthly
26Perhaps this is why LendingClub, a large MPL lender, introduced a new feature in June 2019 that allows Lending-
Club to pay off their borrowers’ credit cards directly without disbursing the loan proceeds to the borrower. Moreover,
consistent with being able screen borrowers and mitigate adverse selection using this new feature, LendingClub of-
fers lower interest rates for borrowers who opt for this feature. Source: https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/new-lendingclub-feature-lets-customers-pay-off-card-debt-directly
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interval (−1,+1) from the loan amount, where month 0 is the loan origination month.27 We re-
estimate the default regressions in Table 2.5, Column (1) and Column (2), after including the con-
solidation ratio and its interaction with the MPL indicator variable. Then we plot the coefficients
associated with consolidation ratio for MPL and bank borrowers in Figure 2.4, Panel A.
First, the negative and significant coefficients in Figure 2.4, Panel A, show that a higher con-
solidation ratio immediately after obtaining a loan predicts lower future defaults. Moreover, the
consolidation ratio is more predictive of defaults for MPL borrowers than bank borrowers. The fig-
ure indicates that a 10 pp increase in the consolidation ratio is associated with a 0.1 pp reduction
in the defaults of bank borrowers two years after loan origination (equivalent to a 4.7% reduction
relative to the mean default rate of the benchmark bank borrowers). In contrast, a 10 pp increase in
the consolidation ratio suggests a 0.3 pp reduction in the defaults of the MPL borrowers two years
after the loan origination (equivalent to a 9.1% reduction relative to the mean default rate of the MPL
borrowers). Figure 2.4, Panel C shows that the difference between the MPL and bank consolidation
ratio coefficients is statistically significant and increasing over time post loan origination.
We find similar results in Figure 2.4, Panel B, when we use the change in future credit scores
instead of default rates as a proxy for borrower quality. Two years after loan origination, a borrower
who uses her entire loan proceeds to consolidate her debt (i.e., 100 pp increase in consolidation
ratio) has a 25 (40) point increase in credit scores if she is a bank borrower (MPL borrower), relative
to a borrower who uses none of the loan proceeds to consolidate debt.
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Figure 2.4: Adverse selection on debt consolidation
The figure presents the coefficient associated with consolidation ratio for the MPL and bank borrowers. Consolidation
ratio is the proportion of the loan amount used by a borrower for debt consolidation within the first two months after loan
origination. These coefficients are estimated by including consolidation ratio and its interaction term with the MPL
indicator to our baseline specification for loan default rate (Panel A) and future credit scores (Panel B). In all panels,
the x-axis displays event time relative to the month of loan origination and the y-axis represents the magnitude of the
coefficient estimate. The x-axis in Panel A starts at month +3 because a borrower is considered to be in default only if
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Figure 2.5: Adverse selection on debt consolidation by credit score
The figure presents the two-year default rate at each credit score by consolidation ratio terciles. Consolidation ratio is the proportion of the
loan amount used by a borrower for debt consolidation within the first two months after loan origination. Panel A and Panel B present the
results for the MPL and bank borrowers, respectively. The default rate trends are lowess smoothed with a bandwidth of 0.5.
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We provide further evidence that the consolidation ratio is related to adverse selection. At each
credit score before loan origination, we sort borrowers into terciles based on their consolidation
ratio. Figure 2.5 plots the average 2-year default rates of the MPL borrowers (Panel A) and the bank
borrowers (Panel B) for each tercile across credit scores.28 Figure 2.5 shows that the dispersion of the
default rates across the consolidation ratio terciles is higher for borrowers with lower credit scores.
This evidence is further consistent with adverse selection, because adverse selection problems (and
hence the benefits of screening) are arguably greater for borrowers with lower credit scores than
for borrowers with higher credit scores. Moreover, at each credit score level, the dispersion of
default rates across the consolidation ratio terciles is higher for the MPL borrowers than for the
bank borrowers. This evidence is again consistent with the weaker screening of the MPL borrowers
relative to the bank borrowers.
Overall, the results in Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 are consistent with adverse selection related
to debt consolidation. Moreover, these results also show that the consolidation ratio has greater
explanatory power for the future defaults and credit scores for the MPL borrowers than bank bor-
rowers, even though both are observably similar before the loan take-up. Thus, these results are
consistent with MPL lenders screening poorly relative to banks on the borrowers’ likelihood of debt
consolidation after loan take-up.
2.5.2 What explains the immediate improvement in borrowing capacities and outcomes after MPL
loan take-up?
Thus far, we have provided evidence suggesting that the adverse selection of MPL borrowers can
explain their ex post default outcomes relative to bank borrowers. However, this adverse selection
suggests that the immediate change in borrowing capacities of the MPL borrower should be worse
than the bank borrowers, which is contrary to our empirical findings. In this section we investigate
28As defaults are rare, to reduce noise, we average the default rates within credit score bin sizes of 5 (e.g., 620–624,
625–629), as opposed to for every unique credit score value.
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the explanation for the immediate effects of obtaining an MPL loan.
Immediate credit score jump
Recall that both bank installment loans and MPL loans are reported to credit bureaus after a delay.
On average, bank installment loans are reported one month after origination, while MPL loans are
reported three months after origination.29 However, the credit scores of the MPL borrowers increase
during the first two months after loan take-up (see Figure 2.1). Thus, the credit score jump for MPL
borrowers is unlikely to be information driven, because during the period of the credit score jump,
the information on loan origination is unavailable to the credit bureau or to other parties who rely on
the credit bureau for such information.
Instead, we find that the immediate credit score jump in the first two months after the MPL
loan take-up is somewhat “mechanically” related to the sharp decline in credit card utilization that
occurs due to credit card debt consolidation. This can be gleaned from the raw trends of credit
card utilization and credit scores shown in Figure 2.1, which are more or less mirror images of one
another. We also formally test this mechanical relationship by adding the contemporaneous change
in credit utilization as a control to our baseline credit score regression specifications in Table 2.3,
Columns (3) and (4). We plot these regression estimates in Figure 2.6, and we report the coefficients
in Table B.8.
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Figure 2.6: Impact of credit card debt consolidation on credit scores
The figure presents regression plots that document the impact of credit card debt consolidation on consumer credit scores in the months
around MPL loan origination. Panel A and Panel B plot regression estimates and their 95% confidence intervals for the unmet and bank
cohorts, respectively. These point estimates are presented in Table B.8. In each panel, the regression estimates that do not account (do
account) for concurrent changes in credit card utilization are presented in the form of red circles (blue triangles). In both panels, the x-axis
displays event time relative to the month of MPL loan origination and the y-axis represents credit scores.
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Figure 2.6 visually displays the timing and the size of the effect of MPL loan take-up on credit
scores (relative to their benchmarks) with and without controlling for the contemporaneous credit
utilization change. The figure shows that the credit score increase for the MPL borrowers is largely
explained by their contemporaneous sharp decline in credit utilization. We characterize this credit
score response as “mechanical” in the sense that it can be computed by inserting the credit utilization
change in the credit scoring formula. Credit utilization is the second most important component in
credit scoring models and it generally explains 30% of the variation in credit scores.30 This is
because, conditional on defaulting, consumers are more likely to default on their unsecured debt
first (e.g., credit card debt) before defaulting on secured debt (e.g., mortgages and auto loans).
Higher credit limits
In this section we show that MPL borrowers enjoy higher credit limits than their benchmark bor-
rowers because of their credit score jump immediately after loan take-up. Since credit scores are
used ubiquitously by lenders for their lending decisions, an improvement in a borrower’s credit
score should directly lead to increased borrowing capacity (see [84, 20, 70]). To test whether MPL
borrowers’ higher credit limits are driven primarily by their immediate credit score jump, we add
the credit score jump as a control to our baseline credit limits regression specifications in Table 2.3,
Columns (5) and (6). The coefficients for these specifications are reported in Table 2.7, Columns (1)
and (3).
A comparison of Table 2.3, Column (5) with Table 2.7, Column (1) shows that the credit score
jump shortly after the MPL loan take-up explains 68% of the credit limit increase of MPL borrowers
relative to unmet borrowers two years after the MPL loan take-up. Similarly, Table 2.7, Columns
(3) suggests that the credit score jump explains 32% of the credit limit increase of MPL borrowers
relative to the bank borrowers two years after the MPL loan take-up. Moreover, the explanatory
30In comparison, the most important factor in credit scoring models – i.e., payment histories – explains 35%
of the variation in credit scores. See https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/credit-
education/score-basics/my-credit-score/
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Table 2.7: What explains the ex post increase in credit card limits?
This table presents results examining the factors that drive the increase in MPL borrowers’ credit card limits after MPL
loan take-up. Columns (1) and (2) (Columns (3) and (4)) report the regression results for the change in credit card limits
for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample of unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row
represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month
specification, the independent variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark
counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and
loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(Credit Card Limits)
Monthly DID Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-period
−12 -5.323∗∗∗ -5.323∗∗∗ -3.905∗∗∗ -3.905∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.186) (0.143) (0.143)
−6 -2.429∗∗∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -1.642∗∗∗ -1.642∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.086) (0.086)
−3 -1.313∗∗∗ -1.110∗∗∗ -0.575∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.071) (0.071) (0.064)
−2 -0.639∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.328∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.054) (0.041) (0.045)
Post-period
+0 0.644∗∗∗ -0.136∗ 0.280∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.071) (0.074) (0.057)
+1 0.813 -0.352∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ -0.262∗∗∗
(0.758) (0.124) (0.116) (0.077)
+2 2.162∗∗ 0.155 1.705∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.921) (0.134) (0.148) (0.104)
+3 3.662∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 2.565∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗
(0.837) (0.123) (0.189) (0.143)
+6 6.310∗∗∗ 1.278∗∗∗ 4.052∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.826) (0.216) (0.275) (0.195)
+12 7.863∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 4.752∗∗∗ -0.092
(0.853) (0.266) (0.339) (0.211)
+18 6.504∗∗∗ -0.255 4.333∗∗∗ -0.956∗∗∗
(0.838) (0.313) (0.428) (0.245)
+24 4.918∗∗∗ -1.532∗∗∗ 3.977∗∗∗ -1.906∗∗∗
(0.912) (0.369) (0.535) (0.293)
Cohort FE X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X
Other Controls X X X X
∆Credit Score (−1,+1) X X X X
∆Log(# CC Accounts (−1, t)) X X
# Cohorts 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148
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Figure 2.7: Impact of post-loan take-up credit score jump on credit limits
The figure presents the effect of the immediate credit score jump after the MPL or bank loan take-up on credit limits.
The figure plots the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals associated with the post-loan take-up credit score
jump from the regressions in Table 2.7, Columns (1) and (3). In all panels, the x-axis displays event time relative to the
month of MPL loan origination for MPL borrowers.
power of this immediate credit score jump strengthens over time, as shown in Figure 2.7, which
plots the coefficient on the credit score jump over time from the estimated regressions in Table 2.7,
Columns (1) and (3).
Next, we distinguish between two sources of credit limit growth: (i) new account openings (i.e.,
extensive margin), and (ii) increased limits on existing credit cards (i.e., intensive margin). The
credit limit growth on the extensive margin is usually demand-driven because consumers need to
apply to open new credit card accounts. In contrast, the credit limit growth on the intensive margin
can be supply-driven because lenders can choose to increase credit limits even when borrowers do
not request it.
105
Table 2.7, Columns (2) and (4) control for the credit limit growth on the extensive margin by
including the log-change in the number of credit card accounts. The results show that the credit limit
growth of the MPL borrowers primarily occurs on the extensive margin. This indicates that the credit
limit increase for MPL borrowers is more likely to be demand-driven than supply-driven. Moreover,
these results also suggest that the credit limit growth most likely occurs at new lenders, who arguably
have to rely on hard information such as credit scores for their lending decisions. This is because
existing lenders can increase credit limits on existing credit cards if consumers demand more credit.
Additionally, consistent with the demand-driven increase in credit limits, Table B.9 shows that MPL
borrowers are more likely to apply and open more new credit card accounts conditional on the credit
score jump immediately after their loan take-up. Overall, the evidence in Table 2.7 and Table B.9
indicate that MPL borrowers enjoy higher credit limits due to their sharp improvement in credit
scores after the MPL loan take-up.
2.5.3 Why do MPL borrowers’ capacities and outcomes improve only temporarily?
The results in Section 2.5.1 suggest that, compared to bank lenders, MPL lenders are less able to
screen high–default risk borrowers from the low–default risk borrowers. This inability to screen
borrowers can pool the high–default risk borrowers along with low–default risk borrowers. Thus,
relative to the bank borrowers, the weaker screening of the MPL borrowers ex ante is expected to
result in lower average credit quality (e.g., lower future credit scores, higher future defaults) of the
approved MPL borrowers ex post. Further, this pooling does not unravel immediately after obtaining
the loan because the credit score jump shortly after the loan take-up is non-fundamental, as argued
in Section 2.5.2.
Subsequently, the average credit market outcomes of the MPL borrowers deteriorate over time
because the low–default risk and high–default risk borrowers, who are pooled at loan origination,
separate over time as their types are revealed through their private actions (e.g., debt accumulation,
delinquencies). Further, as the screening of MPL borrowers is weaker than bank borrowers, the
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credit market outcomes of the MPL borrowers deteriorate faster than bank borrowers as documented
in our results.
2.5.4 Why do MPL lenders screen poorly compared to banks?
In this section, we provide evidence on two possible factors that explain why MPL lenders might
screen poorly compared to banks. First, we find that compared to MPL lenders, banks have superior
information on their borrowers due to their various relationships with the borrower. This superior
information could be hard in nature, such as a borrower’s checking account data or transaction
history ([64]). Alternatively, the superior information could also be soft in nature, which is more
easily collected and stored by a loan officer as opposed to a machine or an algorithm ([65]). However,
unlike banks, such information may not be available to the MPL lenders because borrowers do not
use the MPL platform for payments or transactions and do not interact with the MPL lenders in
person.
Second, [50] show that MPL investors play an important role in screening borrowers over and
above the screening by MPL platforms. However, the screening ability of MPL investors reduced
over time as the MPL platform in our study reduced their information disclosure on loan applicants
over time. We find that this reduction in the screening ability of MPL investors over time has further
lowered the screening of MPL borrowers relative to bank borrowers.
We provide evidence on the two aforementioned factors in Table 2.8. In Panel A, we compare the
performance of the MPL borrowers with two kinds of bank borrowers – namely, new bank borrowers
and relationship bank borrowers. New bank borrowers are those who have no prior relationship
with the bank that originates their bank installment loan. Relationship borrowers are those who
have previously borrowed other credit products (e.g., credit cards, mortgages, auto loans) from the
bank that originates their bank installment loan. Importantly, we drop borrowers with previous bank
installment loans from our sample of relationship borrowers to ensure that our comparison is still
within borrowers who are first-time personal installment loan applicants at both banks and MPL
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platforms.
Table 2.8, Panel A displays the results for the two-year cumulative default rates after the MPL/bank
loan origination. Relationship is an indicator variable that equals 1 for a cohort if the matched bank
borrower in the cohort is a relationship borrower, and equals 0 if the matched bank borrower is a new
borrower. The coefficient associated with MPL×Relationship in all columns in Panel A indicates
that MPL borrowers perform relatively more poorly compared to relationship bank borrowers than
new bank borrowers.
In Table 2.8, Panel B we exploit an unanticipated event in November, 2014 which drastically
reduced the information on MPL loan applicant characteristics made available to investors, and thus
diminished their screening ability (see [50] for more information regarding this event). We compare
the performance of the MPL borrowers to bank borrowers for loans originated before and after this
event in November 2014. Panel B displays the results for the two-year cumulative default rates
across all kinds of debt after the MPL/bank loan origination. Post is an indicator variable that
equals 1 for all loans that were originated after November, 2014, and equals 0 for loans originated
before November 2014. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on MPL × Post in
all columns of Panel B indicates that MPL screening became relatively weaker than bank screening
after the November 2014 event.
We also confirm this result in Figure 2.8, which plots the average two year cumulative default
rates around the November 2014 event for the MPL and bank borrowers. Figure 2.8 shows that
the performance of MPL and bank borrowers trend parallelly before November 2014. However, the
performance of the MPL borrowers deteriorates shortly after November 2014, while the performance
of the bank borrowers remains relatively unchanged.
While our results indicate that the screening of MPL borrowers can improve by providing MPL
investors with more information, it comes with a caveat. [50] show that providing more information
to MPL investors comes with the cost of creating greater adverse selection among investors when
some investors are more sophisticated than the others. Given that MPL platforms seek to maximize
108
Table 2.8: Why do MPLs screen poorly compared to banks?
This table reports results that examine the factors that potentially explain the relatively poor screening ability of MPLs
compared to banks. Panel A explores whether banks have superior information on their borrowers owing to their
various relationships with the borrower. We classify bank borrowers on the basis of their past relationship with the bank
issuing them their installment loans. Relationship is an indicator variable that equals 1 for bank cohorts who have
previously borrowed from the bank that originates their bank installment loan, and 0 for bank borrowers are those who
have no prior lending relationship with the bank that originates their bank installment loan. Panel B explores how MPL
screening quality compares to bank screening quality over time by exploiting a natural experiment in the MPL industry.
In November 2014, the MPL platform drastically reduced the information on MPL loan applicant characteristics made
available to investors, thus diminishing the screening ability of sophisticated investors on the platform. Post is an
indicator variable that equals 1 for loans originated after November 2014, and 0 otherwise. In Column (1) of both
panels, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the borrower defaults on any kind of debt in the 24-month
window after the origination of the installment loan. In Columns (2) and (3), the dependent variable identifies credit card
defaults and non–credit card defaults, respectively. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at
the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Relationship Bank Borrowers
Dependent Variable: 24M All 24M CC 24M Non-CC
Defaults Defaults Defaults
(1) (2) (3)
MPL 1.046∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗
(0.393) (0.269) (0.333)
MPL × Relationship 1.586∗∗∗ 0.740∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗
(0.328) (0.275) (0.270)
Cohort FE X X X
Matching Controls X X X
Other Controls X X X
# Cohorts 109,298 109,298 109,298
Avg. Adj. R2 0.075 0.064 0.077
Panel B: November 2014 Event
Dependent Variable: 24M All 24M CC 24M Non-CC
Defaults Defaults Defaults
(1) (2) (3)
MPL 0.580∗∗ -0.219 0.526∗
(0.230) (0.164) (0.281)
MPL × Post 2.214∗∗∗ 2.374∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.355) (0.401)
Cohort FE X X X
Matching Controls X X X
Other Controls X X X
# Cohorts 109,298 109,298 109,298

























































Figure 2.8: Impact of investor screening on MPL loan quality
The figure presents the average two year cumulative default rates at each month around November-2014
for the MPL and bank borrowers. November-2014 is the month in which the MPL platform in our study
reduced the information provided to their MPL investors. The default rate for a borrower is computed
across all the debt accounts held by the borrower. The x-axis represents the origination month of the MPL
(bank) loan for the MPL (bank) borrower.
loan volume, greater adverse selection among investors can discourage the participation of less
sophisticated investors thereby reducing the loan volume on MPL platforms.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how loans from MPL platforms impact the borrowing capacities and
borrowing outcomes of borrowers. We benchmark the borrowing capacities and outcomes of MPL
borrowers with two types of observably similar borrowers: (i) those who obtained a bank loan, and
(ii) those whose credit demand was unmet or denied. By studying these effects of MPL loans relative
to the two types of borrowers, we seek to compare the quality of MPL lenders’ screening technology
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vis-à-vis the screening technology of banks.
We find that MPL borrowers’ borrowing capacities – as proxied by their credit scores, credit
utilization ratios, and credit limits – improve shortly after obtaining the MPL loan relative to their
benchmark borrowers. However, in the long-run, MPL borrowers perform poorly and have higher
default rates than their counterfactual benchmark borrowers. We document evidence that the rel-
atively worse long-run borrowing outcomes of MPL borrowers is consistent with MPL lenders
screening less effectively than banks, which leads to greater adverse selection of MPL borrowers.
We provide evidence for two factors on which the adverse selection of MPL borrowers occurs. First,
we find that MPL borrowers are more likely to be liquidity constrained than bank borrowers. And
second, we find that MPL borrowers are less likely to use their loans for their stated loan purpose.
Finally, we also explore the factors which allow banks to screen their borrowers better than MPL
platforms. Our results suggest that banks have an information advantage compared to MPL plat-
forms because they engage in relationship lending, which allows banks access to unique borrower
information such as their transactions history or soft information. We also find that greater infor-
mation provision to the investors on the MPL platform can reduce the screening gap between banks
and MPL lenders.
While our results indicate that MPL lenders screen less effectively than banks, we do not take a
stance on the consumer welfare effects of MPL loans, and leave this an avenue for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
SHOCKED BY BANK FUNDING SHOCKS: EVIDENCE FROM 500 MILLION
CONSUMER CREDIT CARDS
3.1 Introduction
Uninsured short-term wholesale liabilities such as repos and commercial paper are an important
source of funding for many banks. However, a reliance on short-term wholesale funding can expose
banks to significant roll-over risks and runs ([85, 86, 87]). These funding markets dried up suddenly
in 2008, causing negative shocks to bank liquidity ([88, 89, 90]). In this paper, we show a new
channel—namely, credit card limits, through which banks transmitted their wholesale funding liq-
uidity shocks to their consumers and affected their consumption. Importantly, we show that banks
transmitted their liquidity shocks unequally across consumers, which sheds light on both who bears
the real costs of fragile bank funding structures and how persistent they are.
Wholesale funding is a significant source of funding for many of the banks in our sample (which
account for 75% of the credit card issuance in the U.S.). However, if these banks can easily substitute
their wholesale funding with another funding source on similar terms, then they may not need to
pass on their funding shocks to their consumers. Similarly, while credit cards are an important
source of marginal financing for many households in the U.S.1, if consumers can switch costlessly
to other credit cards, or if they have sufficient unused credit2, then the transmission of bank liquidity
shocks through credit cards should not have an effect on their credit card spending. Thus, frictions
1Of the 40% of U.S. households that cannot cover an unexpected emergency expense of $400, 43%
said they use credit cards to cover these unexpected expenses and will pay it off over time. Source:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-
being-us-households-201805.pdf.
2According to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance, 59.8% of households held two or more credit cards, and these
households utilize less than half of their available credit limit, on average.
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that constrain both banks and their consumers in the credit market are necessary for the wholesale
funding shock to have a persistent real impact through credit cards ([79]).
Using 500 million credit cards from a major credit bureau, which include all the credit cards for
any given individual, and a within-consumer empirical design, we show that banks that faced a sud-
den decline in wholesale funding reduced the credit limits on their consumer credit cards. However,
there is significant heterogeneity in how banks pass on their funding shocks across their consumers.
Affected banks reduced credit limits more sharply for consumers with lower credit scores and higher
utilization ratios. In response, the consumers of the affected banks reduced their total credit card
consumption suggesting frictions in the credit card market. Further, we also show that the negative
effect of the bank wholesale funding liquidity shock on consumption through credit cards was long
lasting. Thus, our evidence suggests that the borrowing constraints on credit cards induced by the
funding shock were likely an important contributor to the decline in aggregate consumption during
the Great Recession and its sluggish recovery thereafter ([91, 92]).
The short-term wholesale funding market for banks collapsed in September 2008. We refer to
the time period before (after) September 2008 as the pre-shock (post-shock) period. We measure a
bank’s exposure to the funding liquidity shock by the bank’s dependence on short-term wholesale
funding in the pre-shock period. The intensity of the wholesale funding liquidity shock varies across
banks as there is variation in the banks’ dependence on wholesale funding in the pre-shock period.
Moreover, the collapse of the short-term wholesale funding markets seems largely unanticipated.
The primary identification challenge is to isolate the changes in credit supply from the changes in
credit demand. For example, individual-specific demand factors such as income changes can affect
a bank’s credit extension to an individual. So, we first focus on individuals with credit cards from
multiple banks and use a fixed-effects methodology similar to [17]. We essentially compare how the
credit limits on credit cards issued to the same individual change as a function of the issuing bank’s
exposure to the liquidity shock. We find that a bank with a one standard deviation greater dependence
on wholesale funding in the pre-shock period cuts its credit limits by 4.75%, or equivalently by $434,
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based on the average credit limit across consumers.
Another potential endogeneity concern is individual-bank-specific demand driven by a con-
sumer’s preference to use some credit cards more than their other credit cards. To mitigate this
concern, we construct a “leave-out-mean” credit limit change for each card, which by construction
excludes the credit limit change due to individual-bank-specific demand, but captures the bank’s
average change in credit supply. Our results remain unchanged even after accounting for potential
individual-bank-specific demand. Our findings are also not driven by the household balance sheet
channel, or any particular bank, or bank type, such as large banks, risky banks, or risk-averse banks.
Further, on the extensive margin, we find that banks that were more affected by the short-term whole-
sale funding shock were also less likely to issue new credit cards and more likely to close existing
credit cards.
We also validate our exposure measure and our baseline result using publicly available data
from banks’ regulatory filings. First, banks that had a greater dependence on short-term wholesale
funding indeed experienced a greater decline in short-term wholesale funding in the post-shock
period. Moreover, this decline in short-term wholesale funding was not offset by changes in the
other sources of bank funding such as deposits and equity. Second, at the bank level, a bank’s
greater dependence on wholesale funding in the pre-shock period is associated with a reduction in
credit card loans on its balance sheet in the post-shock period.
Next, using the near universe of approximately 500 million credit cards issued to 134 million
consumers, we document that the liquidity crunch induced by the wholesale funding market had real
consequences for aggregate credit card borrowing. By including all credit cards for each consumer,
we can examine whether consumers can hedge themselves by substituting to other credit cards.3
We show that individuals who had a greater exposure to the funding shock through their banks
experienced a greater reduction in their total credit limits. On average, a 1% short-term wholesale
3We also aggregate limits and balances across newly opened credit cards to capture the substitution effect more
precisely.
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funding shock induced reduction in an individual’s total credit limit reduced the individual’s total
credit card balance by 0.32%. Equivalently, in terms of marginal propensity to consume (MPC), a
$1 reduction in total credit limit led to $0.07 reduction in total credit balance. These MPC estimates
through the card card channel are similar to the household balance sheet channel documented in
[91] ($0.05-$0.07 MPC for $1 decline in housing values). While it is possible that individual-
level demand factors confound our individual-level analysis, it seems less likely based on our credit
card-level analysis, which suggests that demand factors are mostly uncorrelated with the exposure
measure.4
We find heterogeneous effects of the short-term wholesale funding shock on consumers. First,
at the credit card level, we find that banks do not transmit shocks equally across consumers. Con-
ditional on the same liquidity shock, banks reduced credit limits by more for consumers with lower
credit scores and higher credit card utilization. We find that consumers who had a 90% or more
credit card utilization experienced a $970 reduction in their credit limits, on average. While, con-
sumers with less than 50% utilization experienced a credit limit reduction of $370. These results are
consistent with the increased cost of lending to such borrowers due to information frictions when a
bank’s cost of funding increases ([79]). At the individual level, conditional on the same magnitude
of the funding shock transmitted by banks, we find that consumers who had higher aggregate credit
card utilization and lower credit scores cut back more on their credit card balances. These results are
consistent with credit-constrained consumers being unable to hedge themselves from the transmitted
bank shocks. Overall, our results at the credit card level and the consumer level show that consumers
who face more credit constraints bear greater costs of bank fragility.
We find that in the long run, while the total credit extended by credit card issuers returns to
pre-shock levels at the bank level, the effect of the wholesale funding shock was persistent for
some individuals. Specifically, among consumers with low credit scores, even in the long run, the
4For the credit card-level analysis, the coefficient estimates for the exposure measure are similar with or without
individual fixed effects. Also, the estimates are similar when we use the “leave-out-mean” approach. Together both
results suggest that individual-level demand factors are unlikely to be correlated with the exposure measure.
115
consumers who were more exposed to their banks’ wholesale funding shock had lower total credit
limits and as a result, were more limited in their ability to borrow on their credit cards, than the
low-exposure consumers. In contrast, the effect of the wholesale funding shock dissipated relatively
quickly over time for the consumers with higher credit scores. These results suggest that either (i)
financing frictions for lower-quality borrowers were binding for a very long time or (ii) the funding
shock itself weakened borrowers’ fundamentals, thereby limiting their access to credit in the future.
Regardless of the underlying channel, our results underscore the long-term real consequences of a
bank’s fragile funding structure across different types of consumers.
Finally, we also compare the importance of the credit card channel relative to alternate revolv-
ing credit lines through which banks can transmit their funding shock. Specifically, we compare
the transmission of the bank funding shock between credit cards and the home equity line of credit
(HELOC), which is an alternate revolving line of credit that homeowners can tap to smooth their
consumption. However, unlike the unsecured credit card debt, HELOCs are secured by the con-
sumer’s home. We find that banks transmitted the short-term wholesale funding shock primarily
through credit cards as opposed to HELOCs even though both revolving credit accounts were avail-
able to banks for transmitting the funding shock.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the transmission of bank shocks to firms ([17, 93,
94, 42, 95]) and households ([96, 97, 98, 99]). Using detailed microdata on credit card limits
and a within-consumer empirical design, we identify the transmission of banks’ liquidity shocks to
consumers through the credit card lending channel.
Importantly, our paper contributes to the post-crisis regulatory reform that has focused on ad-
dressing the vulnerabilities of a bank’s funding structure that is especially reliant on wholesale fund-
ing ([89]). For instance, the Federal Reserve has proposed to tie the risk-based capital surcharges




rich this debate by providing elasticities of aggregate credit limits and credit balances to wholesale
funding and also the heterogeneity of these elasticities across different types of consumers. In doing
so, we shed light on who bears the cost of bank fragility and for how long.
Our paper also adds to the literature on the sharp decline in household consumption during the
recent Great Recession. [100, 91, 101] attribute the consumption decline to the poor state of house-
hold balance sheets, which were impaired by the sharp decline in house prices. We complement
their study by showing how the impaired balance sheets of financial intermediaries affected the
credit supply to the economy and the consumption of goods. Instead of helping households smooth
consumption during the crisis, banks can pass on their own shocks to households and may also am-
plify them. Further, while consumption recovered slowly in the post-crisis period, this recovery was
puzzlingly slow for non-durable goods and services relative to durable goods, despite the recovery
in households’ net worth ([92]). Our evidence suggests that borrowing constraints on credit cards,
which are used to consume non-durable goods and services also played a significant role in the
sluggish recovery in consumption in the post-crisis period.
Our paper is also related to [48], [14], and [102] who document that households borrow more
immediately after credit card limit increases. In contrast, we focus on a large negative liquidity
shock that varies across banks and negatively affects their credit decisions. Using the near universe
of credit cards in the U.S., we identify how the pass through varies across consumers. In addition
to examining balance changes at the credit card level, we also study changes in total credit card
balance and total debt balance at the individual level. Our results suggest that some consumers
couldn’t hedge the negative funding shock that their banks transmitted by borrowing from other
sources. Most importantly, we document that although banks’ total credit supply has recovered, the
impact of the funding shock is still persistent for some borrowers even a decade after the shock.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses identification challenges and
empirical methodology. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents the main results. Section
3.5 studies the heterogeneous response to the funding shock. Section 3.6 presents the long-run
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effects of the funding shock. We conclude in Section 3.7.
3.2 Identification challenges and empirical methodology
This section discusses the identification challenges and the empirical specification used to identify
the transmission of the short-term wholesale funding shock to consumers through credit cards. The
aggregate trends of credit card limits and balances indicate that such a transmission channel through
credit cards may exist. Time-series patterns shown in Figure 3.1 reveal that credit card limits de-
clined by approximately 25% between January 2008 and January 2010. Similarly, during the same
time period, aggregate credit card balances declined by approximately 16.7%. This figure appears to
suggest that the drop in aggregate credit card limits precedes the drop in credit card balances, which
is consistent with households being unable to smooth their consumption through credit cards due
to a reduction in their credit limits. However, such aggregate trends can be confounded by various
credit demand factors.
Consequently, the main identification challenge is to isolate the changes in credit supply from
the changes in credit demand. Specifically, our empirical exercise could be subject to potential
endogeneity concerns if credit card issuers change credit limits in anticipation of changes in credit
demand. For instance, credit card issuers can reduce credit limits in anticipation of lower consumer
demand (e.g., an increase in unemployment in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 Great Recession) if
maintaining unused credit lines is costly for credit card issuers.6
Our identification strategy allows us to mitigate such endogeneity concerns. We use an unantic-
ipated funding shock to banks resulting from the dry-up of the short-term wholesale funding market
at the end of 2008. Banks varied substantially in their dependence on short-term wholesale funding.
Thus, banks that depended more on short-term wholesale funding experienced greater unanticipated
funding liquidity shocks. Next, we use the granular credit card account–level data to estimate the
impact of the funding shock on the credit limits extended by the banks to their credit card borrow-
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Figure 3.1: Aggregate changes in credit limits and credit balances
The figure presents the aggregate trend in credit limits and credit balances over time. Our data are available at a
semiannual frequency from 2007–2010 from one of the three major credit bureaus in the U.S. The solid blue line
represents the trend in aggregate credit limits over time. The dashed red line represents the trend in aggregate credit
balances over time. The dashed vertical black line represents July 2008, which demarcates the pre- and post-shock
period in our analysis. While both aggregate credit limits and balances decline in the post-shock period, the changes in
aggregate credit balances seem to follow changes in credit limits.
ers. For identification, we construct our tests similar to [17] (see also [42, 43]), in which we isolate
changes in credit limits at the credit card account level in the presence of Individual fixed effects.
We estimate the following specification:
∆CreditLimiti,c,b = α + βExposureb + f(Xi,c,b) + ηi + εi,c,b (3.1)
where i, c, and b index individuals, credit cards, and banks, respectively. ∆CreditLimiti,c,b is the
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log-change in credit limits for individual i’s credit card c with bank b from the pre-shock to the
post-shock period.
The log-change in credit limits for each credit card is computed by first collapsing the time-series
credit card–level data by averaging across time to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section
separately in the pre-shock and post-shock period. Pre-shock and post-shock periods are symmetric,
with each consisting of three semiannual archives. Each archive is a snapshot of the credit limit and
the balance on each credit card in our sample. The pre-shock period includes semiannual archives
for January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008. The post-shock period includes semiannual archives
for January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010.
The variable Exposureb measures the exposure of a bank to the wholesale funding shock. It
is constructed as the pre-shock value of the short-term wholesale funding-to-deposit ratio, thus it
captures the proportion of a bank’s runnable funding to its stable funding. The main coefficient of
interest is β, which measures the impact of a bank’s wholesale funding shock on the credit limits of
its borrowers. ηi is the individual fixed-effects, which controls for confounding individual-specific
demand factors (e.g., income changes) that could bias our results. However, individual-bank-specific
demand factors can still confound our analysis, especially if consumers prefer to use some of their
credit cards more than their other credit cards.7 In such cases, the true measure of individual de-
mand will be better reflected through those frequently used credit cards. We address this plausible
concern in Section 3.4.1 by constructing a “leave-out-mean” credit limit for each bank–consumer
pair. This measure captures the average credit limits extended by the bank across all credit cards
after excluding the bank’s credit limit extended to that consumer.
Finally, f(Xi,c,b) is a vector of control variables at the bank level, the individual–bank level,
and the credit card level, as measured in the pre-shock period. The bank-level variables control for
differences in characteristics across credit card issuers that can confound our analysis, such as size,
7For instance, consumers may be rewarded with cash-back or points that are redeemable for cash on certain credit
cards.
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performance, and lending quality. Moreover, our specification allows for these bank-level charac-
teristics to have differential effects on the post-period relative to the pre-period. Effectively, this
allows for a horse-race between our proposed mechanism based on the funding shock versus the
other bank-level characteristics along the lines of [103, 104]. For instance, the credit extended by
large banks and small banks might differ in the post-period relative to the pre-period because large
banks and small banks were subject to different intensities of regulatory oversight post-2008. As fur-
ther robustness, we also control for bank characteristics non-parametrically using indicator variables
(e.g., above/below median) and find that our results are unchanged. We also include individual–bank
variables (e.g., the number of credit-related accounts with the bank) and credit card–level variables
(e.g., the age of the account) to control for individual-bank-specific demand and supply factors that
can affect credit limits. The error term is εi,c,b.
To estimate the effect of the banks’ wholesale funding shock on credit card balances, we estimate
a two-stage least squares regression model. The first stage is estimated using Equation (3.1), which
captures the change in credit limits (i.e., the bank’s credit supply) that resulted from the wholesale
funding shock. In the second stage, we estimate the effect of credit limit changes on credit balance
changes by instrumenting the credit limit changes with the bank’s exposure to the wholesale funding
shock. We estimate the following second-stage regression:
∆CreditBalancei,c,b = α
′ + β′∆ ̂CreditLimiti,c,b + f(Xi,c,b) + η′i + ε′i,c,b (3.2)
where ∆ ̂CreditLimiti,c,b are the fitted values from Equation (3.1). For β′ to be consistent, the
instrument Exposureb must satisfy the exclusion restriction. That is, a bank’s wholesale funding
exposure should affect only the changes in their borrowers’ credit balances through credit limit
changes. This seems plausible, since most borrowers are unlikely to be familiar with their banks’
funding structure for it to directly affect their credit card consumption.8 An important caveat in our
8However, it is possible that a reduction in bank funding can reduce a bank’s investment in its service quality, which
can in turn affect the usage of their issued credit card. We test this possibility by regressing the change in a bank’s
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analysis of credit card balances is that we observe the snapshot of balances in each archive, which
can differ from the true borrowing on those credit cards. However, since the credit card spending
of unconstrained borrowers should not be systematically affected by credit limit changes, β′ should
capture the changes in credit card borrowing from the pre- to the post-shock period due to the short-
term wholesale funding shock.
An alternate method to conduct our analysis is by using the time-series panel data and including
Individual×Archive fixed effects. However, this is more challenging, as it entails a larger number
of fixed effects. Further, collapsing the time-series and estimating cross-sectional regressions miti-
gates the econometric issues related to the underestimation of standard errors in the panel data that
have short time dimensions ([44, 45]). Thus, our procedure provides us with conservative standard
errors. Similarly, one could also carry out the analysis at the individual–bank level (as opposed to
the individual–bank–card level) by aggregating across the multiple credit cards an individual has
with a bank. However, we prefer the individual–bank–card level analysis as we can control for the
credit card-level variables related to demand more flexibly (e.g., credit card utilization ratio, credit
card age). However, as robustness, we also conduct our baseline analysis at the individual–bank
level and find that our results largely unchanged.
3.2.1 The short-term wholesale funding shock
A bank’s funding sources can be broadly divided into deposits and wholesale funding. Wholesale
funding consists of non-deposit financing such as repos and commercial paper. These funding are
provided mainly by institutional investors such as money market funds (MMFs) and other banks.
Deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and are thus a cheaper
source of funding than wholesale funding. By the virtue of being insured, deposits are also less
noninterest expense-to-assets ratio from the pre- to the post-shock period on the Exposure measure. The noninterest
expense includes advertising, promotional, public relations, business development expenses, and salaries. We do not
find any evidence that banks with a greater dependence on wholesale funding reduced their noninterest expense per unit
of assets.
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sensitive to a bank’s financial health than other uninsured sources of bank funding. As a result,
deposits are more stable and less prone to runs ([105]). However, banks generally find it costly to
raise deposits quickly to cover any funding gap because the supply of deposits is highly inelastic
with respect to the deposit rates offered ([106]). Therefore, banks turn to non-deposit or wholesale
funding as an alternative to deposits when they need to quickly cover any funding gap.
Figure C.1 shows the change in bank funding measures over time as a fraction of total assets.
Consistent with wholesale funding and deposits being substitutes, Subfigures C.1a, C.1b, and C.1c
show their negative correlation over time. Subfigure C.1d gives credence to the substitution argu-
ment by showing that the total liabilities are either relatively stable (before 2008) or decreasing (after
2008) across time.
The total wholesale funding consists of all funding sources of banks other than deposits and
equity. This funding can be broadly divided into short-term and long-term wholesale funding. Short-
term wholesale funding consists of funding liabilities that have a maturity of less than one year,
such as repos, commercial paper, and interbank borrowing. However, long-term wholesale funding
consists of other funding liabilities that have a maturity of greater than one year. Furthermore,
among the total wholesale funding, the short-term wholesale funding is more sensitive to a bank’s
financial condition. This is because the shorter the maturity of the wholesale funding, the more
exposed it is to rollover risks. Therefore, a decline in a bank’s financial health can quickly make
short-term wholesale funding prone to runs and liquidity shocks if the lenders who provide the
short-term funding choose not to rollover their funding ([88, 107]).9 Figure C.2 shows the change
in the components of wholesale funding over time as a fraction of total assets. The rise and fall of
wholesale funding—especially the short-term funding—is apparent.
We measure a bank’s exposure to the short-term wholesale funding shock as the short-term
wholesale funding-to-deposits ratio. Recall that this ratio is a measure of a bank’s runnable funds
9For instance, the maturity of certain short-term wholesale liabilities (e.g., repos, commercial paper) can be as short
as a day or a week.
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(i.e., short-term wholesale funding) as a proportion of its non-runnable funds (i.e., deposits). A
bank with a higher value of this measure should be more prone to the short-term wholesale funding
shock. In Figure 3.2, we plot our main bank exposure variableover time. Figure 3.2 shows that short-
term wholesale funding increased with respect to deposits from 2004 to 2008, then fell dramatically
after 2008. This is consistent with the sudden dry-up of the wholesale funding market which was
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Figure 3.2: Exposure measure over time
The figure presents the time trend of our main independent variable of interest, Exposure, which is defined as the ratio
of a bank’s short-term wholesale funding to its total deposits. The figure is plotted by averaging the Exposure variable
across the banks in our sample in each quarter. The data for the plot below are gathered from the quarterly Y-9C filings
of U.S. BHCs.
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3.3 Data and summary statistics
3.3.1 Data
We use data from Equifax, which is one of the three major credit bureaus in the U.S. All the data
described below are used purely for academic purposes, and they contain anonymized information.
The credit bureau’s data provide comprehensive records of the various credit accounts opened by
every U.S. resident. These credit accounts span credit cards, mortgage, auto, student loans, and
personal/business loans.
We identify the 25 bank holding companies (BHCs) from the credit bureau’s data files that con-
tain credit card issuers and also have a non-zero dependence on wholesale funding. These 25 BHCs
account for 75% of the market in terms of open credit cards. From this set of 25 credit card issuers,
we omit six issuers that differ from the rest of the sample of banks, and we omit one issuer because
of insufficient data coverage during our sample period. Of the six issuers we omit, four are foreign
credit card issuers, one issuer specializes in retail store credit cards, and one issuer targets a par-
ticular segment of the U.S. population. By omitting these six issuers, we mitigate potential credit
card–specific demand factors that can confound our analysis. For instance, if consumers use retail
store credit cards exclusively to borrow and purchase expensive luxury goods, then reductions in the
credit limits and balances of the retail store credit cards could reflect the lower demand for luxury
goods in the post-2008 period. Our final dataset consists of 18 credit card issuers that cover seven
of the top 10 credit card issuers and account for 65% of the market share.
Next, from the entire U.S. population, we identify all individuals who have active credit card ac-
counts issued by at least one of the 18 credit card issuers in our sample, as of January 2008. We then
obtain their credit card limit and balance information. As mentioned previously, this information
on credit card limits and balances is available at a semiannual frequency. For the credit-card level
analysis, we omit credit cards that are closed in the post-shock period. This filter ensures that we do
not pick up changes in credit card limits and balances due to credit card cancellations or personal
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bankruptcies. As a result, the credit-card level analysis focuses on tracking changes in credit cards
along the intensive margin. However, for robustness, we also show that our results are similar on the
extensive margin. We also limit our analysis to credit cards that have at least one nonmissing pre-
shock and one nonmissing post-shock limit and balance observation. We winsorize both measures
at the 1% and 99% levels. Finally, we average the credit limits on credit cards separately in the pre-
and post-shock periods to capture the average credit supply on individual credit cards before and
after the shock. We do the same for credit card balances. Our baseline credit card–level analysis
with individual fixed effects relies on comparing changes in credit card limits and balances within
individuals. Thus, our baseline credit card–level analysis includes only individuals who have two
or more credit cards issued by banks that are exposed to the short-term wholesale funding shock, in
which the banks differ in their exposure to the funding shock. After this final filter, we are left with
158 million credit cards issued to 54 million individuals.
Importantly however, for our individual-lavel analysis, we use our entire dataset of 500 million
credit cards issued to 134 million individuals.10 By doing this, we allow credit card closures, more
importantly, credit card originations, in the post-shock period. This analysis aggregates credit limits
and balances across all credit cards for each consumer and allows us to test the overall effect of
the short-term wholesale funding shock at the individual level. For instance, we can account for
the possibility that consumers can hedge themselves by opening new credit cards in the post-shock
period.
10Table C.1 reports the summary statistics at the consumer level for the full sample (134 individuals) and the fixed
effect model (FE) sample (54 million individuals). This table shows that individuals in the FE sample have similar
credit score, monthly income, debt-to-income ratio, credit card utilization, and mortgage balance as individuals in the
full sample. Individuals in the FE sample have more credit card accounts, more debt related accounts, and higher credit
card balances. However, the difference is mechanically driven by the fact that we require individuals in the FE sample
have at least two credit cards.
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3.3.2 Bank-level summary statistics
We use a bank’s dependence on wholesale funding as a measure of the bank’s exposure to the
unexpected liquidity shock. Therefore, we use the cross-sectional variation in the dependence on
short-term wholesale funding across banks as a measure of the variation in a bank’s exposure to
the unexpected liquidity shock. Table 3.1 shows how the exposure to liquidity shocks varies cross-
sectionally across the banks in our sample. To show this, we first collect data from the quarterly
BHC Y-9C regulatory filings for each of our credit card–issuing banks at the bank holding company
level from 2006–2010.11 We define the pre-shock period from 2006Q1 to 2007Q4, and we define
the post-shock period from 2009Q1 to 2010Q4. Then, we collapse the quarterly bank-level data
to obtain a single bank-level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock periods by
averaging across time.
Table 3.1, Panel A presents summary statistics for the bank-level characteristics after splitting the
pre-shock cross-section into banks that had a high exposure (above median) and banks that had a low
exposure (below median) to the wholesale funding liquidity shock based on the bank’s short-term
wholesale funding-to-deposits ratio. We report means and medians for the bank-level characteristics
where the medians are reported in square brackets. Column (3) reports the difference between the
means for the high– and low–shock exposure banks, and also tests for its statistical significance.
11We can collect data at the holding company level for 17 out of the 18 credit card–issuing banks. We supplement
our data with the quarterly call report data for the remaining credit card–issuing bank. Our results are robust even after
excluding this bank from our analysis. However, we choose to retain it for our analysis because it is an economically
important bank that ranks among the top five credit card–issuing banks in terms of market share.
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Table 3.1: Balancing of covariates
This table presents the summary statistics at the credit card–issuing bank level. Panel A uses quarterly BHC Y-9C and
Call report regulatory filings data in the pre-shock period. The pre-shock period for regulatory filing data ranges from
2006Q1 to 2007Q4. Panel B uses credit bureau data in the pre-shock period. The pre-shock period for credit bureau data
consists of three semiannual archives namely, January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008. The data are first collapsed to
obtain a single bank-level cross-section in the pre-shock period by averaging across time. Next, the statistics reported in
the table are obtained by dividing the cross-section based on high (above median) and low (below median) dependence
on short-term wholesale funding in the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding is measured
as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. The variables in Panel A are reported as a fraction of
total assets unless otherwise specified. The table reports means and medians. Medians are reported in square brackets.
Column (3) reports the difference in means and medians. The significance for the statistical test that tests the equality
of means are reported using *, **, and ***, which indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Quarterly BHC Y-9C and Call report regulatory filing data




Short-term wholesale funding/Deposits 0.300 0.101 0.200***
[0.217] [0.095] [0.122]
Wholesale funding 0.242 0.099 0.143***
[0.218] [0.098] [0.120]
Fed funds purchased 0.014 0.016 -0.002
[0.009] [0.008] [0.001]
Repo 0.074 0.026 0.048*
[0.042] [0.020] [0.023]
Other liabilities maturity < 1 yr 0.060 0.024 0.035***
[0.059] [0.018] [0.041]
Other liabilities maturity < 1 yr 0.094 0.033 0.061***
[0.098] [0.020] [0.078]
Other
Assets (log) 19.599 16.377 3.222***
[19.213] [16.555] [2.659]
Deposits 0.539 0.662 -0.123*
[0.555] [0.713] [-0.158]
Equity capital 0.096 0.177 -0.081
[0.092] [0.098] [-0.006]
Liquid assets 0.223 0.226 -0.003
[0.215] [0.220] [-0.005]
Business mix
CC loans 0.041 0.070 -0.029
[0.038] [0.029] [0.010]
Mortgage loans 0.298 0.379 -0.081
[0.304] [0.442] [-0.138]
C&I loans 0.115 0.100 0.015
[0.100] [0.095] [0.004]
Performance
ROE 0.088 0.105 -0.018
[0.087] [0.080] [0.007]
Non-perf loans 0.007 0.005 0.002
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003]
Non-perf CC loans/Total CC loans 0.019 0.023 -0.004
[0.021] [0.011] [0.010]
Risk-based capital ratio 12.140 23.215 -11.075*
[11.605] [14.221] [-2.617]
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Panel B: Credit bureau data




Credit score 733.47 729.21 4.26
[741.75] [750.89] [-9.14]
Monthly income ($) 3,897.39 3,868.95 28.44
[3,985.62] [3,994.93] [-9.31]
Debt-to-income ratio (DTI) 33.49 32.55 .94
[34.65] [31.95] [2.7]
Subprime (%) 10.08 13.71 -3.63
[8.39] [5.28] [3.11]
Credit card debt
Credit card accounts 4.49 4.17 .32
[4.54] [3.98] [0.56]
Credit card balance 6,936 5,743.50 1,192.50**
[6,634.90] [6,013.95] [620.95]
Credit card utilization 26.61 28.96 -2.36
[23.90] [21.74] [2.16]
Credit card delinquency 0.75 0.86 -0.11
[0.54] [0.42] [0.12]
Other debt
Total-debt related accounts 10.58 9.87 0.71
[10.55] [9.97] [0.58]
Mortgage balance ($) 191,283.39 170,178.43 21,104.96*
[198,673.86] [163,028.70] [35,645.16]
Auto balance ($) 16,732.41 17,077.06 -344.65
[16,806.57] [16,840.96] [-34.39]
Table 3.1, Panel A, shows that the mean exposure (i.e., the dependence on short-term wholesale
funding) for the banks in the high-exposure group is three times greater than the mean exposure for
banks in the low-exposure group. The total wholesale funding as a fraction of assets is also about
2.5 times greater for the high-exposure group than the low-exposure group. In terms of individual
components of wholesale funding, except for the federal funds purchased, the high-exposure banks
have a significantly greater dependence (by about 2.5–3 times) on all components of the wholesale
funding compared to the low-exposure banks.
High-exposure banks are also significantly larger than low-exposure banks, and they have a
smaller deposit base as a fraction of their assets. This is consistent with previous literature that
argues that a bank can substitute deposit funding with wholesale funding either (a) because of the
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bank’s inability to raise deposits quickly when it must expand lending, or (b) in response to an
outflow of deposits (see [108]). Moreover, [108] also suggest that, when required, large banks
(as opposed to small banks) are better able to substitute deposits with wholesale funding because
they face lower financial frictions. As a result, they obtain wholesale funding at a lower cost. Our
results are consistent with the observed size differential between high- and low-exposure banks in
our sample.
Further, Table 3.1, Panel A, shows that the high- and low-exposure banks are not statistically
different in terms of their equity capital, which is an alternate source of bank funding. The high-
and low-exposure banks are also similar in terms of their business mix, which measures the extent to
which the banks engage in credit card, mortgage, and commercial and industrial (C&I) lending. The
covariate balance along each component of the business-mix dimension also mitigates the concern
that a shock to a particular industry in which banks operate drives the drop in credit card lending.
Finally, Table 3.1, Panel A, shows that the high- and low-exposure banks have similar performance-
based measures. Importantly, given that credit cards are the focus of our study, we find no statistical
difference in the performance of credit card loans between the high- and low- exposure banks. If
anything, the point estimates suggest that the credit card loans of the high-exposure banks performed
better than the low-exposure banks in the pre-shock period. The high-exposure banks had 0.4 per-
centage points fewer non-performing credit card loans as a fraction of their total credit card loans
(or 17.4% lower than the low-exposure banks).
3.3.3 Credit card–level summary statistics
Table 3.1, Panel B, presents summary statistics for the quality of borrowers to whom banks issue
credit cards, after splitting banks into high- and low-exposure banks. We follow the same procedure
as shown in Table 3.1, Panel A. We first collapse the data to obtain a single bank-level cross-section
in the pre-shock period by averaging across the semiannual archives. Next, we obtain the statistics
reported in the table by dividing the cross-section into the same high- and low-exposure banks as
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defined in Table 3.1, Panel A.
Table 3.1, Panel B, shows that the high-exposure banks lend to borrowers who have better credit
quality and stronger fundamentals. The borrowers of the high-exposure banks have higher credit
scores and a higher monthly income. The percentage of subprime credit card borrowers (i.e., bor-
rower credit scores< 620) for the high-exposure banks is lower than that of the low-exposure banks.
While borrowers of the high- and low-exposure banks have a similar number of credit card ac-
counts, the borrowers of the high-exposure banks have a significantly higher credit card balance (by
$1,192.50) and a lower utilization ratio (by 2.36 percentage points) than the low-exposure banks.
This implies that borrowers of the high-exposure banks have, on average, significantly higher credit
card limits.
Further, Table 3.1, Panel B, shows that, despite higher credit card balances and similar debt-to-
income ratios, borrowers of the high-exposure banks have a lower delinquency rate on their credit
cards relative to the borrowers of the low-exposure banks. In terms of other debt, the borrowers of
the high-exposure banks have about one more debt-related account, a higher mortgage balance, and
a lower auto balance than the borrowers of the low-exposure banks. Despite the differences in the
composition of debt, it is important to note that the overall debt-to-income ratios are similar for the
borrowers in both groups.
Overall, the summary statistics in Table 3.1, Panel B, are consistent with the statistics in Ta-
ble 3.1, Panel A and show that the high-exposure banks had a better lending quality than the low-
exposure banks. To the extent that better-quality borrowers can handle adverse shocks that are
correlated with the negative shock to their bank’s wholesale funding, the summary statistics imply
that the wholesale funding supply shock transmitted from the banks to their borrowers is negatively
correlated with the borrowers’ demand shocks. In other words, any confounding borrower-related
demand shocks that can bias our results should work against finding the proposed relationship be-
tween a bank’s short-term wholesale funding shock exposure and the cut in credit limits.
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3.3.4 Preliminary bank-level results
Figure 3.3 provides evidence for our baseline result at the bank level using the BHC Y-9C regulatory
filings data. We partial out (orthogonalize) our exposure measure, and the log-change in credit card
loans with respect to bank size by regressing them against the log of total assets and obtaining the
residuals. This procedure adjusts for the fact that banks that have a greater dependence on wholesale
funding are significantly larger, as reported in the summary statistics in Table 3.1. Figure 3.3 shows
that banks that have a greater dependence on short-term wholesale funding experienced a greater
reduction in credit card loans on their balance sheets from the pre- to the post-shock period. How-
ever, aggregated bank-level data cannot distinguish between credit supply and credit demand effects.
Thus, we rely on the credit card–level data to infer the credit supply–driven effects of the short-term
wholesale funding liquidity shock.
Figure 3.4 provides evidence for the necessary conditions for our empirical tests. First, Subfig-
ure 3.4a provides supporting evidence for our main assertion that banks with a greater dependence
on short-term wholesale funding experienced a greater reduction in short-term wholesale funding
in the post-shock period. Subfigures 3.4b, 3.4c, and 3.4d plot changes in the total wholesale fund-
ing, total liabilities, and equity capital. These figures indicate that banks could not make up for the
funding gap using other sources of funding after the loss of short-term wholesale funding.12
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Figure 3.3: Bank exposure and change in credit card loans
The figure plots the change in credit card loans from the pre-shock to the post-shock period as a function of our main
independent variable of interest, Exposure, which is defined as the ratio of a bank’s short-term wholesale funding to its
total deposits. However, before plotting, we partial out (orthogonalize) Exposure and the log-change in credit card loans
with respect to the log of total bank assets to account for the fact that larger banks, in general, have a greater dependence
on wholesale funding (see Table 3.1). The pre-shock period ranges from 2006Q1 to 2007Q4, and the post-shock period
ranges from 2009Q1 to 2010Q4. The points on the graph are plotted proportional to bank size as measured by the
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(d) ∆Equity capital
Figure 3.4: Bank exposure and change in bank funding
The figure plots the change in bank funding measures from the pre-shock to the post-shock period as a function of our main independent variable of
interest, Exposure, which is defined as the ratio of a bank’s short-term wholesale funding to its total deposits. However, before plotting, we partial out
(orthogonalize) Exposure and bank funding measures with respect to bank assets to account for the fact that larger banks, in general, have a greater
dependence on wholesale funding (see Table 3.1). The pre-shock period ranges from 2006Q1 to 2007Q4, and the post-shock period ranges from 2009Q1
to 2010Q4. The points on the graph are plotted proportional to bank size as measured by the average total assets in the pre-shock period. The data for the
plot below are gathered from the quarterly Y-9C filings of U.S. BHCs.
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3.4 Results
A funding shock increases a bank’s marginal cost of extending credit because it increases the bank’s
funding costs. Banks can pass on their higher funding costs to consumers either through price (e.g.,
increasing interest rates on credit card borrowing) or through quantity (e.g., reducing credit limits).
However, interest rates on credit cards tend to be relatively inelastic ([83, 54]). Moreover, an increase
in interest rates can lead to adverse selection issues since only the riskier borrowers are willing to
borrow ([83, 109]). Thus, credit limits, as opposed to interest rates, are more likely to be the primary
margin of adjustment for banks as they transmit their funding shocks to consumers through credit
cards. We first estimate the average effect of the wholesale funding shock on individuals. Next,
we examine the heterogeneous effects of the wholesale funding shock across individuals because
the heterogeneity of information issues (e.g., moral hazard, adverse selection) can affect the cost of
extending credit differentially across consumers ([79]).
3.4.1 Credit card–level results
Effect of the funding shock on credit limits
In this section, we use the granular credit card–level data to estimate the effect of the wholesale
funding shock on a bank’s credit supply. As described in Section 3.2, we isolate changes in credit
limits at the credit card–level in the presence of Individual fixed effects. Table 3.2 documents
these results, which are obtained by estimating Equation 3.1. Our regression sample consists of 158
million credit card accounts belonging to 54 million individuals after applying the filters described
in Section 3.3 to the raw data from the credit bureau, which cover the entire U.S. population. We
also standardize the exposure variable for ease of interpretation. Finally, all control variables are
constructed by averaging over the pre-shock period.
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Table 3.2: Effect of funding shock on credit card limits
This table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and the change in
credit card limits using the credit bureau data. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of three semiannual
archives. The pre-shock period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual archives, while
the three semiannual archives for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010. Credit card–
level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock
periods by averaging across time. Then, the change in credit card limits is computed by taking the log difference from
the post- to the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding is measured as the ratio of short-term
wholesale funding to total deposits. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Individual FE OLS
Depvar: ∆CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposure -3.811*** -6.613*** -5.050*** -4.750*** -4.035***
(-9.85) (-16.11) (-13.32) (-12.89) (-8.66)
Bank characteristics
Assets (log) -1.353*** -1.068*** -0.362*** -0.359*** -0.519***
(-17.98) (-33.86) (-4.62) (-4.85) (-5.95)
Assets2 (log) 0.035*** 0.028*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015***
(17.99) (33.40) (5.00) (5.22) (6.39)
Risk-based capital ratio -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.004* -0.004** -0.006***
(-14.89) (-23.54) (-1.74) (-1.98) (-2.67)
CC business (%) -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-9.12) (-16.88) (-9.45) (-9.35) (-6.19)
Bank performance
ROE 3.059*** 1.351*** 1.366*** 0.778**
(11.51) (4.36) (4.62) (2.02)
Non-perf loans (%) -0.182*** -0.026 -0.020 0.052
(-5.24) (-0.85) (-0.66) (1.37)
Lending quality
Avg. credit score -0.001* -0.001* -0.002***
(-1.86) (-1.78) (-3.20)
Avg. DTI -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.040***
(-6.17) (-6.22) (-5.72)
Avg. CC balance (log) 0.301*** 0.283*** 0.196***
(7.51) (7.10) (3.99)
Avg. mortgage balance (log) 0.041 0.051 -0.012
(0.97) (1.10) (-0.25)
Credit card controls
CC utilization 0.002*** 0.001***
(23.57) (8.07)
Months CC open (log) -0.006** -0.016***
(-2.13) (-6.18)
Accounts open (log) 0.023*** -0.023***
(6.94) (-8.09)
N 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533
Adj. R2 0.072 0.082 0.084 0.090 0.036
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The summary statistics in Table 3.1 show that larger banks, in general, have a greater fraction of
wholesale funding. Therefore, in Table 3.2, Column (1), we control for bank size by including the
logarithm of bank assets and its square to account for any nonlinear effects due to bank size in our
analysis. Column (1) also controls for a bank’s ability to sustain losses by including the risk-based
capital ratio. To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by correlated shocks to the credit
card industry, we also include the amount of credit card loans as a fraction of the bank’s assets as a
control in Column (1). After controlling for these initial sets of bank characteristics, we find that the
coefficient of interest, which is associated with the Exposure variable, is negative and statistically
significant. This indicates that the banks that had a greater dependence on short-term wholesale
funding in the pre-shock period reduced credit limits more in the post-shock period. In Column (2)
and Column (3), we show that our point estimates remain virtually unchanged even after controlling
for the performance and lending quality of the bank. These specifications suggest that our results are
unlikely to be driven by banks with poor fundamentals such as poor performance, more risk-taking,
or a low-quality customer base.
In Column (4), we also control for credit card–specific and individual–bank-specific character-
istics than can affect credit limits, such as the age of the credit card account and the relationship
between an individual and her credit card–issuing bank. We measure the relationship between an
individual and her credit card–issuing bank by observing the number of open accounts (e.g., mort-
gage loans, auto loans) that the individual has with the bank. Column (4) show that our results
remain unchanged, indicating that such individual–bank-specific factors are less likely to confound
our results. The coefficient estimated in Column (4) suggests that a one standard deviation increase
in the dependence on short-term wholesale funding in the pre-shock period leads to a 4.75% decline
in credit card limits from the pre- to post-shock period.13 Given that the average pre-shock credit
limit is $9,131.60, a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s exposure to the short-term wholesale
funding shock decreases the credit limit by $434, on average. Or equivalently, a 10 percentage point
13The standard deviation of the exposure measure is 16%.
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(pp) increase in a bank’s short-term wholesale funding dependence in the pre-shock period leads to
a 3% ($271) decline in credit limits in the post-shock period, on average.
In Column (5), we re-estimate the specification in Column (4) without individual fixed effects.
We note that the coefficient associated with the Exposure variable is relatively unchanged. This
implies that the individual demand factors, which we absorb using the fixed-effects specifications
in Column (4), is mostly uncorrelated with the Exposure variable. This result is useful when we
attempt to trace the impact of the wholesale funding shock on an individual’s aggregate credit card
balances through the changes in credit limits.
In Figure 3.5, we provide evidence for parallel trends in the credit limits extended by the high-
and low-exposure banks in the pre-shock period. Figure 3.5 attempts to replicate the cross-sectional
“within” individual analysis in Table 3.2 over time (see [17]). The plot in Figure 3.5 is equivalent
to first obtaining the residual from regressing credit limits on Individual×Archive fixed effects, then
plotting the residual after sorting it based on whether it is associated with a high- or a low-exposure
bank. However, given the large number of fixed effects that must be employed in such a regression,
we choose to implement this task in the following equivalent manner.14 For each individual in every
semiannual archive, we compute the deviation of each credit card’s credit limit from the individual’s
mean credit limit in that archive. Next, we sort the deviations into two groups based on whether
the individual’s credit card was issued by a high- or a low-exposure bank. Then, we plot the mean
of the deviations computed for each group–archive in Figure 3.5. The high- and low-exposure
bank groups are defined “within” individual, based on the mean of our wholesale funding exposure
measure computed for each individual.
Figure 3.5 shows parallel trends for the (within-individual) credit limits extended by the high-
and low-exposure banks in the pre-shock period. However, in the post-shock period, the credit limits
for the cards issued by high-exposure banks trend lower relative to the mean individual credit limit.
14Our sample consists of 54 million credit card consumers and covers seven semiannual archives during our sample
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Figure 3.5: Credit limits extended within-individual over time
The figure plots the mean credit limit deviations computed “within” individual for the low- and high-exposure banks
over time. For each individual in every semiannual archive, we compute the deviation of each credit card’s credit limit
from the individual’s mean credit limit in that archive. Next, we sort the deviations into two groups based on whether
the individual’s credit card was issued by a high- or a low-exposure bank. Banks are classified as low- and high-
exposure banks within each individual based on the mean exposure computed at the individual level. The figure plots
the mean of the deviations computed across all credit cards in each semiannual archive for the low- and high-exposure
banks separately. Our data sample is gathered from one of the three major credit bureaus in the U.S. and ranges from
2007–2010 at a semiannual frequency.
The within-individual credit limits trend for credit cards issued by the low-exposure banks is a mirror
image of the trend for high-exposure banks because we sum up the deviations within each individual
and archive. The unconditional mean change in credit limits from the pre- to post-shock period is
−3.95% for the high-exposure banks and −0.30% for the low-exposure banks. These unconditional
means indicate that our results are not driven by credit limit increases on cards issued by the low-
exposure banks. Rather, these changes occur due to the credit limit reductions on cards issued by
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the high-exposure banks.
So far, our analysis has focused on the effects of the sudden decline in short-term wholesale
funding on the credit limits extended on the intensive margin. Next, we estimate the effect of the
bank liquidity shock on the extensive margin. Specifically, we test whether banks that were more
affected by the shock are less likely to issue new credit cards and more likely to close existing
credit card accounts. In Table C.3, Columns (1) and (2), we consider all new credit card accounts
that were opened by the banks in our sample in the post-shock period, but did not exist in the
pre-shock period. We define an indicator variable Newi,c,b, which takes the value 1 if a new card
c is issued to individual i by bank b in our post-shock period, and takes the value 0 otherwise.
Column (1) estimates the OLS regression and shows that a one standard deviation increase in a
bank’s dependence on short-term wholesale funding reduces its likelihood of issuing new credit
cards by 1.97%. In Column (2), we include Individual fixed effects to control for individual demand
factors that might affect the issuance of credit cards to an individual. The fixed effects estimator
in Column (2) is slightly higher and indicates that banks are 2.34% less likely to issue new credit
cards in the post-shock period if they had a one standard deviation greater dependence on short-term
wholesale funding in the pre-shock period.
Similarly, we define an indicator variable Closedi,c,b, which takes the value 1 if a card c issued to
individual i by bank b was closed in the post-shock after the sudden decline in short-term wholesale
funding, and takes the value 0 otherwise.15 Columns (3) and (4) present results for the closed credit
card accounts. The point estimates with Individual fixed effects (Column (4)) and without them
(Column (3)) are similar. These results suggests that a bank with one standard deviation greater
exposure to the short-term wholesale funding shock was 4.35% more likely to close credit cards
in the post-shock period. Overall, our extensive margin results suggest that banks that were more
15Creditors can close a credit card account with no advance notice if (a) the card is inactive, (b) the creditor no longer
offers the same terms on the credit card, or (c) the borrower has defaulted. Creditors can also close credit card accounts
for undisclosed reasons (see https://blog.equifax.com/credit/credit-tips-what-to-do-when-an-issuer-closes-your-credit-
card/)
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exposed to the short-term wholesale funding shock were more likely to close existing cards and less
likely to open new credit cards.
Effect of the funding shock on credit balances
Ex ante, controlling for individual demand factors, it is not obvious how changes in credit limits
should affect credit card balances. For instance, if consumers are not liquidity constrained then a
change in credit limits should not lead to a change in credit card balances.16 Table 3.3 shows how
consumers change their their credit card usage when it experiences a credit limit cut. In Column
(1) we estimate the OLS regression to obtain the relation between credit limit changes and credit
balance changes at the credit card level. We find that a 1% reduction in credit limits leads to a 0.74%
increase in credit card balances. It is important to note that Column (1) does not include Individual
fixed effects and thus captures the cross-sectional variation across individuals.
Clearly, endogenous demand factors can bias the results in Column (1) because consumer de-
mand is arguably the primary driver of changes in credit balances. For example, consumers can
receive an increase in credit limits by applying for it with the intention of utilizing more credit in the
future. Similarly, if lenders anticipate future demand changes (e.g., a reduction in future income),
then they could reduce credit limits in anticipation of such demand factors. Therefore, in Column
(2), we re-estimate our specification in Column (1) with Individual fixed effects. This allows us to
control for individual demand factors and compare how credit limit changes affect credit balance
changes within individuals who use multiple credit cards. The Individual fixed effects estimator in
Column (2) shows that a 1% change in credit limits leads to a 0.85% change in credit card balances.
16For instance, under the permanent income hypothesis, credit limit changes should not affect credit balances or
consumption. However, if liquidity constraints are binding, or if they are expected to bind in the future (buffer stock
models), then credit limit changes can lead to changes in credit balances or consumption.
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Table 3.3: Effect of funding shock on credit card balances
The table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and the change in credit
card balances at the credit card level. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of three semiannual archives.
The pre-shock period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual archives, while the three
semiannual archives for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010. Credit card–level data
are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock periods by
averaging across time. Then, the change in credit card balance is computed by taking the log difference from the post- to
the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding (exposure) is measured as the ratio of short-term
wholesale funding to total deposits. In Column (5), ∆ CC limit is instrumented by the Exposure variable. Column (6)
re-estimates the specification in Column (5) by using dollar changes in credit limits and balances. The standard errors
are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆CC Balance $∆CC Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




∆ CC limit (instrumented) 2.064***
(4.52)
$∆ CC limit (instrumented) 0.235***
(7.30)
Individual FE X X X X
Bank characteristics X X X X X X
Bank performance X X X X X X
Lending quality X X X X X X
Credit card controls X X X X X X
N 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533
Adj. R2 0.038 0.164 0.024 0.146 0.128 0.273
F-stat (Excl. instru) 97.1 177.15
Columns (3) and (4) estimate the OLS and the Individual fixed effects estimator using our bank
Exposure variable to the short-term wholesale funding shock. Both columns suggest that the credit
card consumers of banks that had a greater exposure to the short-term wholesale funding shock
reduced balances on those credit card to a greater extent. The Individual fixed effects estimator in
Column (4), which corrects for changes in individual demand factors, indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in a bank’s exposure to the short-term wholesale funding shock leads to reduction
of 9.81% in balances on the credit cards issued by the bank. A comparison of the estimates in
Columns (3) and (4) reveals that the individual demand factors are positively correlated with our
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bank Exposure variable resulting in a positively biased coefficient in Column (3). This suggests
that omitting demand factors should work against finding the negative relation between a bank’s
exposure to the liquidity shock and the reduction in the balances on the credit cards issued by the
bank.
In Column (5), we estimate the 2SLS specification in Equation 3.2, which instruments the change
in credit card limits from the pre- to post-shock period with our bank Exposure variable. Therefore,
the estimate in Column (5), which captures the local average treatment effect (LATE), shows that
a 1% reduction in credit limits due to the short-term wholesale funding shock reduces credit card
balances by 2.06%.17 In Column (6), we re-estimate Column (5) by using dollar changes in credit
limits and credit balances instead of log changes. The result suggests that $1 dollar decrease in
credit limits led to 23.5 cents lower credit balances. This point estimate, which shows the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) out of an additional $1 in credit card liquidity, is consistent with
previous studies (e.g., [48]).
Are the results being driven by individual-bank-specific demand?
If endogenous demand factors exist only at the individual level, then our fixed-effects specification
can control for them entirely. However, if there are confounding demand factors at the credit card
level, then our results could still be biased. For instance, if individuals prefer to use certain credit
cards over others, then the true measure of individual demand will be reflected only through those
frequently used credit cards. Moreover, if banks tend to reduce credit limits for those cards that are
infrequently used, then our results should matter less economically. Therefore, in Table 3.4, Panel A,
we consider only the active credit cards in our sample. These are cards that had a nonzero balance in
both the pre- and the post-shock period. This additional condition results in dropping approximately
17When consumers substitute away from a more affected card to a less affected card, a balance reduction on the more
affected card is a balance gain on the less affected card. So the treatment effect captures the sum of these two effects,
and thus is more than a one-for-one effect. Further, as balances are smaller than limits, the same dollar change is a
greater percentage on balances than limits.
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24% of the credit card accounts in our sample.
Column (1) shows how a bank’s exposure to the short-term wholesale funding shock affects the
change in credit limits for the subsample of active cards. We find a stronger effect compared to the
baseline results in Table 3.2. Namely, a one standard deviation increase in the dependence on short-
term wholesale funding leads to a 5.20% reduction in the credit limits of an actively used card. This
suggests that the credit cards that were in greater use saw a larger reduction in credit limits in the
post-shock period, which makes our analysis economically relevant. Column (3) re-estimates the IV
specification in Table 3.3, Column (5). We find that a 1% reduction in credit limits for active cards
due to the short-term wholesale funding shock leads to a 3.42% decrease in credit card balances for
active cards. This effect is about 1.6 times greater than the estimate in Table 3.3, Column (5), which
also includes cards that are not actively used. Moreover, recall that the fixed-effects specification for
the actively used cards should be better able to control for the endogenous changes in the demand-
side factors at the individual level. Thus, it is likely that the higher IV estimate for the active credit
cards subsample better reflects the LATE stemming from the financially constrained individuals.
To further mitigate endogeneity concerns due to individual-bank-specific demand factors, we
construct a “leave-out-mean” credit limit change for each credit card. For every individual i’s credit
card c issued by bank b, we first compute the “leave-out-mean” credit limit CreditLimiti,−c,b as
the average credit limit using all the credit cards issued by bank b except credit card c. Next, we
compute the change in this “leave-out-mean” credit limit for each credit card.18 By construction, this
measure excludes the credit limit changes made by a bank due to individual-bank-specific demand
factors such as individual requests for increases in credit limits. At the same time, this measure
captures the bank’s average change in credit supply through its issued credit cards.















Table 3.4: Effect of funding shock on credit cards: Robustness
The table shows the robustness of the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and
the change in credit card limits and balances. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of three semiannual
archives. The pre-shock period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual archives, while
the three semiannual archives for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010. Credit card–
level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock
periods by averaging across time. Then, the change in credit card limits and balances are computed by taking the log
difference from the post- to the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding (shock exposure)
is measured as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. The standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: ∆CCLimit using active cards only




∆ CC limit (instrumented) 3.419***
(8.18)
N 120,497,687 120,497,687 120,497,687
Adj. R2 0.099 0.192 0.104
F-stat (Excl. instru) 212.629
Panel B: ∆CCLimiti,−c,b: computed independent of credit card-specific limits




∆ CC limit (instrumented) 2.305***
(4.57)
N 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533
Adj. R2 0.981 0.146 0.152





∆ CC limit (instrumented) 1.809*** 2.213***
(2.95) (5.36)
N 68,474,761 89,957,772
Adj. R2 0.127 0.133
F-stat (Excl. instru) 108.469 199.268





Credit card controls X
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We re-estimate our baseline model with the leave-out mean credit limit change measure in Ta-
ble 3.4, Panel B. The point estimate in Column (1) indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in bank exposure to short-term wholesale funding led to a −4.30% reduction in credit limits. This
point estimate is remarkably similar to the point estimate of−4.75% in the comparable specification
shown in Table 3.2, Column (4), with individual fixed effects. This further suggests that individual-
bank-specific demand factors are less likely to influence our results, and individual fixed effects
seem to adequately control for confounding demand-related factors in our setting. Similarly, for the
credit card balance regressions, the point estimates in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.4, Panel B, are
similar to the point estimates with comparable specifications shown in Table 3.3, Columns (4) and
(5), with individual fixed effects.
In Table 3.4, Panel C, we mitigate the concern that our results might still be demand driven due
to household balance sheet effects in the post-2008 period after the housing market crash. [91] show
that areas with greater house price declines and more levered households reduced their consumption
more in the post-2008 period. Their results highlight the role of negative housing-wealth shocks
and debt overhang in reducing household consumption (see also [92]). Thus, our results might be
confounded by the household balance sheet effect if homeowners are more likely to borrow from
banks that have a greater dependence on short-term wholesale funding. To address this concern,
we re-estimate the model in Table 3.3, Column (5), by splitting the sample based on whether an
individual owns a home. Table 3.4, Panel C, shows that the point estimates for homeowners and
non-homeowners are similar, suggesting that our results are less likely to be confounded by the
household balance sheet channel.
Are the results driven by other differences across banks?
A potential concern is that our results are driven by differences in other characteristics between the
high- and low-exposure banks, as opposed to their differential exposure to the short-term wholesale
funding shock. For instance, the summary statistics in Table 3.1 show that banks dependent on
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wholesale funding were larger banks. It is plausible that larger banks were subject to greater scrutiny
and regulation in the post-2008 period, which led them to be more conservative while extending
credit. To mitigate such a concern, we classify the banks into large (above median) and small
(below median) size groups, and we include the interactions of the size indicator variable with the
Individual fixed effects in our regression specification (i.e., Individual×SizeGroup fixed effects).
First, these fixed effects control for any differences in the credit extended by smaller and larger banks
to consumers in a flexible and nonparametric manner. Moreover, the coefficient of interest, which
is associated with Exposure, is also identified within large and small banks. In other words, if the
reduction in credit limits in the post-shock period is in fact driven by differences in bank size, then
the Individual×SizeGroup fixed effects should subsume all the variation in the Exposure variable
across banks and render its estimated coefficient statistically insignificant.
Table C.4, Column (1), presents the results after including the Individual×SizeGroup fixed ef-
fects. The coefficient associated with Exposure in Table C.4, Column (1), is −4.79. This coefficient
is practically unchanged when compared to the coefficient of −4.75 in our baseline specification in
Table 3.2, Column (4), with Individual fixed effects and the same set of control variables. Thus, our
baseline results, which show a reduction in credit limit due to the wholesale funding liquidity shock,
are unlikely to be driven by differences in size between the high- and low-exposure banks. Simi-
larly, based on the summary statistics in Table 3.1, one might argue that the high-exposure banks
were riskier because they had lower capital ratios, on average, and they suffered greater losses in
the post-shock period as a consequence. Table 3.1 also shows that high-exposure banks have lower
utilization ratios, and they may have sought to reduce their unused credit card commitments in the
post-shock period because such commitments are costly to maintain. Table 3.1 also shows that the
high-exposure banks were lending to relatively safer consumers in the pre-shock period. Thus, it is
plausible that the high-exposure banks were more risk-averse and consequently reduced credit limits
more in the post-shock period.
In order to mitigate the above potential concerns, we follow the same empirical strategy as we
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did with bank size in Table C.4, Column(1). We classify banks into above-median and below-median
groups based on their capital ratios, their unused credit card commitments, and their percentage of
subprime consumers. Next, we interact the Individual fixed effects with the aforementioned group
indicator variables, and include them in our analysis. These results are presented in Table C.4,
Columns (2)–(4), and they remain qualitatively unchanged when compared to our baseline spec-
ification in Table 3.2, Column (4). Overall, our results are robust to controlling for the potential
differences in bank characteristics that could drive our results.
We also show that our results are not driven by any particular bank. We re-estimate the baseline
regression specification shown in Table 3.2, Column (4), by excluding one bank from the analysis
each time and estimating the regression on the sample consisting of the remaining 17 banks. Conse-
quently, there are 18 such regressions, and we plot the 18 estimated coefficients of interest associated
with Exposure, along with their standard errors, in Figure 3.6. As can be seen, the estimated coeffi-
cients are significantly negative and relatively stable across all the 18 specifications, which indicates
that our results are not driven by any particular bank.
Other robustness tests
We also show that our results are unchanged if we conduct the analysis at the individual–bank level
as opposed to our baseline models in Equation (3.1) and Equation (3.2) which are at the individual–
bank–card level. If an individual has multiple credit cards from a bank, then we sum the limits and
balances across those multiple credit cards to construct our dataset at the individual–bank level. We
also aggregate our credit card-level controls (i.e., CC utilization, Months CC open) to the individual–
bank level. We compute the CC utilization at the individual–bank level by dividing the summed
balance by the summed limit. Months CC open at the individual–bank level is assigned based on the
oldest credit card issued to the individual by the bank. The results using the individual–bank level
analysis are qualitatively similar to baseline results and are presented in Table C.5 in the Appendix.






























































































Figure 3.6: Estimation excluding each bank
This figure shows the coefficient β associated with our variable of interest, Exposure, from Equation 3.1 estimated
by excluding each BHC from our sample to address the potential concern that a particular BHC might be driving our
results. Exposure is defined as the ratio of a bank’s short-term wholesale funding to its total deposits. The circles in
the plot represent the coefficient estimate β associated with the Exposure variable from estimating Equation 3.1 after
excluding the bank shown below the plotted point on the x-axis. The solid vertical lines represent the 95% confidence
intervals for the estimated coefficients. The point estimates are ordered based on bank size. Thus, “Bank 1” represents
the coefficient estimate after removing the largest bank in our sample, and “Bank 18” represents the coefficient estimate
after removing the smallest bank in our sample.
flexibly control for credit card level variables related to credit demand.
Table C.6 shows that our baseline results in Table 3.2 are robust to using alternate measures of
bank exposure and using different levels of clustering. We use short-term wholesale funding as a
fraction of total assets as an alternate measure for bank exposure in Columns (2) and (4), and we find
that our results are unchanged. Consistent with Figure C.1, this suggests that our results capture the
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variation in the numerator of the bank exposure measure (i.e., a bank’s dependence on short-term
wholesale funding) as opposed to the denominator. We also cluster the standard errors at the bank
level instead of the bank–state level as in Columns (3) and (4), and we find that our results are robust.
Although the bank-level cluster is larger and can completely account for within-bank correlations,
we cluster at the bank–state level for the rest of the analysis because we have only 18 banks and the
standard errors can be biased when there are too few clusters ([45, 47]).
3.4.2 Individual-level results: Does the funding shock affect total credit card balances?
So far, we have provided evidence for how negative liquidity shocks to banks transmit through credit
limits and result in lower balances on the affected credit card. In this section, we test whether the
liquidity shocks to banks that are transmitted through credit limits have an aggregate effect on credit
card borrowing and spending by consumers.
If credit card consumers are hedged with respect to their bank’s liquidity shocks, then the bank
liquidity shocks transmitted through credit limits should not affect consumers’ total credit card bal-
ances. However, if consumers are constrained, either due to high aggregate credit card utilization
ratios or due to high costs of substituting to other credit cards, then the liquidity shocks transmitted
from banks can have real consequences by reducing consumers’ total credit card balances and con-
sumption through credit cards. Our data allow us to test for the impact of the short-term wholesale
funding shock on total credit card balances, because we can observe balances and credit limits on all
the credit cards of a consumer in our pre- and post-shock period. Therefore, we aggregate the credit
limits and credit balances for all the credit cards at the consumer level for the pre- and post-shock
period, then we take the log-difference to construct the change in total credit card limits and balances
from the pre- to the post-shock period.
Next, we construct a weighted average exposure measure at the consumer level called Weighted
Exposure, which measures the exposure of a consumer to the funding shock through their credit
limits. Weighted Exposure is constructed by weighting the bank’s exposure variable (i.e., the ratio
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of short-term wholesale funding to deposits) associated with a credit card by its credit limit as a
proportion of the consumer’s total credit limit. For the credit card–issuing banks that are not among
the 18 banks in our sample, we assume that their exposure to the short-term wholesale funding (and
thus their exposure to the liquidity shock) is zero. If we rely on this assumption, we could mis-
classify some banks as unexposed banks when in fact they experienced a liquidity shock due to the
contraction of short-term wholesale funding. As a result, some individuals would be misclassified as
unexposed or low-exposure individuals when they are actually high-exposure individuals. However,
such a misclassification will only underestimate any effect on the change in aggregate credit card
limits and spending.19
Table 3.5 presents results for the impact of the short-term wholesale funding shock on total
credit card balances. The coefficient associated with the Weighted Exposure variable in Column
(1) captures the aggregate effect of the funding shock on total credit card balances. If credit card
consumers are hedged with respect to their bank’s liquidity shocks, then the coefficient associated
with the Weighted Exposure should be close to zero and statistically insignificant.
It is also important to note that in Table 3.5, we do not control for Individual fixed effects because
our unit of observation is at the individual level rather than at the credit card level. As a consequence,
our results in Table 3.5 rely on a stronger identification assumption that credit demand and supply
factors are uncorrelated. However, our credit card–level analysis shows that it is less likely that
credit demand factors confound our analysis, because the coefficient associated with the exposure
variable is similar with or without the addition of Individual fixed effects (see Table 3.3), and this
coefficient also remains unchanged when we construct a leave-out mean credit supply measure for
a credit card account by excluding that credit card’s credit limit (see Table 3.4).
19This underestimation occurs for two reasons. First, the changes in credit limits and balances for the low-exposure
individuals will be biased downwards. This should be the case, because our prior “within” individual credit card–level
analysis, which was confined to the set of 18 banks that had a nonzero exposure to the short-term wholesale funding
shock, shows that a high exposure to the liquidity shock negatively affects credit limits and balances. Second, the
coefficient on the weighted average exposure measure captures the change in aggregate credit limits and balances for
the high-exposure individuals relative to the low-exposure individuals.
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In any case, to control for unobserved confounding factors, we include the 5-digit ZIP code
fixed effects and controls for the individual’s credit quality, such as the individual’s pre-shock credit
score, monthly income, debt-to-income ratio, credit card utilization, and credit card and mortgage
balances. The ZIP code fixed effects allow us to compare the changes in credit limits and balances
for two individuals within the same ZIP code. As a result, we can control for any common shocks
at the ZIP code level (e.g., changes in unemployment, house prices) that can affect an individual’s
total credit card balance.
Table 3.5: Effect of funding shock on aggregate credit card balances
The table shows the relation between funding shock-induced changes in total credit card limits on total credit card
balances. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of three semiannual archives. The pre-shock period includes
the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual archives, while the three semiannual archives for the post-
shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single
credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock periods by averaging across time. Then,
the credit card limits and balances are aggregated at the individual level and the change in total credit card limits and
total balances are computed by taking the log difference from the post- to the pre-shock period. Weighted exposure
is computed at the individual level by aggregating the weighted Exposure measure at the credit card–level, where the
weights assigned to a credit card are proportional to its credit limit. In Column (4), ∆ Aggregate CC limit is instrumented
by the Weighted exposure variable. Column(5) re-estimates the specifiction in Column (4) by using dollar changes in
credit limits and balances. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a significance
greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆ Agg. CC Limit ∆ Agg. CC Balance $∆ Agg. CC Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Weighted exposure -3.827*** -1.216**
(-9.56) (-2.55)
∆ Agg. CC limit 0.859***
(43.56)
∆ Agg. CC limit (instrumented) 0.318***
(2.87)
$∆ Agg. CC limit (instrumented) 0.071***
(13.03)
Zip-code FE X X X X X
Consumer quality X X X X X
N 133,501,009 133,501,009 133,501,009 133,501,009 133,501,009
Adj. R2 0.027 0.032 0.141 0.098 -0.938
F-stat (excl. instru) 91.386 104.48
Table 3.5, Column (1) and Column (2), show that a one standard deviation increase in the
weighted exposure measure reduces an individual’s total credit limit by 3.83% and the individ-
ual’s total credit card balance by 1.22% . Column (3) shows the OLS regression of the change in
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total credit balance on the change in total credit limit. The result in Column (3) indicates that a
1% reduction in total credit limits leads to a 0.86% reduction in total credit card balances. Column
(4) estimates the IV regression for the total credit balance changes on the total credit limit changes
by instrumenting the total credit limit by the weighted exposure variable. The point estimates in
Column (4) indicate that a 1% reduction in total credit limits leads to a 0.32% reduction in total
credit card balances. This estimate is smaller than the IV estimates in Table 3.3, Column (5), which
suggests that the effect of transmitted bank shock is smaller at the consumer level. However, the es-
timate in Column (5) is economically significant and thus suggests that the consumers were not able
to completely hedge away the short-term wholesale funding shock. In Column (5), we re-estimate
the specification in Column (4) by using dollar changes in credit limits and balances. The estimates
suggest that a $1 reduction in total credit limit led to 7 cents reduction in total credit balance. The
economic magnitude is comparable to that in [91], who estimate that a $1 decline in housing values
is associated with 5-7 cents reduction in consumption.
3.5 Heterogeneity of the funding shock: Are all consumers equally affected?
3.5.1 Credit card–level limits
In this section, we examine whether banks transmit their funding shocks equally across all con-
sumers. The cost of extending credit may vary significantly in the cross-section due to information
issues such as moral hazard and adverse selection ([79, 110, 109, 14]). For instance, the marginal
cost of extending credit should be higher for those individuals who are more likely to borrow out
of it and then default.20 Table 3.6 examines the heterogeneous effect of the short-term wholesale
funding shock on credit limits across credit cards. In Panel A, we explore the cross-sectional cuts
across credit cards that have different utilization ratios, because the marginal cost of extending credit
20For example, higher debt levels for consumers can cause higher defaults, because either (a) higher debt levels
increase a consumer’s sensitivity to liquidity shocks, (b) the consumer has an incentive to default strategically (i.e.,
moral hazard), or (c) consumers overborrow and default due to behavioral biases.
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to such consumers should be higher, since they are more likely to borrow on it. We group the credit
cards in our sample into three groups based on their pre-shock utilization ratios: low (≤ 50%), high
(50–90%), and very high (> 90%). The results in Table 3.6, Panel A, show that a one standard
deviation increase in a bank’s exposure to the wholesale funding shock reduces credit card limits
by 4.30% and 6.59% more for the high- and very high-utilization ratio credit cards, respectively,
relative to the low-utilization credit cards. Overall, the results in Table 3.6, Panel A, suggest that
banks transmitted the short-term wholesale funding shock disproportionately more to credit cards
with a higher utilization ratio.
In Table 3.6, Panels B, we perform cross-sectional cuts at the individual-level utilization ratio,
which is computed as the ratio of an individual’s total credit balance to the individual’s total credit
limit. The results in Panel B are similar, but stronger when compared Table 3.6, Panel A. For
instance, the results in Panel B indicate that a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s exposure
to the wholesale funding shock reduces credit card limits by 8.19% more for consumers with a total
utilization ratio of greater than 90% relative to the consumer with a total utilization ratio of less than
50%. In Table 3.6, Panel C, we find similar results when we conduct cross-sectional cuts on the
credit scores of consumers. Banks pass on their liquidity shocks to a greater extent to the subprime
consumers (FICO <620) than the prime consumers (FICO>680).
154
Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in bank response to funding shock
This table shows how banks pass on the short-term wholesale funding shock differentially across consumers. The dependence on short-term wholesale
funding (exposure) is measured as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. CC utilization (50–90%), and CC utilization (> 90%) are
indicator variables that equal 1 if the utilization ratio for a credit card is between 50% and 90% or greater than 90%, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Agg.
utilization (50–90%), and Agg. utilization (> 90%) are indicator variables that equal 1 if an individual’s aggregate utilization ratios, computed using all
the credit cards, is between 50% and 90% or greater than 90%, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Near-prime, and Subprime are indicator variables that equal
1 if an individual’s credit score is between 620 and 680 or lower than 620, respectively, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state
level. *, **, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Credit-card level utilization Panel B: Individual-level utilization Panel C: Credit score
Depvar: ∆CC Limit (1) Depvar: ∆CC Limit (2) Depvar: ∆CC Limit (3)
Exposure -4.052*** Exposure -4.232*** Exposure -4.038***
(-10.61) (-10.87) (-10.26)
Exposure×CC utilization (50–90%) -4.298*** Exposure×Agg. utilization (50–90%) -4.994*** Exposure×Near-prime -4.145***
(-10.61) (-11.68) (-9.92)
Exposure×CC utilization (>90%) -6.587*** Exposure×Agg. utilization (>90%) -8.185*** Exposure×Subprime -7.887***
(-15.16) (-15.37) (-14.88)
CC utilization (50–90) 9.099***
(19.55)
CC utilization (≥90) 7.997***
(10.32)
Individual FE X X X
Bank characteristics X X X
Bank performance X X X
Lending quality X X X
Credit card controls X X X
N 158,432,533 151,449,029 158,423,518
Adj. R2 0.089 0.089 0.089
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3.5.2 Credit card–level balances
Next, we examine the heterogeneous effect of credit limit cuts on credit balances across individuals
in Table 3.7, Panel A, at the credit card level. Consumers can substitute their affected credit cards
(i.e., cards with a credit limit cut) for other credit cards or other sources of credit (e.g., personal
loans, home equity line of credit). However, the ability to substitute away from an affected card
can vary across individuals. For instance, consumers with a high total credit card utilization across
all their cards should be less able to substitute away from their affected credit cards to their other
credit cards. As a result, for such individuals, a credit limit cut on their affected cards should have a
smaller effect on the credit balance on that card.
In Table 3.7, Panel A, we re-estimate our instrumented specification from Equation 3.2 by split-
ting our sample based on how easily a consumer can substitute away from an affected credit card.
Table 3.7, Panel A, shows that the relation between changes in credit limits and changes in credit
balances at the credit card level is positive and stronger for individuals with lower aggregate utiliza-
tion. For instance, consumers with a low aggregate credit card utilization ratio (0–50%) reduce their
balances on affected credit cards by 2.65% for a 1% reduction in the credit limit on that card. How-
ever, consumers with a higher aggregate credit card utilization appear to be unable to reduce their
spending in response to a credit limit cut. We also split our sample based on a consumer’s credit-
worthiness (measured by the FICO score), which proxies for the consumer’s ability to substitute the
affected credit card with other credit cards. Consistent with the results for aggregate utilization, the
elasticity of credit balances to credit limits at the credit card level increases with the creditworthiness
of the consumer.
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Table 3.7: Heterogeneity in consumer response to funding shock
This table shows consumers’ differential response to their credit limit cuts induced by their banks’ short-term wholesale
funding shock. Panel A shows cross-sectional variation in consumer response at the credit card-level similar to Table 3.3,
Column (5). Panel B shows cross-sectional variation in consumer response at the individual level similar to Table 3.5,
Column (4). Panel C is similar to Panel B, but the dependent variable is the total change in debt balances across
all debt-related accounts of the consumer. Columns (1)–(3) consist of subsamples of individuals whose aggregate
utilization ratios, computed using all the credit cards issued to them, is between 0–50%, 50–90%, and greater than 90%,
respectively. Columns (4)–(6) consist of subsamples of subprime (< 620), near-=prime (>= 620 and< 680), and prime
(>= 680) individuals, classified based on their credit score. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *,
**, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Credit card balances
Utilization Credit score
0-50% 50-90% 90%+ Sub-prime Near-prime Prime
Depvar: ∆ CC Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ CC limit (instrumented) 2.650*** -0.827** -2.393*** -2.018*** -0.172 2.959***
(5.58) (-2.31) (-3.15) (-4.16) (-0.51) (6.04)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Bank characteristics X X X X X X
Bank performance X X X X X X
Lending quality X X X X X X
Credit card controls X X X X X X
N 121,040,448 23,846,428 13,111,138 17,331,618 25,369,629 115,731,258
Adj. R2 0.102 0.131 -0.284 -0.326 0.197 0.069
F-stat (Excl. instru) 158.877 156.524 43.442 70.802 244.376 136.286
Panel B: Total credit card balances
Utilization Credit score
0-50% 50-90% 90%+ Sub-prime Near-prime Prime
Depvar: ∆ Agg. CC Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Agg. CC limit (instrumented) 0.232 1.078*** 1.325*** 1.475*** 0.639*** 0.120
(1.14) (21.11) (44.16) (36.59) (12.50) (0.66)
N 98,625,046 20,357,771 14,237,721 19,181,224 19,924,108 94,395,673
Adj. R2 0.079 0.285 0.254 0.099 0.205 0.058
F-stat (Excl. instru) 45.184 147.687 250.590 251.084 132.804 58.953
Panel C: Total debt balances
Utilization Credit score
0–50% 50–90% 90%+ Sub-prime Near-prime Prime
Depvar: ∆ Agg. Debt Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Agg. CC limit (instrumented) -0.890*** -0.001 0.199*** 0.596*** 0.123** -0.723***
(-4.91) (-0.03) (6.48) (10.23) (2.13) (-5.43)
N 99,045,677 20,421,935 14,380,579 19,551,761 20,007,886 94,598,483
Adj. R2 -0.238 0.058 0.117 0.070 0.073 -0.128
F-stat (Excl. instr) 45.863 148.713 249.066 246.854 133.895 58.965
Controls for Panels B and C
Zip-code FE X X X X X X
Consumer quality X X X X X X
157
3.5.3 Individual-level total credit card balances
Table 3.5 shows the average impact of the short-term wholesale funding shock on total credit card
balances. However, as discussed previously, the impact of the funding shock should be greater
for consumers who are more constrained and cannot costlessly substitute away from an affected
bank’s credit card. For instance, the transmission of the funding shock should have a greater impact
on the total credit card balances of individuals who have higher aggregate credit card utilization.
Thus, for such consumers, in contrast to the credit card–level analysis, a greater cut in their total
credit card limits should also lead to a greater reduction in their total credit card balances—i.e., we
should expect a positive relation between total credit limit changes and total balance changes at the
consumer level for consumers who cannot easily substitute away from their affected credit cards. In
Table 3.7, Panel B, we study the heterogeneous response of the total credit card balances to changes
in total credit limits due to the transmission of the short-term wholesale funding shock by splitting
the sample based on the aforementioned factors similar to Table 3.7, Panel A.
Consistent with our expectation, Columns (1)–(3) show that the relation between total credit
limit changes and total credit balance changes at the consumer level monotonically increases with
the aggregate utilization ratio. For instance, consumers with a low aggregate utilization ratio (0–
50%) do not change their total credit card balances despite experiencing credit limit cuts due to
the transmission of the short-term wholesale funding liquidity shock from their credit card–issuing
bank. That is, consumers with lower aggregate credit card utilization ratios are hedged from bank
liquidity shocks. However, for consumers with high aggregate utilization ratios (> 90%), a 1% cut
in total credit limits resulting from the transmission of the bank liquidity shock leads to an equivalent
1.33% reduction in total credit card balances.
In Columns (4)–(6), we split our sample based on a consumer’s creditworthiness and her ability
to access other less affected or unaffected credit cards proxied by her credit score. Consistent with
the results for the sample split on aggregate credit utilization, we find that the elasticity of total credit
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balances to total credit limits at the consumer level monotonically decreases with the creditworthi-
ness of the consumer. While prime borrowers’ credit card balances are unaffected by the transmitted
funding shocks, subprime borrowers reduce their total credit card balances by 1.48% for every 1%
reduction in total credit limits.
3.5.4 Individual-level total debt balances
Section 3.5.3 indicates that the liquidity shocks to banks that are transmitted through credit card lim-
its have an effect on the total credit card balances of consumers. This effect is more pronounced for
credit-constrained consumers who have higher credit card utilization ratios or lower credit scores.
In this section, we examine whether consumers seek other sources of credit to finance their con-
sumption and offset their credit limit cuts. If so, who is able to hedge away the liquidity shocks
transmitted through credit card limits by substituting to other sources of credit? We answer these
questions by studying the change in total debt balances aggregated over all credit accounts for an
individual. For instance, the total debt balance for an individual includes debt balances for home
equity line of credit (HELOC) and personal installment loans, which are likely substitutes for credit
card debt. We use the individual-level change in total debt balances as our dependent variable and
conduct a similar IV analysis as in Table 3.7, Panel B. Table 3.7, Panel C, reports the results.
Column (1) in Table 3.7, Panel C shows that consumers with a low aggregate credit card utiliza-
tion ratio (0–50%) do not exhibit a reduction in total debt balances, even though they experience
credit card limit cuts due to the funding shock. However, Column (3), which analyzes the high
aggregate credit card utilization ratio (> 90%) consumers, indicates that a 1% reduction in total
credit card limit resulting from the transmission of the funding shock leads to a 0.20% reduction
in total debt balances. We find similar results when splitting the sample based on credit scores in
Columns (4)–(6). Subprime and near-prime consumers have a 0.60% and 0.12% reduction in total
debt balances, respectively, for a 1% reduction in total credit card limits, while prime consumers do
not exhibit any reduction in their total debt balances in response to the short-term wholesale funding
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shock induced credit limit cuts.
Overall, these results show that the elasticity of total debt balances decreases in consumers’ abil-
ity to hedge. Our results on total debt balances show that some individuals, such as consumers with
higher utilization ratios or lower credit scores, were not able to hedge away the wholesale fund-
ing shock to their banks. As a result, these consumers were likely forced to reduce their aggregate
borrowing, which lowers their ability to smooth consumption.
There is an important caveat for the exclusion restriction of the IV analysis in the total debt
balance regressions in Table 3.7, Panel C. The IV’s exclusion restriction may be violated if the
short-term wholesale funding liquidity shock to banks also affects the credit supply of other types
of consumer credit. That is, if consumers also borrow other types of credit from their credit card
lenders, then the bank liquidity shock may be transmitted to the consumers’ total debt balances
through other types of credit in addition to credit card limits. However, this concern is somewhat
mitigated since we use credit card limits as weights to compute our weighted exposure. Regardless,
we present the reduced form analysis for Table 3.7, Panel C in Table C.7 where we regress the
total debt balance change on our weighted exposure measure directly. The main takeaways from
Table C.7 are unchanged as Table C.7 again shows that the high aggregate utilization ratio consumers
and the subprime consumers could not hedge away from their banks’ wholesale funding liquidity
shock.
Next, we conduct a similar analysis as in Table 3.7, Panel C, with HELOC revolving debt,
which is a substitute for credit card revolving debt. However, unlike the unsecured credit card debt,
HELOC is secured by an individual’s home. We compare the transmission of the wholesale funding
shock through HELOCs and credit cards using a horse race and find that banks mainly transmit
their funding shock through credit cards. Table C.8 presents these results. We compute a HELOC
exposure measure for an individual in similar fashion as the credit card exposure measure for an
individual: We weight the bank’s exposure variable (i.e., the ratio of short-term wholesale funding
to deposits) by the bank’s HELOC credit limit to the individual as a proportion of the individual’s
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total HELOC credit limit.21 We then instrument the individual’s HELOC credit limit change by the
weighted HELOC exposure measure in our IV analysis.
In order to compare the credit card channel to the HELOC channel, we limit our analysis to
consumers who have both a credit card and a HELOC. Table C.8 shows that the elasticity of the
total debt balances to the instrumented credit card limits is largely unchanged even after adding
the instrumented HELOC credit limits to our regressions. Moreover, the magnitude of the point
estimates for the subprime and near-prime borrowers indicate that banks transmitted the wholesale
funding shock primarily through credit cards as opposed to HELOCs even though both revolving
credit accounts were available to banks for transmitting the funding shock. Moreover, we find
that only 5.5% of the subprime borrowers and 11% of the near-prime borrowers in our sample
have HELOCs. This again indicates the the importance of the credit card channel in terms of its
availability to banks to pass on their funding shocks.
3.6 Long run effect of funding shock
Figure 3.7 plots the average credit limits extended by the high- and low-exposure banks relative to
the pre-shock period. The average credit limits are computed by averaging the total credit limits
extended by banks to all consumers across the high exposure (above median) and the low exposure
(below median) bank groups. The figure shows that, relative to pre-shock levels, the aggregate credit
limits extended by the high-exposure banks reduced more than the low-exposure banks in the first
two years after the short-term wholesale funding liquidity shock. This trend is consistent with the
high-exposure banks facing greater liquidity constraints than the low-exposure banks due to their
greater exposure to the short-term wholesale funding liquidity shock. After the first two years, the
aggregate credit limits extended by both types of banks recover close to their pre-shock levels within
10 years after the wholesale funding shock.
21Typically, individuals have only one HELOC account. Thus, for most individuals, HELOCs are aggregated over
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Figure 3.7: Long-run effect of the funding shock on aggregate credit supply
This figure plots the average credit limits extended by the high- and low-exposure banks relative to
the pre-shock period. The average credit limits are computed by averaging the total credit limits
extended by banks to all consumers across the high exposure (above median) and the low exposure
(below median) bank groups.
Figure 3.8 plots the long-run effect of the funding shock on total credit card balances for the sub-
prime, near-prime, and prime individuals. The coefficients in the plot are the elasticities estimated
using the specifications in Columns (4)–(6) in Table 3.7, Panel B, for each category of borrower
quality over time. We plot the negative elasticites (as opposed to elasticities) for the ease of inter-
preting the coefficients as the change in total credit card balances for a 1% reduction in the total
credit limits induced by the short-term wholesale funding shock. For each period, the changes in to-
tal credit limits and total credit balances for each individual are computed relative to their pre-shock
period values. Figure 3.8 shows a striking result — the effect of the short-term wholesale funding
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shock was persistent for the subprime and the near-prime consumers. That is the credit balances for
the more-exposed subprime and near-prime consumers were lower than the less-exposed subprime
and near-prime consumers even in the long run. However, Figure 3.8 shows that the effect of the
transmitted bank funding shock gradually dissipated over time for the prime consumers. Our results
suggest that either financing frictions for lower-quality borrowers are binding for a very long time,
or that the transmitted funding shock can itself weaken a borrower’s fundamentals, thereby limiting



















Figure 3.8: Long-run effect of the funding shock on total credit card balances
This figure plots the negative elasticities of total credit card balances to total credit card limits for subsamples of in-
dividuals with subprime (< 620), near-prime (≥ 620 and < 680), and prime (≥ 680) credit scores. To obtain these
elasticities, total credit card limits are instrumented by the individual’s pre-shock weighted exposure to the short-term
wholesale funding shock using the specification in Table 3.5, Column (4). The regressions are estimated at the individual
level. An individual’s weighted exposure is computed by aggregating the weightedExposuremeasure at the credit card
level, where the weights assigned to a credit card are proportional to its credit limit. The points represent coefficient
estimates, and the dashed vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that liquidity shocks to banks can transmit to consumers with significant
distributional consequences. We use micro data on credit limits and credit balances for the near
universe of 500 million credit cards issued to 134 million consumers to show how the dry-up of
the short-term wholesale funding for banks transmitted to consumers through credit cards. We
document a new channel – namely, credit card limits, through which banks transmitted their short-
term wholesale funding liquidity shocks to their consumers and affected their consumption through
credit cards.
We document significant heterogeneity in how banks transmit their liquidity shocks to consumers
through credit card limits. In general, banks passed on their liquidity shock to a greater extent
to credit-constrained consumers (e.g., consumers with lower credit scores and higher credit card
utilization). As credit-constrained consumers generally face greater credit market frictions, they
were unable to hedge away from the transmitted bank liquidity shocks and were forced to reduce
their consumption. Our results show that when banks face liquidity shocks, they are more likely to
pass on these shocks to those consumers who are least able to cope with them. Consequently, our
results show who bears the real costs of fragile bank funding structures and for how long.
Our results also contribute to the debate on post-crisis regulatory reform on banks’ funding struc-
tures that have become heavily reliant on wholesale funding. Our analysis provides estimates for the
elasticities of consumer-level credit limits and credit balances to wholesale funding across different
consumer groups, such as prime, subprime, and near-prime consumer groups. Thus, by providing
these elasticities, our results enrich the debate on the distributional effects of banks’ funding fragility
on consumers.
We also add to the understanding of why consumption declined during the Great Recession and
recovered slowly after the recession. Our results suggest that the impaired balance sheets of finan-
cial intermediaries played an important role. We document the credit card limits channel through
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which the financial health of intermediaries was transmitted to consumers. Although the total credit
supplied by banks through credit cards recovered subsequently, the impact of the funding shock was





APPENDIX FOR “REDUCING RISK OR REACHING FOR YIELD? IMPACT OF
STRESS TESTS ON CREDIT CARD LENDING”
Table A.1: Are results driven by bank-specific consumer demand?
This table shows the robustness of the relation between stress test exposure and bank risk-taking through credit card
limit growth to bank-specific consumer demand. Each pre-collection and post-results periods for any given stress test
cycle consists of two semiannual archives. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card–level
cross section separately in the pre– and post–stress test periods by averaging across time. Then, the dependent variable
is constructed as the growth in limits at the credit card–level from the pre– to the post–stress test period. Exposure is
computed as the difference between the starting value of banks’ Tier 1 ratios at the outset of the stress test and the lowest
capital ratio implied by the severely adverse stress scenario. Non-prime is an indicator that equals 1 if an individual’s
credit score is below 680 at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at
the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆ CC Limit (1) (2) (3)
Exposure -2.249*** -2.442***
(-6.73) (-7.55)
Exposure × Non-prime 1.125*** 1.024***
(6.31) (5.79)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X
Observations 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.213 0.509 0.972
Trade-level controls X X X
Bank-level controls X X
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Figure A.1: Estimation excluding each bank
This figure shows the coefficient β2 associated with my variable of interest, StressTestExposure×NonPrime, from
Equation (1.4) estimated by excluding each BHC from my sample one at a time. StressTestExposure is defined as
the difference between the tested BHC’s risk-based Tier 1 capital ratio at the outset of a stress test and the lowest implied
equivalent ratio in the severely adverse scenario for that testing cycle. NonPrime is dummy indicator that equals 1 for
consumers with credit scores under 680, and 0 otherwise. The circles in the plot represent the coefficient estimate β2
associated with StressTestExposure × NonPrime from Equation (1.4) after excluding the bank shown below the
plotted point on the x-axis. The solid vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals for the estimated coefficients.
The point estimates are ordered based on bank size. Thus, “Bank 1” (“Bank 23”) represents the coefficient estimate after
removing the largest (smallest) bank in my sample.
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Table A.2: Are stressed banks cutting limits to risky consumers? Additional proxies for consumer constraints
This table reports the robustness of the relation between stress test exposure and bank risk-taking through credit card limit growth to different
proxies for consumer constraints. Exposure refers to stress test exposure and is computed as the difference between banks’ starting Tier
1 ratio at the outset of a stress test cycle and the lowest implied Tier 1 ratio in the severely adverse stress scenario. In Panel A (Panel
B), consumer constraints are captured through credit card–level utilization (individual-level utilization). CC Utilization (50–90%) and CC
Utilization (>90%) are indicator variables that equal 1 if the utilization ratio of a credit card is between 50% and 90% or greater than 90%,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. Ind. Utilization (50–90%) and Ind. Utilization (>90%) are indicator variables that equal 1 if the individual’s
aggregate utilization ratio, computed using all credit cards issued to the consumer, is between 50% and 90% or greater than 90%, respectively,
and 0 otherwise. In Panel C, consumer constraints are measured using the debt-to-income ratio. Across all panels, consumers are sorted into
constrained and non-constrained groups at the outset of any given stress test cycle. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level.
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: CC utilization Panel B: Consumer utilization Panel C: Debt-to-income
Depvar: ∆CC Limit (1) Depvar: ∆CC Limit (2) Depvar: ∆CC Limit (3)
Exposure × CC util (50–90%) 5.112*** Exposure × Ind. util (50–90%) 3.888*** Exposure × DTI quintile 0.431**
(5.34) (4.38) (2.12)
Exposure × CC util (>90%) 4.564*** Exposure × Ind. util (>90%) 3.837***
(5.31) (4.33)
CC util (50–90%) 13.266***
(15.80)
CC util (>90%) 10.813***
(8.93)
N 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.207 0.214 0.214
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Table A.3: Robustness check: Alternative definitions of stress test exposure
This table reports the robustness of the relation between stress test exposure and bank risk-taking through credit card limit growth to alternative definitions
of stress test exposure. In Panel A, Exposure is computed as the difference between banks’ starting total risk-based capital ratio at the outset of a stress
test cycle and the lowest implied total risk-based ratio in the severely adverse stress scenario under DFAST disclosures. In Panel B, Exposure is defined
in terms of banks’ Tier 1 leverage ratios under DFAST disclosures. In Panel C, Exposure is defined in terms of banks’ Tier 1 risk-based capital ratios
under CCAR disclosures. In Panel D, stress-tested banks are compared to non-tested banks. For the 2012 and 2013 testing cycles, non-tested banks with
assets greater than $50 billion are chosen as a control group for stress-tested banks. For the 2014–2016 cycles, non-tested banks with assets greater than
$10 billion are chosen as a control group for stress-tested banks. Non-Prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit score is under 680
at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Panel B: Panel C: Panel D:
DFAST DFAST CCAR
Total Risk-Based Tier 1 Tier 1 Risk-Based Comparing
Capital Ratio Leverage Ratio Capital Ratio Stressed/Non-Stressed
Depvar: ∆ CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Exposure -4.422*** -3.778* -5.349** -9.449***
(-2.97) (-1.93) (-2.51) (-6.93)
Exposure × Non-prime 4.009*** 3.602*** 3.289** 2.916** 5.553*** 4.803*** 3.269*** 2.302***
(4.41) (3.94) (2.57) (2.39) (4.68) (4.51) (4.59) (3.06)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X X X
Observations 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 4,942,746 4,942,746
Adj. R2 0.193 0.202 0.192 0.202 0.194 0.213 0.086 0.225
Trade-level controls X X X X X X X X
Bank-level controls X X X X
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Table A.4: Robustness check: Bank-level clustering
This table reports the robustness of the relation between stress test exposure and bank risk-taking through credit card
limit growth to alternative clustering techniques. Exposure refers to stress test exposure and is computed as the dif-
ference between banks’ starting Tier 1 ratio at the outset of a stress test cycle and the lowest implied Tier 1 ratio in
the severely adverse stress scenario. Non-Prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit score
is below 680 at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank
level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Depvar: ∆ CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposure -5.382** -5.893*** -4.676** -4.925***
(-2.56) (-2.58) (-2.43) (-2.61)
Exposure × Non-prime 3.018** 3.010** 3.868*** 3.617***
(2.21) (2.21) (2.72) (2.59)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X
Observations 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.169 0.169 0.181 0.193 0.213
Trade-level controls X X X
Bank-level controls X
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Table A.5: Are cuts in credit limits driven along the extensive margin on the intensive margin?
This table examines whether the findings presented in Table 1.2 are driven along the intensive or extensive margins.
Intensive margin results are presented in Panel A. The sample is restricted to credit cards that remain open for up to one
year after the disclosure of stress test results for any given cycle. Panel B reports results for credit card closures along
the extensive margin. Exposure is computed as the difference between banks’ starting risk-based Tier 1 ratios at the
outset of a stress test cycle and the lowest implied Tier 1 ratio in the severely adverse stress scenario. Non-Prime is an
indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit score is below 680 at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and
0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Panel B:
Intensive margin Extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure -1.617*** 2.229**
(-8.11) (2.19)
Exposure × Non-prime 1.253*** 1.736*** -2.222*** -2.035***
(5.77) (6.67) (-3.36) (-3.01)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X X
Observations 8,116,284 8,116,284 10,071,409 10,071,409
Adj. R2 0.119 0.125 0.188 0.198
Trade-level controls X X X X
Bank-level controls X X
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Table A.6: Impact of consumer characteristics on trade-level delinquencies: Horse-racing specifications
This table reports results examining how the relationship between banks’ stress test exposure and credit card–level performance is affected by consumer
characteristics in a horse-racing setting. Exposure is computed as the difference between the starting value of banks’ Tier 1 ratios at the outset of the stress
test and the lowest capital ratio implied by the severely adverse stress scenario. Non-prime is an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual’s credit
score is below 680 at the outset of a given stress test cycle, and 0 otherwise. Panel A examines whether consumer income impacts card-level performance.
Panel B examines the role of consumer education, where No College is an indicator that equals 0 if the consumer holds a college degree, and 1 otherwise.
Lastly, Panel C examines the role of consumers’ job sophistication, where Non-Soph Job is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the consumer holds a job
that does not require sophisticated skills, and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–year level. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: 1(Delinquency) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Exposure × Non-Prime 0.453*** 0.421** 0.440** 0.434*** 0.467*** 0.464**
(2.78) (2.48) (2.28) (2.74) (2.95) (2.34)
Exposure × Income (log) -0.143*** -0.052** -0.037* -0.041**
(-4.87) (-2.37) (-1.85) (-2.49)
Exposure × No college 0.041*** 0.022** 0.017* 0.018*
(4.08) (2.34) (1.94) (1.69)
Exposure × Non-soph job 0.021 0.016 0.004
(1.45) (1.10) (0.34)
Consumer × ST Cycle FE X X X X X X X X X
Bank × ST Cycle FE X X X X X X X X X
Observations 10,071,409 8,082,699 8,082,699 8,088,998 8,088,998 8,082,699 2,786,075 2,786,075 2,784,200
Adj. R2 0.587 0.578 0.578 0.577 0.577 0.577 0.558 0.558 0.556
Trade-level controls X X X X X X X X X
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Table A.7: Stress-tested banks in each cycle
This table lists stress-tested banks for each round of stress tests. The ‘X’ symbol indicates that a bank was tested in the
respective year, and passed the test. The ‘X’ symbol identifies banks that did not pass the test conducted in the respective
year. Results for the 2011 CCAR are not publicly available.
SCAP CCAR CCAR/DFAST
Bank Holding Company 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Ally Financial Inc. X X X X X X X
American Express Company X X X X X X X
Bank of America Corporation X X X X X X X
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation X X X X X X X
BB&T Corporation X X X X X X X
Capital One Financial Corporation X X X X X X X
Citigroup Inc. X X X X X X X
Fifth Third Bancorp X X X X X X X
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. X X X X X X X
JPMorgan Chase & Co. X X X X X X X
KeyCorp X X X X X X X
Metlife, Inc. X X X
Morgan Stanley X X X X X X X
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. X X X X X X X
Regions Financial Corporation X X X X X X X
State Street Corporation X X X X X X X
SunTrust Banks, Inc. X X X X X X X
U.S. Bancorp X X X X X X X
Wells Fargo & Company X X X X X X X
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. X X X
Banco Santander, S.A. X X X
BancWest, Inc. X
Bank of Montreal X X X
Citizens Financial Group, Inc. X X X
Comerica Incorporated X X X
Deutsche Bank X X
Discover Financial Services X X X
HSBC Holdings PLC X X X
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated X X X
M&T Bank Corporation X X X
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. X X X
Northern Trust Corporation X X X
The Toronto-Dominion Bank X
Zions Bancorporation X X X
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR “IMPACT OF MARKETPLACE LENDING ON CONSUMERS’
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Figure B.1: Impact of MPL loans on total debt
This figure presents the average monthly trends for the total debt balances for the unmet and bank cohorts. In both
panels, the x-axis displays event time relative to the month of loan origination and the y-axis represents the total debt.
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Table B.1: Impact of MPL loans on future borrowing
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ overall debt levels in the months surrounding MPL loan origination.
Columns (1)–(2) and Columns (3)–(4) present the evolution of total non-mortgage debt and monthly debt payment,
respectively. Columns (1) and (3) (Columns (2) and (4)) report the regression results for the change in the borrowing
outcomes for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample of unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers).
Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each
event month specification, the independent variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the
benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit
zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(Total Non-MTG Debt) Log(Monthly Debt Payment)
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-period
−12 3.962∗∗∗ 0.236 -0.339∗∗ -1.039∗∗∗
(0.417) (0.301) (0.136) (0.134)
−6 2.874∗∗∗ 0.197 -0.002 -0.600∗∗∗
(0.584) (0.218) (0.066) (0.081)
−3 0.986∗∗∗ 0.126 -0.100 -0.271∗∗
(0.110) (0.135) (0.144) (0.121)
−2 0.591∗∗∗ 0.133 -0.079 -0.217∗∗
(0.058) (0.106) (0.106) (0.095)
Post-period
+0 36.493∗∗∗ 3.849∗∗∗ 29.579∗∗∗ 6.342∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.222) (0.221) (0.154)
+1 27.570∗∗∗ 4.376∗∗∗ 22.415∗∗∗ 8.071∗∗∗
(0.643) (0.194) (0.329) (0.182)
+2 28.645∗∗∗ 5.837∗∗∗ 22.177∗∗∗ 9.235∗∗∗
(0.990) (0.212) (0.485) (0.161)
+3 30.403∗∗∗ 6.996∗∗∗ 23.403∗∗∗ 10.106∗∗∗
(1.038) (0.262) (0.505) (0.212)
+6 32.129∗∗∗ 7.399∗∗∗ 24.783∗∗∗ 10.570∗∗∗
(1.075) (0.310) (0.562) (0.181)
+12 32.368∗∗∗ 7.698∗∗∗ 28.693∗∗∗ 12.186∗∗∗
(1.005) (0.511) (0.532) (0.286)
+18 30.111∗∗∗ 6.845∗∗∗ 30.483∗∗∗ 12.835∗∗∗
(1.097) (0.514) (0.602) (0.446)
+24 27.374∗∗∗ 6.069∗∗∗ 30.072∗∗∗ 12.661∗∗∗
(1.056) (0.498) (0.604) (0.468)
Cohort FE X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X
Other Controls X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.139 0.133 0.298 0.31
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Table B.2: Impact of MPL loans on future borrowing capacities (5% unmatched sample)
This table presents the evolution of the borrowing capacities of MPL borrowers in the months surrounding MPL loan
origination. Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) report results documenting the evolution of credit
card utilization ratios, credit scores, and credit card limits, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4),
and (6)) report the regression results for the change in borrowing capacities for the MPL borrowers relative to the unmet
credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers) in a 5% random sample of U.S. consumers. Each row represents a unique
event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification,
the independent variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual
borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination
year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Depvar: CC Utilization Credit Score Log(CC Limit)
MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs
Monthly DID Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
MPL Coefficient β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
−12 -1.387∗∗∗ -2.038∗∗∗ -0.783∗∗∗ -4.878∗∗∗ -3.395∗∗∗ -4.545∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.150) (0.302) (0.336) (0.320) (0.316)
−6 -0.825∗∗∗ -1.167∗∗∗ -0.550∗∗ -3.564∗∗∗ -1.393∗∗∗ -1.678∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.141) (0.233) (0.253) (0.195) (0.183)
−3 0.093 0.057 -0.192 -2.544∗∗∗ -0.314 -0.492∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.110) (0.188) (0.213) (0.221) (0.134)
−2 0.260∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗ -1.598∗∗∗ -0.079 -0.054
(0.097) (0.100) (0.152) (0.150) (0.144) (0.122)
Post-period
+0 -8.507∗∗∗ -2.659∗∗∗ 12.013∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗ 0.219 0.653∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.327) (0.555) (0.395) (0.246) (0.185)
+1 -27.184∗∗∗ -9.151∗∗∗ 37.003∗∗∗ 13.291∗∗∗ 0.271 1.124∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.397) (0.747) (0.847) (0.801) (0.236)
+2 -25.654∗∗∗ -7.749∗∗∗ 36.287∗∗∗ 12.581∗∗∗ 2.859∗∗∗ 2.757∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.400) (0.799) (0.763) (0.994) (0.298)
+3 -22.098∗∗∗ -6.483∗∗∗ 26.294∗∗∗ 4.353∗∗∗ 5.849∗∗∗ 4.266∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.400) (0.603) (0.597) (0.920) (0.364)
+6 -14.164∗∗∗ -3.371∗∗∗ 17.247∗∗∗ -0.649 11.435∗∗∗ 7.470∗∗∗
(0.409) (0.392) (0.623) (0.620) (1.035) (0.452)
+12 -7.066∗∗∗ -0.976∗∗∗ 5.660∗∗∗ -5.287∗∗∗ 15.821∗∗∗ 10.027∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.349) (0.718) (0.582) (1.054) (0.561)
+18 -4.493∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗∗ 0.666 -7.200∗∗∗ 15.215∗∗∗ 10.465∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.307) (0.745) (0.602) (1.098) (0.655)
+24 -3.729∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗ -3.130∗∗∗ -8.815∗∗∗ 13.999∗∗∗ 10.644∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.322) (0.692) (0.605) (0.987) (0.746)
Zipcode FE X X X X X X
Origination Month FE X X X X X X
Credit Score Bin FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Observations 410,964 136,177 410,964 136,177 410,964 136,177
Avg. Adj. R2 0.172 0.208 0.198 0.207 0.215 0.189
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Table B.3: Impact of MPL loans on future borrowing outcomes (5% unmatched sample)
This table presents the evolution of the borrowing outcomes of MPL borrowers in the months surrounding MPL loan
origination. Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) report results documenting the evolution of credit
card balances, default rates on credit cards, and default rates on non–credit card products, respectively. Columns (1),
(3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4), and (6)) report the regression results for the change in borrowing outcomes for the MPL
borrowers relative to the unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers) in a 5% random sample of U.S. consumers.
Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each
event month specification, the independent variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the
benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit
zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Depvar: Log(CC Balance) CC Defaults Non-CC Defaults
MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs MPL vs
Monthly DID Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
MPL Coefficient β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
−12 3.016∗∗∗ 3.591∗∗∗ -0.017 0.057 0.190∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.730) (0.900) (0.047) (0.049) (0.101) (0.108)
−6 2.297∗∗∗ 1.262 0.049 0.076∗∗ -0.019 0.116
(0.752) (0.771) (0.048) (0.037) (0.078) (0.079)
−3 1.323∗∗ 0.714 -0.023 0.036 0.024 0.092
(0.631) (0.677) (0.037) (0.044) (0.069) (0.058)
−2 1.275∗∗∗ 0.430 -0.031 0.013 -0.0001 0.056
(0.487) (0.448) (0.027) (0.032) (0.044) (0.046)
Post-period
+0 -24.044∗∗∗ -3.179∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.245∗∗∗ 0.028
(1.669) (1.221) (0.026) (0.027) (0.047) (0.049)
+1 -98.564∗∗∗ -16.122∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗ -0.030
(1.671) (1.923) (0.041) (0.025) (0.065) (0.074)
+2 -82.731∗∗∗ -4.569∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗ -0.060
(1.833) (1.808) (0.064) (0.042) (0.078) (0.076)
+3 -59.137∗∗∗ 1.573 -1.259∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -1.143∗∗∗ -0.121
(1.777) (1.744) (0.073) (0.045) (0.092) (0.083)
+6 -18.564∗∗∗ 12.635∗∗∗ -2.004∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -1.370∗∗∗ -0.109
(1.456) (1.551) (0.117) (0.095) (0.117) (0.133)
+12 10.158∗∗∗ 18.648∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ 0.155 -0.603∗∗∗ -0.005
(1.526) (1.644) (0.139) (0.139) (0.121) (0.137)
+18 17.730∗∗∗ 17.069∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(1.651) (2.036) (0.227) (0.178) (0.150) (0.162)
+24 19.016∗∗∗ 15.714∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(1.537) (1.778) (0.177) (0.171) (0.144) (0.128)
Zipcode FE X X X X X X
Origination Month FE X X X X X X
Credit Score Bin FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Observations 410,964 136,177 410,964 136,177 410,964 136,177
Avg. Adj. R2 0.168 0.158 0.188 0.109 0.028 0.023
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Table B.4: Impact of MPL loans on borrowing capacities with loan term controls
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ borrowing capacities in the months surrounding MPL loan orig-
ination for the bank cohort after controlling for loan terms. Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6)
present the evolution of credit card utilization ratios, credit scores, and credit card limits, respectively. Columns (1),
(3), and (5) report the regression results that control for loan amount and maturity. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report
regression results that additionally control for loan interest rates. Each row represents a unique event month relative to
the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable
captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CC Utilization Credit Scores Log(CC Limits)
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coefficient β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 -1.435∗∗∗ -1.234∗∗∗ -3.879∗∗∗ -3.120∗∗∗ -3.471∗∗∗ -3.017∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.114) (0.316) (0.291) (0.165) (0.163)
−6 -0.734∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -2.910∗∗∗ -2.326∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗∗ -1.161∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.094) (0.209) (0.186) (0.114) (0.116)
−3 -0.118∗∗ -0.007 -2.027∗∗∗ -1.675∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.197) (0.176) (0.077) (0.075)
−2 -0.042 0.028 -1.419∗∗∗ -1.145∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.046) (0.166) (0.156) (0.067) (0.064)
Post-period
+0 -0.907∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -0.090 0.791 0.330∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.391) (0.559) (0.528) (0.088) (0.090)
+1 -2.059∗∗∗ -2.549∗∗∗ 5.880∗∗∗ 7.433∗∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗
(0.441) (0.408) (1.152) (1.065) (0.189) (0.181)
+2 -0.512 -1.280∗∗∗ 5.049∗∗∗ 7.088∗∗∗ 2.163∗∗∗ 1.911∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.360) (0.955) (0.802) (0.238) (0.224)
+3 0.115 -0.796∗∗ -2.957∗∗∗ -1.265∗∗ 3.020∗∗∗ 2.791∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.347) (0.615) (0.500) (0.247) (0.245)
+6 1.645∗∗∗ 0.521∗ -5.814∗∗∗ -3.529∗∗∗ 4.293∗∗∗ 4.122∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.298) (0.603) (0.469) (0.360) (0.346)
+12 2.726∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗ -9.127∗∗∗ -5.773∗∗∗ 3.980∗∗∗ 4.263∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.246) (0.591) (0.592) (0.483) (0.450)
+18 2.837∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ -10.737∗∗∗ -7.128∗∗∗ 3.370∗∗∗ 4.236∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.346) (0.694) (0.721) (0.545) (0.480)
+24 2.913∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ -12.576∗∗∗ -9.224∗∗∗ 2.859∗∗∗ 4.114∗∗∗
(0.421) (0.429) (0.714) (0.719) (0.622) (0.530)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Amount and Maturity X X X X X X
Interest Rate X X X
# Cohorts 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393
Avg. Adj. R2 0.27 0.275 0.195 0.205 0.216 0.217
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Table B.5: Impact of MPL loans on future borrowing with loan term controls
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ overall debt levels in the months surrounding MPL loan origination
for the bank cohort after controlling for loan terms. Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present
the evolution of credit card balances, total balances, and debt-to-income ratios, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and
(5) report the regression results that control for loan amount and maturity. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report regression
results that additionally control for loan interest rates. Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month
of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures
the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors,
reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Log(CC Balance) Log(Total Debt) DTI Ratio
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coefficient β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 4.360∗∗∗ 4.282∗∗∗ -1.456∗∗∗ -1.218∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗ -0.227∗
(0.593) (0.628) (0.376) (0.399) (0.124) (0.132)
−6 2.043∗∗∗ 2.044∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -0.642∗∗ -0.403∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(0.601) (0.628) (0.245) (0.250) (0.109) (0.103)
−3 0.037 0.056 -0.562∗ -0.323 -0.137∗ -0.100
(0.293) (0.297) (0.320) (0.336) (0.083) (0.081)
−2 0.334∗ 0.345∗ -0.415 -0.307 -0.077 -0.066
(0.199) (0.199) (0.255) (0.271) (0.057) (0.058)
Post-period
+0 -2.617 -3.872∗∗ -0.366 -0.535∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ -0.028
(1.651) (1.749) (0.256) (0.247) (0.120) (0.091)
+1 2.459 -1.618 0.764∗∗∗ 0.367 1.564∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗
(2.708) (2.593) (0.287) (0.280) (0.140) (0.113)
+2 13.076∗∗∗ 8.035∗∗∗ 1.853∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 2.377∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗
(2.119) (1.852) (0.379) (0.399) (0.151) (0.134)
+3 14.922∗∗∗ 10.024∗∗∗ 2.825∗∗∗ 2.283∗∗∗ 2.360∗∗∗ 1.721∗∗∗
(2.091) (1.910) (0.446) (0.469) (0.156) (0.140)
+6 19.193∗∗∗ 14.591∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗
(1.362) (1.368) (0.320) (0.345) (0.156) (0.131)
+12 16.823∗∗∗ 13.423∗∗∗ 2.657∗∗∗ 2.079∗∗∗ 3.526∗∗∗ 2.380∗∗∗
(1.509) (1.743) (0.421) (0.463) (0.188) (0.193)
+18 16.527∗∗∗ 14.029∗∗∗ 3.637∗∗∗ 3.159∗∗∗ 4.899∗∗∗ 3.783∗∗∗
(1.959) (1.989) (0.532) (0.516) (0.282) (0.296)
+24 15.333∗∗∗ 13.128∗∗∗ 3.661∗∗∗ 3.476∗∗∗ 5.567∗∗∗ 4.780∗∗∗
(2.336) (2.272) (0.770) (0.786) (0.290) (0.316)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Amount and Maturity X X X X X X
Interest Rate X X X
# Cohorts 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393
Avg. Adj. R2 0.162 0.163 0.331 0.331 0.217 0.224
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Table B.6: Impact of MPL loans on default rates with loan term controls
This table presents the evolution of MPL borrowers’ default rates in the months surrounding MPL loan origination for
the bank cohort after controlling for loan terms. Columns (1)–(2) and Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present the
evolution of defaults on any kinds of debt, defaults on credit cards, and defaults on non–credit card products, respectively.
Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the regression results that control for loan amount and maturity. Columns (2), (4), and
(6) report regression results that additionally control for loan interest rates. Each row represents a unique event month
relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent
variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The
standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month
levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: All Defaults CC Defaults Non-CC Defaults
Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre-period
−12 0.200∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.004 0.003 0.199∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗
(0.070) (0.061) (0.035) (0.037) (0.072) (0.064)
−6 0.087 0.081 0.046 0.038 0.077 0.072
(0.062) (0.064) (0.035) (0.032) (0.063) (0.065)
−3 0.130∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.049∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.078∗
(0.056) (0.050) (0.027) (0.026) (0.050) (0.044)
−2 0.060∗ 0.049∗ 0.001 0.009 0.072∗∗ 0.049∗
(0.031) (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) (0.026)
Post-period
+0 0.028 0.030 0.021 0.017 0.014 0.019
(0.030) (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) (0.031) (0.031)
+1 0.086∗ 0.068 0.052∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.045 0.028
(0.048) (0.044) (0.024) (0.024) (0.045) (0.039)
+2 0.094∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.002 0.012 0.096∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.031) (0.031) (0.045) (0.042)
+3 0.059 0.096 -0.014 0.003 0.071 0.104∗∗
(0.064) (0.061) (0.044) (0.043) (0.057) (0.053)
+6 0.237∗∗ 0.139 0.197∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 0.094 0.030
(0.121) (0.110) (0.072) (0.066) (0.088) (0.079)
+12 0.844∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.195∗
(0.156) (0.128) (0.129) (0.101) (0.105) (0.108)
+18 0.933∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.861∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.149) (0.135) (0.166) (0.167) (0.114) (0.104)
+24 1.155∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.147) (0.159) (0.140) (0.132) (0.122)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Amount and Maturity X X X X X X
Interest Rate X X X
# Cohorts 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393 83,393
Avg. Adj. R2 0.115 0.116 0.122 0.123 0.061 0.061
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Table B.7: Adverse selection on liquidity constraints
This table presents results that examine the role of different measures of borrower indebtedness in explaining trends in
Non-CC defaults. Columns (1)–(2) and Columns (3)–(4) present the results for the unmet cohort and the bank cohort,
respectively. Columns (1) and (3) (Columns (2) and (4)) report the regression results that control for change in total debt
(change in debt-to-income ratio). Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origina-
tion by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures the differential response
of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are
double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: CC Defaults Non-CC Defaults
Monthly DID Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre-period horizon
−12 0.014 0.013 0.030 0.030 0.164∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)
−6 0.043∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.082 0.086∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.051) (0.051)
−3 -0.033∗ -0.032∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.035 0.036
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
−2 -0.024∗∗ -0.024∗ 0.004 0.004 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Post-period horizon
+0 -0.093∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ 0.003 0.003 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.764∗∗∗ 0.002 0.004
(0.012) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.030) (0.049) (0.020) (0.021)
+1 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ 0.010 0.006 -0.245∗∗∗ -0.821∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.054∗
(0.017) (0.026) (0.016) (0.017) (0.044) (0.060) (0.031) (0.032)
+2 -0.572∗∗∗ -1.157∗∗∗ -0.041∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -1.348∗∗∗ 0.008 -0.111∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.068) (0.022) (0.025) (0.049) (0.076) (0.031) (0.035)
+3 -1.017∗∗∗ -2.027∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.921∗∗∗ -1.976∗∗∗ -0.046∗ -0.255∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.104) (0.030) (0.033) (0.061) (0.082) (0.025) (0.029)
+6 -1.646∗∗∗ -3.473∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.708∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ -2.774∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.137) (0.052) (0.050) (0.069) (0.088) (0.072) (0.071)
+12 -0.423∗∗∗ -3.001∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗ -0.190 -2.506∗∗∗ 0.114 -0.847∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.057) (0.125) (0.079) (0.124) (0.067) (0.087) (0.063)
+18 0.879∗∗∗ -2.229∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ -0.831∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ -0.834∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.071) (0.115) (0.075) (0.119) (0.071) (0.088) (0.071)
+24 0.946∗∗∗ -2.064∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ -0.879∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ -1.650∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ -0.594∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.060) (0.091) (0.086) (0.093) (0.066) (0.100) (0.099)
Cohort FE X X X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X X X
∆Total Debt (−1, t) X X X X
∆DTI Ratio (−1, t) X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.086 0.173 0.082 0.166 0.029 0.091 0.042 0.097
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Table B.8: Impact of credit utilization changes on credit scores
This table presents results examining the factors that drive the increase in MPL borrowers’ credit scores after MPL
loan take-up. Columns (1) and (2) (Columns (3) and (4)) report the regression results for the change in credit scores
for the MPL borrowers relative to the matched sample of unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row
represents a unique event month relative to the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month
specification, the independent variable captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark
counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and
loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Credit Score
Monthly DID Unmet Cohort Bank Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-period
−12 -1.597∗∗∗ -1.597∗∗∗ -3.434∗∗∗ -3.434∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.286) (0.261) (0.261)
−6 -0.943∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗∗ -2.632∗∗∗ -2.632∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.126) (0.169) (0.169)
−3 -0.172 -0.172 -1.720∗∗∗ -1.720∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.127)
−2 0.215∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗ -1.084∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.110) (0.110)
Post-period
+0 12.493∗∗∗ 5.009∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗ -0.438∗∗
(0.656) (0.195) (0.499) (0.193)
+1 38.090∗∗∗ 10.361∗∗∗ 13.029∗∗∗ 6.730∗∗∗
(0.878) (0.484) (1.062) (0.642)
+2 37.365∗∗∗ 9.749∗∗∗ 12.354∗∗∗ 7.081∗∗∗
(0.994) (0.694) (0.977) (0.586)
+3 27.472∗∗∗ 3.746∗∗∗ 3.770∗∗∗ -0.329
(0.716) (0.424) (0.745) (0.357)
+6 18.284∗∗∗ 2.418∗∗∗ 0.131 -1.352∗∗∗
(0.724) (0.450) (0.727) (0.269)
+12 7.143∗∗∗ -0.153 -4.050∗∗∗ -2.722∗∗∗
(0.820) (0.576) (0.745) (0.403)
+18 1.798∗∗ -1.396∗∗ -5.527∗∗∗ -3.910∗∗∗
(0.870) (0.642) (0.713) (0.423)
+24 -2.153∗∗∗ -3.732∗∗∗ -6.538∗∗∗ -5.083∗∗∗
(0.725) (0.541) (0.629) (0.445)
Cohort FE X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X
Other Controls X X X X
∆CC Util (−1, t) X X
# Cohorts 347,172 347,172 118,148 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.171 0.451 0.175 0.505
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Table B.9: Credit demand around MPL loan take-up
This table presents the evolution of the credit demand of MPL borrowers in the months surrounding MPL loan origina-
tion. Columns (1) and (2) proxy credit demand through the number of hard inquiries for credit cards, while Columns
(3) and (4) proxy credit demand through the number of credit card accounts. Columns (1) and (3) (Columns (2) and
(4)) report the regression results for the change in credit demand for the MPL borrowers relative to a matched sample
of unmet credit demand borrowers (bank borrowers). Each row represents a unique event month relative to the month
of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable captures
the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard errors,
reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Depvar: Log(CC Hard Inquiries (#)) Log(CC Accounts (#))
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-period
−12 -3.035∗∗∗ -4.565∗∗∗ 0.160 -0.557∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.223) (0.154) (0.091)
−6 -1.799∗∗∗ -2.376∗∗∗ 0.194 -0.306∗∗∗
(0.174) (0.139) (0.180) (0.053)
−3 -1.134∗∗∗ -1.216∗∗∗ -0.153∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.091) (0.081) (0.039)
−2 -0.747∗∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ -0.061 -0.028
(0.063) (0.070) (0.046) (0.027)
Post-period
+0 -0.421 0.054 0.509∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.081) (0.118) (0.031)
+1 0.584∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.680 0.594∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.096) (0.500) (0.074)
+2 0.996∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 1.178∗ 0.939∗∗∗
(0.327) (0.108) (0.612) (0.087)
+3 1.328∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 1.277∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.119) (0.584) (0.093)
+6 2.115∗∗∗ 2.356∗∗∗ 2.884∗∗∗ 1.976∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.149) (0.569) (0.104)
+12 3.117∗∗∗ 3.477∗∗∗ 3.553∗∗∗ 2.450∗∗∗
(0.370) (0.212) (0.535) (0.137)
+18 3.583∗∗∗ 4.129∗∗∗ 2.889∗∗∗ 2.217∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.289) (0.536) (0.193)
+24 3.630∗∗∗ 4.614∗∗∗ 2.196∗∗∗ 2.070∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.323) (0.533) (0.232)
Cohort FE X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X
Other Controls X X X X
∆Credit Score (−1,+1) X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.084 0.08 0.16 0.135
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Table B.10: Impact of MPL loans on default rates by credit segment
This table presents the default rates of MPL borrowers’ in three separate credit segments – prime (credit scores over
680), near-prime (credit scores between 620 and 680), and subprime (credit scores under 620). Results are reported for
both the immediate horizon (3 months after loan origination) and the longer horizon (24 months after loan origination).
Columns (1)–(2), Columns (3)–(4), and Columns (5)–(6) present results for defaults on any kind of debt, defaults on
credit cards, and default on non–credit card products, respectively. Columns (1), (3), and (5) (Columns (2), (4), and (6))
report the regression results for the unmet cohort (bank cohort). Each row represents a unique event month relative to
the month of MPL loan origination by MPL borrowers. For each event month specification, the independent variable
captures the differential response of MPL borrowers relative to the benchmark counterfactual borrowers. The standard
errors, reported in parentheses, are double clustered at the 5-digit zip-code and loan origination year-month levels. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: All Defaults CC Defaults Non-CC Defaults
Unmet Bank Unmet Bank Unmet Bank
Monthly DID Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort Cohort
MPL Coef. β{t} (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-term (β+1)
MPL 0.010 0.076∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.039∗ -0.062 0.045
(0.047) (0.038) (0.019) (0.021) (0.044) (0.038)
MPL × Near-Prime -0.295∗∗∗ -0.055 -0.143∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.181∗∗∗ -0.084
(0.055) (0.067) (0.027) (0.032) (0.052) (0.059)
MPL × Subprime -1.792∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -1.282∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.218
(0.170) (0.168) (0.074) (0.093) (0.135) (0.147)
Long-term (β+24)
MPL 0.078 0.246∗∗ 0.101 0.213∗∗ -0.095 0.084
(0.113) (0.109) (0.089) (0.099) (0.080) (0.102)
MPL × Near-Prime 0.991∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.181) (0.092) (0.178) (0.110) (0.179)
MPL × Subprime 2.712∗∗∗ 0.766 1.583∗∗∗ 0.239 2.473∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.552) (0.220) (0.488) (0.244) (0.355)
Cohort FE X X X X X X
Matching Controls X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
# Cohorts 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148 347,172 118,148
Avg. Adj. R2 0.106 0.097 0.086 0.082 0.029 0.042
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR “SHOCKED BY BANK FUNDING SHOCKS: EVIDENCE FROM 500
MILLION CONSUMER CREDIT CARDS”
This appendix is divided into two sections. The first section documents excerpts from news articles
which provide anecdotal evidence for credit limit cuts in our post shock period which ranges from
2008–2010. The second section provides variable descriptions.
A Anecdotal evidence on credit limit cuts
1. “A July 30, 2008, report by Javelin Strategy & Research says that of the 13 top-tier credit
card issuers it surveyed, eight said that as a direct result of current economic conditions, they
had reduced consumers’ credit lines. It’s a move took Jerry Jacobs by surprise. About eight
months ago, one credit card bank reduced his $10,000 limit to $6,200, just above his card
balance. The Florida resident says he’s never missed a payment or been late with a bill, and
his phone calls to the company netted no real reason for the change.”
Source: https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/lending-crisis-
credit-score-cut-limits-1270.php
2. “After years of flooding Americans with credit card offers and sky-high credit lines, lenders
are sharply curtailing both, just as an eroding economy squeezes consumers. The pullback is
affecting even creditworthy consumers . . . Capital One, another big issuer, for example, has
aggressively shut down inactive accounts and reduced customer credit lines by 4.5 percent in
the second quarter from the previous period, according to regulatory filings.”
Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/business/29credit.html
3. “Credit card companies are not immune to the credit crisis, and one way they’re protecting
themselves is by lowering credit limits wherever and whenever they can. You might have a
perfect payment history and still wake up to a $5,000 card limit that’s been reduced to $500.
One of the biggest victims in this whole economic meltdown — besides the millions who’ve
lost their jobs – is the world’s financial liquidity reserve. That means there’s no credit any-
where because there’s no money to lend.”
Source: https://www.gobankingrates.com/credit-cards/advice/why-credit-
limits-cut/
4. “Many Americans have come to rely on credit cards to cover everyday expenses like gro-
ceries, gasoline and medical bills, in addition to big-ticket items and luxuries. While consumer
spending, the nation’s economic engine, has been surprisingly resilient of late, a more sweep-
ing reduction in credit card limits could pose serious challenges for hard-pressed consumers
and, in turn, the broader economy.”
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“Washington Mutual cut back the total credit lines available to its cardholders by nearly 10
percent in the first quarter of the year, according to an analysis of bank regulatory data. HSBC
HOldings, Target and Wells Fargo each trimmed their credit card lines by about 3 percent.”
Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/21/business/21credit.html
5. “Johann Beukes, a software engineering manager for Bankrate Inc. based in North Palm
Beach, Fla., logged on to American Express’ Web site recently to make a payment and dis-
covered his credit line had been reduced by $5,000, despite the fact that he’s been a cardholder
for more than 10 years and has a credit score north of 800.
“I called them up the next day and asked why they were doing this, since we’ve never had a
late payment,” he says.
After lodging complaints with three company representatives, Beukes finally was told that
his credit line was lowered because American Express wants to reduce its risk because of the
credit crisis. Nothing personal.”
Source: https://www.bankrate.com/finance/financial-literacy/coping-
with-cut-credit-1.aspx
6. “About one in five cardholders had their credit limits reduced recently, according to a [2008]
July survey by Consumer Action, a San Francisco-based consumer advocacy group.”
“Meredith Whitney, a banking analyst at Oppenheimer & Co., predicts card issuers will cut




Data for the following variable definitions were gathered from the quarterly bank holding company
Y-9C filings.
• Wholesale funding = Fed funds purchased + Repo + Other liabilities maturity < 1 yr + Other
liabilities maturity > 1 yr
• Short-term wholesale funding = Fed funds purchased + Repo + Other liabilities maturity < 1
yr
• Exposure = Short-term wholesale funding / Deposits
• Fed funds purchased = BHDMB993
• Repo (repurchase agreements) = BHCKB995
• Other liabilities maturity < 1 yr = BHCK2332
• Other liabilities maturity > 1 yr = BHCK2333
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• Assets = BHCK2170
• Deposits = BHDM6631 + BHDM6636 + BHFN6631 + BHFN6636
• Equity capital = BHCK3210
• Liquid assets = BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773 +
BHDMB987 + BHCKB989
• CC loans (credit card loans) = BHCKB538
• Mortgage loans = BHCK1410
• C&I loans (commercial and industrial loans) = BHCK1763 + BHCK1764
• Net income = BHCK4340
• ROE (return on equity) = Net income/Equity capital
• Non-perf loans (non-performing loans) = BHCK5525 + BHCK5526
• Risk-based capital ratio = (BHCK3792/BHCKA223)×100
• CC Business (%) = (CC loans / Assets)×100
• Non-Perf Loans (%) = (Non-perf loans/ Assets)×100
Data for the following variable definitions were gathered from the semi-annual archives of the credit
bureau data.
• Credit card delinquency = Average percentage of delinquent credit cards at the bank level
in the pre-shock period, where ‘delinquency’ is defined as being 90 days past due on the
minimum payment requirement on credit cards
• Total-debt related accounts = Total number of mortgage, auto, and student loan accounts
• Subprime (%) = Average percentage of subprime customers at the bank level in the pre-shock
period; customers with credit scores below 620 on the Vantage 3.0 scale are identified as
“subprime”
• Months CC open (log) = Number of months the credit card is open as of January 2008
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(d) Total liabilities
Figure C.1: Bank funding measures over time
The figure presents the trend of the various sources of funding as a proportion of assets for the banks in our sample over time. These data are gathered
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(d) Fed funds purchased
Figure C.2: Components of wholesale funding over time
The figure presents the trend of the various components of wholesale funding as a proportion of assets for the banks in our sample over time. These data
are gathered from the quarterly Y-9C filings of U.S. BHCs.
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Table C.1: Summary statistics at the consumer level
This table presents the summary statistics at the consumer level for the full sample and fixed effects model (FE) sample
using credit bureau data in the pre-shock period. The pre-shock period consists of three semiannual archives namely,
January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008. The data are collapsed to obtain a single consumer-level cross-section in
the pre-shock period by averaging across time.
Full Sample FE Sample
N Mean Median Std. dev. N Mean Median Std. dev.
Borrower fundamentals
Credit score 133,507,048 725 743 83.9 54,174,946 735 751 76.1
Monthly income ($) 133,507,048 3,735 3,583 1,436 53,867,498 3,963 3,750 1,388
Debt-to-income ratio (DTI) 133,507,048 28.4 23 26.8 53,127,992 31.2 27.3 25.7
Credit card debt
Credit card accounts 133,507,048 3.7 3 2.54 54,174,952 5.34 5 2.86
Credit card balance 133,507,048 4,985 1,980 7,459 54,174,952 7,505 3,655 9,724
Credit card utilization 120,364,050 0.29 0.16 0.31 51,166,136 0.27 0.15 0.29
Other debt
Total debt related accounts 132,104,446 8.69 7.67 5.3 53,385,332 10.8 10 5.65
Mortgage balance ($) 53,407,329 184,645 134,378 171,887 24,113,774 184,457 135,569 169,268
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Table C.2: Bank-level aggregate evidence
This table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding, the change in bank
funding, and the total credit card loans. The pre-shock period ranges from 2006Q1 to 2007Q4, and the post-shock
period ranges from 2009Q1 to 2010Q4. Bank-level variables are obtained from the quarterly BHC Y-9C and Call report
regulatory filings. The quarterly data are first collapsed to obtain a single bank-level cross-section separately in the
pre-shock and post-shock periods by averaging across time. Then, the change in bank funding and credit card loans is
computed by taking the log difference from the post- to the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale
funding (exposure) is measured as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. *, **, and *** indicate a
significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A: Dependence on short-term wholesale funding and change in bank funding
Depvar: ∆ST Wholesale ∆Wholesale ∆Tot Liabilities ∆Tot Equity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure -0.425*** -0.324*** -0.272*** -0.151
(-4.03) (-2.95) (-3.34) (-1.75)
Assets (log) 0.946*** 0.812*** 0.400*** 0.283*
(3.79) (3.57) (3.74) (1.80)
Constant -0.511** -0.324 0.148 0.254**
(-2.39) (-1.56) (1.24) (2.49)
N 18 18 18 18
Adj. R2 0.469 0.334 0.412 0.181
Orthog-Exposure R2 0.531 0.412 0.481 0.278
Panel B: Dependence on short-term wholesale funding and change in credit card loans
Depvar: ∆CC Loans (1) (2) (3)
Exposure -0.211* -0.197* -0.210**
(-1.89) (-1.81) (-2.26)
Assets (log) 0.011 -0.032 0.123
(0.04) (-0.11) (0.53)
CC Business (%) -0.237 -0.251
(-1.10) (-1.35)
Non-perf loans (%) 0.261
(1.61)
Constant 0.764*** 0.734*** 0.656***
(3.40) (3.41) (3.12)
N 18 18 18
Adj. R2 0.333 0.324 0.373
Orthog-Exposure R2 0.411
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Table C.3: Effect of funding shock on extensive margin
This table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and the opening and
closure of a credit card. The regressions are estimated at the credit card level. The dependent variable in Columns (1)
and (2) is New which is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a new card is issued by the bank in the post-shock
period (i.e., after July 2008), and is 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Columns (3) and (4) is Closed which is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if an existing credit card in the pre-shock period (i.e., prior to July 2008) is closed
in the post-shock period, and is 0 otherwise. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding (exposure) is measured
as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. The standard errors are clustered at the bank-state level.
*, **, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
New Cards Closed Cards
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure -1.974*** -2.340*** 4.358*** 4.345***
(-3.68) (-5.16) (4.76) (5.41)
Individual FE X X
Bank characteristics X X X X
Bank performance X X X X
Lending quality X X X X
Credit card controls X X
N 164,445,583 164,445,583 344,803,931 344,803,931
Adj. R2 0.020 0.057 0.028 0.192
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Table C.4: Robustness: Controlling for potential alternate channels
This table presents results assuaging concerns of a particular type of bank driving the baseline findings presented in
Table 3.2. The table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and the
change in credit card limits using the credit bureau data, where the focus is on individuals who hold multiple credit
cards issued by the same ‘type’ of bank. In column (1), bank type is determined by the size of the bank’s assets. Banks
with assets larger (smaller) than the sample median are classified as large (small) banks. Similarly, in columns (2), bank
type is determined through the banks’ capital ratios. In column (3), the sample of banks is partitioned into high- and low-
groups on the basis of unused credit card limits as a percentage of total extended credit cards limits. Finally, in column
(4), bank type is identified through lending quality, as proxied by the percentage of subprime borrowers constituting
the bank’s clientele. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of three semiannual archives. The pre-shock
period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual archives, while the three semiannual archives
for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010. Credit card–level data are first collapsed to
obtain a single credit card–level cross-section separately in the pre-shock and post-shock period by averaging across
time. Then the change in credit card limits is computed by taking the log difference from the post- to the pre-period.
The dependence on short-term wholesale funding (exposure) is measured as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding
to total deposits. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and ***, indicate a significance greater
than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Individual FE Size Cap ratio Unused CC limits % Subprime
interacted with Group: indicator indicator indicator indicator
Depvar: ∆CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure -4.792*** -5.558*** -5.911*** -3.195***
(-15.88) (-14.31) (-15.76) (-9.40)
Individual×Group FE X X X X
Bank characteristics X X X X
Bank performance X X X X
Lending quality X X X X
Credit card controls X X X X
N 131,652,681 118,081,930 155,904,113 131,574,880
Adj. R2 0.086 0.126 0.090 0.086
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Table C.5: Effect of funding shock on credit card limits: Individual-bank level analysis
This table shows the robustness of the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding and
the change in credit card limits and balances using individual-bank level analysis. Both the pre-shock and post-shock
periods consist of three semiannual archives. The pre-shock period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January
2008 semiannual archives, while the three semiannual archives for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009,
and January 2010. Individual-bank level data are first collapsed to obtain a single individual-bank level cross-section
separately in the pre-shock and post-shock periods by averaging across time. Then, the change in credit card limits is
computed by taking the log difference from the post- to the pre-shock period. The dependence on short-term wholesale
funding is measured as the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. We aggregate credit-card controls to
the individual-bank level. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *, **, and *** indicate a significance
greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.




∆ CC limit (instrumented) 2.578***
(5.21)
N 123,335,977 123,335,977 123,335,977
Adj. R2 0.062 0.112 0.067
F-stat (Excl. instru) 140.87
Individual FE X X X
Bank characteristics X X X
Bank performance X X X
Borrower quality X X X
Credit card controls X X X
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Table C.6: Effect of funding shock on credit card limits: Robustness
This table presents robustness for the baseline results in Table 3.2 with alternate measures for bank exposure and different
levels of clustering. The table shows the relation between the pre-shock dependence on short-term wholesale funding
and the change in credit card limits using the credit bureau data. Both the pre-shock and post-shock periods consist of
three semiannual archives. The pre-shock period includes the January 2007, July 2007, and January 2008 semiannual
archives, while the three semiannual archives for the post-shock period are January 2009, July 2009, and January 2010.
Credit card–level data are first collapsed to obtain a single credit card-level cross-section separately in the pre-shock
and post-shock period by averaging across time. Then the change in credit card limits is computed by taking the log
difference from the post- to the pre-period. The dependence on short-term wholesale funding (exposure) is measured as
the ratio of short-term wholesale funding to total deposits. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *,
**, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Depvar: ∆CC Limit (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposure (w.r.t. deposits) -4.750*** -4.750***
(-12.89) (-9.04)
Exposure (w.r.t. assets) -4.532*** -4.532***
(-11.72) (-7.17)
Individual FE X X X X
Bank characteristics X X X X
Bank performance X X X X
Lending quality X X X X
Credit card controls X X X X
N 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533 158,432,533
Adj. R2 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
Bank×State clustering X X
Bank clustering X X
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Table C.7: Reduced form: Heterogeneity in consumers’ total debt response to funding shock: Re-
duced form
This table shows results from reduced form regressions that examine consumers’ differential total debt response to their
banks’ short-term wholesale funding shock. Columns (1)–(3) consist of subsamples of individuals whose aggregate
utilization ratios, computed using all the credit cards issued to them, is between 0–50%, 50–90%, and greater than 90%,
respectively. Columns (4)–(6) consist of subsamples of subprime (< 620), near-=prime (>= 620 and< 680), and prime
(>= 680) individuals, classified based on their credit score. The standard errors are clustered at the bank–state level. *,
**, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Utilization Credit score
0–50% 50–90% >90% Subprime Near-prime Prime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weighted exposure 2.548*** 0.006 -1.421*** -4.914*** -0.575** 2.318***
(7.18) (0.03) (-5.76) (-10.12) (-2.00) (7.35)
Zip-code FE X X X X X X
Consumer quality X X X X X X
N 99,045,677 20,421,935 14,380,579 19,551,761 20,007,886 94,598,483
Adj. R2 0.017 0.059 0.070 0.071 0.043 0.023
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Table C.8: Heterogeneous effect of funding shock on total debt balance: Robustness
This table shows the robustness of the heterogeneous effects of credit card limit cuts induced by banks’ short-term
wholesale funding shock on total debt balance after controlling for HELOC limit cuts induced by banks’ short-term
wholesale funding shock. The dependent variable is the change in total debt balances across all debt-related accounts
of the consumer. The analysis focuses on individuals that have HELOCs prior to the funding shock. Subprime (< 620),
near-prime (>= 620 and < 680), and prime (>= 680) are classified based on the individual’s credit score before the
funding shock. The standard errors are double clustered at the credit card bank–state and HELOC bank–state level. *,
**, and ***, indicate a significance greater than 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Sub-prime Near-prime Prime
Depvar: ∆ Agg. Debt Balance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Agg. CC limit (instrumented) 0.217*** 0.255*** 0.068*** 0.069*** -0.162*** -0.159***
(7.88) (2.91) (6.82) (7.37) (-7.26) (-8.80)
∆ Agg. HELOC limit (instrumented) 0.246 -0.059 -0.239***
(0.52) (-0.56) (-3.38)
Zip-code FE X X X X X X
Consumer quality X X X X X X
N 1,079,680 1,079,680 2,197,811 2,197,811 15,092,835 15,092,835
Adj. R2 0.039 0.006 0.031 0.025 -0.008 -0.035
F-stat (Excl. instr) 96.78 153.85 107.81
Cond. F-stat (∆ Agg. CC limit) 16.29 133.38 105.63
Cond. F-stat (∆ Agg. HELOC limit) 13.61 119.77 24.82
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